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Abstract 
 
Wittgenstein’s mention of the term “phenomenology” in his writings from the 
middle period has long been regarded as puzzling by interpreters. It is striking to 
see him concerned with this philosophical approach, generally regarded as being 
foreign to the tradition of Russell and Frege, in which Wittgenstein’s thought is 
taken to have primarily developed. On the basis of partially unpublished material 
from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, this thesis provides a reconstruction of the rationale 
and fate of his peculiar notion of phenomenology, which he developed after his 
return to Cambridge in 1929. 
 
On the one hand, this notion is tributary to Wittgenstein’s longstanding task of 
the philosophical clarification of language. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s 
concern with phenomenology develops against the background of his 
reconsideration of the resources for clarification provided by his early philosophy. 
His 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” is elucidatory in this respect. 
The paper expresses a dissatisfaction with the Tractarian account of logical 
grammar and pleas for a “logical investigation of the phenomena themselves”. This 
plea echoes Wittgenstein’s conception of a “phenomenological language” in the 
manuscripts from the same period.  
 
The thesis discusses the intricacies of this conception and the reasons for 
Wittgenstein’s criticisms of it. By contrast to the prevalent view in the secondary 
literature, the discussion shows that he did not fully endorse for a definite period, 
and then suddenly abandoned, the idea of phenomenological language. 
Wittgenstein rather attempts to develop a viable means of clarification and 
philosophical expression through phenomenological language, while critically 
exploring the implications and consequences of this attempt at the very same 
time.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The theme of this thesis is Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology in the 
writings of his middle period. The aim of the present work is twofold. On the one 
hand, the aim is to provide a detailed account of phenomenology as Wittgenstein’s 
conceives of it. On the other hand, the aim is to explore his reflections on 
phenomenology as part of his reconsideration of his early philosophy. In this 
light, Wittgenstein’s engagement with the problem of phenomenology turns out 
to be faithful to his longstanding conception of philosophy as an activity of 
clarifying language and thought. At the same time, his concern with 
phenomenology is motivated by a recognition of some difficulties with the 
clarificatory resources available in the Tractarian philosophy.  
 A qualification of the phrase “middle Wittgenstein” is first in order. 
According to the classical view, the period designated by this phrase is 
circumscribed mostly negatively. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is read as consisting 
mainly in two phases. The first or the early phase would be marked by the 
Tractatus and pre-Tractarian works that led to its publication.1 The second or the 
late phase would be most notably marked by the Philosophical Investigations. 
Against this background, the middle period appears as a merely transitional 
period. It would be a transition from a first philosophy meant as definitive, to a 
collection of investigations, which, though not meant by Wittgenstein as 
definitive, are considered by readers to be quite sedimented. 
The present work aims at providing a more positive account of 
Wittgenstein’s middle period. This can be achieved by way of a focus on his 
explicit reflections on phenomenology, lasting from early 1929 until the Big 
Typescript, put together between 1932 and 1933. The task of exploring the middle 
period of Wittgenstein in this way is not without difficulties. At first sight, the 
interval between 1929 and 1933 appears to be one of the most experimental in his 
corpus of writings. One constantly encounters therein not only revisionary 
                                                     
1 These works comprise the “Notes on Logic” written in 1913 for Russell, the “Notes Dictated to G. E. 
Moore in Norway” in 1914, the wartime Notebooks written between 1914 and 1916 and the 
preliminary version of the Tractatus, known as the Prototractatus. 
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concerns with the Tractatus, but also constant revisions of these revisions. In this 
period, Wittgenstein does not only recognize limitations of his early philosophy. 
He also attempts at times to salvage bits and pieces of the Tractarian approach to 
the task of philosophical clarification. At other times, however, he tries out novel 
approaches to the same or similar problems previously addressed. The most 
striking novel approach considered thereby is phenomenology. While admitting 
the arguably unstable character of the reflections on phenomenology between 
1929 and 1933, I explore them as constituting a period of Wittgenstein’s 
development in its own right. 
Among the highlights of the writings from the middle period that are 
crucial to Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology, one should count the 
paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form”. It was written in early 1929, after 
Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. This piece was to be presented at a meeting 
of the Aristotelian Society. Although the paper was not presented there in the 
end, it was published, not without Wittgenstein’s reservations, in the proceedings 
of the event. Other, better known and more explored sources that are significant 
to Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology are Philosophical Remarks and 
Philosophical Grammar.  
There is, however, a problem with relying primarily on the latter two 
sources. In Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar, the highly 
selective and non-chronological presentation of middle Wittgenstein’s 
development makes the understanding of his conception of phenomenology 
particularly difficult. It is not only the understanding of the steps of this 
development that is made difficult. Rather, important aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
reflections on phenomenology, like his idea of phenomenological language, are 
not readily available through these writings.  
I will thus address the question of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology by 
giving priority to his reflections as they appear and as they are reconsidered in the 
context of his Nachlass. The Nachlass provides raw remarks contained in pocket 
Notebooks that Wittgenstein used to carry with him and which served primarily 
as material he wanted to expand upon. More refined and extended remarks are 
found in Manuscripts, written on the basis of the Notebooks. When the remarks 
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were considered to reach a more consolidated form, they were selected and 
reorganized in Typescripts, which Wittgenstein typed himself or dictated to 
someone else. Among the notable Dictations are the ones typed by Moritz Schlick. 
 Wittgenstein’s interactions with Schlick are significant sources for the 
exploration of the conception of phenomenology in the former’s middle period. 
Some of the actual discussions they engaged in are recorded by Waismann and 
these recordings have been published in the volume Wittgenstein and the Vienna 
Circle. Other discussions, with Waismann himself and with other members of the 
Vienna Circle found in this publication provide valuable points of comparison 
with the material in the Nachlass. 
The present work is guided by three main questions. The first question is 
that of the rationale of Wittgenstein’s reflections on phenomenology. 
Wittgenstein’s very mention of phenomenology has been long regarded as 
puzzling and unexpected in his writings.2 Various attempts have been made to 
compare Wittgenstein’s understanding of phenomenology with phenomenological 
approaches in the continental tradition. But the rationale of his own concern with 
phenomenology in light of his development remained a problem in need of 
further elucidation. 
 The second question addressed here is that of the specificity of 
phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s conception. A central aspect of this conception 
is the idea of phenomenological language. This is a medium that Wittgenstein 
envisages for philosophical expression and for the fulfillment of the task of 
philosophical clarification. My view in this respect is that understanding 
Wittgenstein’s view on phenomenology requires a detailed scrutiny of the 
development of the idea of phenomenological language.  
 The third question that guides the present study is that of Wittgenstein’s 
commitment to his conception of phenomenology. The unstable terrain of his 
middle period affects his view on phenomenology as well. One must thus ask 
whether Wittgenstein had a coherent view in this respect from 1929 to 1933. And 
                                                     
2 One of the first interpreters to draw attention to Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology was 
Herbert Spiegelberg in his paper “The Puzzle of Wittgenstein’s Phänomenologie (1929-?)”, initially 
published in 1968. 
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especially whether he fully endorses a notion of phenomenological language for a 
definite period of time. 
 By way of addressing these leading questions, I aim to shed light on some 
main concerns raised in the exegetic landscape. 
An influential view in studies of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology has been 
that this approach is found already in his early philosophy. A prominent 
proponent of this view is Jaakko Hintikka. A landmark study in this respect is the 
book he co-wrote in 1986, Investigating Wittgenstein. Hintikka defended his 
interpretation also in a series of articles collected in 1996 in the volume Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths. A leitmotif of the 
interpretation is that phenomenology is at work not only in the writings around 
1929 but already in the Tractatus. Hintikka understands phenomenology rather 
loosely, as an investigation of immediate experience. He takes the task of 
accounting for immediate experience to be a constant aim of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. Accordingly, the Tractatus would employ a phenomenology in an 
implicit way, which would be made explicit and would come to be ultimately 
discarded only after Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge. The leitmotif of this 
reading was followed by B.-C. Park in his 1997 book Phenomenological Aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy.  
 My discussion of the rationale of Wittgenstein’s conception of 
phenomenology challenges the view that this conception is at work already in the 
Tractatus. My claim is that he first envisages a phenomenology precisely while 
becoming dissatisfied with the Tractarian resources for philosophical clarification. 
The paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” is pivotal in this regard. In the paper 
Wittgenstein recognizes some difficulties with the applicability of the Tractarian 
account of the syntax for connectives. As a remedy, he envisages a logical 
investigation of the phenomena themselves. This appeal informs the development 
in manuscripts of his idea of phenomenological language.  
Another longstanding attempt in the literature has been to understand 
Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology as akin to that of Husserl’s. This line 
of inquiry started before Wittgenstein’s Nachlass was widely available. 
Interpreters have thus tried to pinpoint various points of convergence between 
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the Tractatus or the Philosophical Investigations on the one hand and Husserl’s 
philosophy on the other hand.3  This line of inquiry was continued after the 
publication of Philosophical Remarks and Philosophical Grammar and after 
interpreters had more access to Wittgenstein’s manuscripts. An influential 
comparison between Wittgenstein’s idea of phenomenology and continental 
phenomenology starting from Husserl was carried by Nicholas Gier in his 1981 
volume Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: a Comparative Study of the Later 
Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. One leading thread of 
Gier’s reading is that the development of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology follows 
the development of continental phenomenology, from a Husserlian position 
towards existential approaches. A key point in this comparison with Husserl is 
that Wittgenstein endorsed unconditionally the notion of synthetic a priori. 
Another leading thread of Gier’s reading, occurring in his 1990 paper 
“Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology Revisited”, is the attempt to trace in 
Wittgenstein’s writings a method of reduction that has an affinity to the 
phenomenological reduction. A similar attempt was made by Don Ihde in his 1975 
“Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological Reduction”.  
 My reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology shows 
that this conception does not rely on a notion of synthetic a priori. As I will point 
out, Wittgenstein suggests in a conversation with Schlick that he shares his view 
that the notion of synthetic a priori is not viable.4 At the same time, I attempt to 
make a contribution to the investigation of the question whether Wittgenstein’s 
conception of phenomenology involves a method of reduction. I will address this 
question, however, internally to Wittgenstein’s writings. In this respect, my 
reconstruction of his conception of phenomenological language provides a 
discussion of what he calls the “isolation” of sensory fields and of the multiple 
                                                     
3 Among the earliest attempts of this kind is that of Van Peursen in his 1959 paper “Edmund Husserl 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein”. 
4 This conversation is central also to Ray Monk’s recent critique of Gier’s claim that Wittgenstein 
endorsed unconditionally the notion of synthetic a priori. The critique is exposed in Monk’s paper 
“The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘Analytic a 
Posteriori’” from 2014. 
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facets of propositions and phenomena regarded as multidimensional grammatical 
structures.  
A further longstanding focus in studies of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology 
has been his notion of phenomenological language. The discussion of this notion is 
central to a significant study of Wittgenstein’s middle period: Wolfgang Kienzler’s 
volume from 1997 entitled Wittgensteins Wende zu seiner Spätphilosophie 1930-
1932: eine historische und systematische Darstellung. According to this reading, 
Wittgenstein fully endorses for  a period in 1929 the notion of phenomenological 
language, and then comes to suddenly abandon it. All his concerns with 
phenomenology are taken to cease at the same time. 
By way of a detailed examination of the conception of phenomenological 
language, I intend to show that Wittgenstein’s position in this respect is more 
complex than it was previously taken to be. This conception involves some crucial 
notions that have not received much attention so far. These are primarily the 
notions of verification and hypothesis. I will present Wittgenstein’s idea of 
phenomenological language as marked by various attempts to develop these 
notions and by various difficulties he faces at the very same time. In the Nachlass, 
Wittgenstein’s positive remarks on phenomenological language are mingled with 
related critical remarks that reveal a series of problems with this conception. This 
fact already challenges the view that he is fully endorsing the conception for a 
definite period of time. The view that Wittgenstein suddenly abandons 
phenomenological language is equally questioned by my discussion of the relevant 
remarks as they occur in their original context of the Nachlass. 
The present thesis will proceed as follows. The first chapter addresses the 
question of the rationale of Wittgenstein’s explicit interest in phenomenology 
from 1929 onwards. The chapter discusses this rationale in light of the approach to 
the so-called colour-exclusion issue provided in his 1929 paper “Some Remarks on 
Logical Form”. The issue is the impossibility of a fleck being of two colours 
simultaneously all over. The task is to account for the workings of simultaneous 
colour ascriptions. The paper in fact re-addresses this problem in light of the 
account of it already provided in the Tractatus. By comparing the Tractarian and 
the 1929 accounts of colour-exclusion, I will show that the paper ultimately 
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formulates a dissatisfaction with early Wittgenstein’s account of logical grammar. 
The incipient solution to the colour-exclusion problem in the 1929 paper involves 
a plea for a logical investigation of phenomena. This plea informs the idea of 
phenomenological language in manuscripts from the same period.  
The second chapter starts by discussing the view expressed in “Some 
Remarks on Logical Form” that ordinary language disguises logical structure. I 
then present a more robust version of this view on the basis of Wittgenstein’s 
manuscript remarks pertaining to the conception of phenomenological language. 
According to this conception, ordinary statements disguise their logical structure 
due to what Wittgenstein regards as their hypothetical character. Ordinary 
statements regarded as hypotheses are multifaceted grammatical structures that 
account for ordinary objects of experience, regarded in their turn as multifaceted 
phenomena. Wittgenstein regards, by contrast, phenomenological statements as 
single facetted grammatical structures that are directly verifiable by correlation to 
facets of phenomena isolated from one another. The idea of phenomenological 
language thus comes with a conception of verification as a universal method of 
clarification. 
The third chapter reconstructs Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea of 
phenomenological language. Some of the remarks that lead to this ultimate 
critique are mingled with those that support his attempts at positively developing 
the idea of phenomenological language. The chapter first discusses Wittgenstein’s 
consideration of a resort to ordinary language in the search for resources of 
clarification alternative to phenomenological language. This resort questions the 
privilege granted to phenomenological language as the adequate means of 
philosophical expression and clarification. I will then show that a major line of 
critique of phenomenological language is traced by Wittgenstein’s realization of a 
series of difficulties to carry out the method of verification in some particular 
cases. This realization points to a tension between the rigidity of the method of 
verification and the diversity of the functions and roles that ordinary propositions 
can have. I will also discuss a further problem with the idea of phenomenological 
language as pointed out by Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of its task. In order to 
provide a clarification of the workings of ordinary language, phenomenological 
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language is supposed to provide an immediate description of immediate 
experience. The task of providing such a description turns out to be ultimately 
unfulfillable.  
The fourth chapter discusses an application of the methodological 
reflections on phenomenological language. The application is to the clarification 
of the workings of propositions about pain. The idea of phenomenological 
language informs a uniform account of the workings of pain expressions. 
According to this account, the workings of all discourse about pain is reducible to 
the workings of pain expressions used in the first person. Pain expressions in the 
first person would be verifiable by comparison to immediate experience, or to 
what Wittgenstein calls in this context “mental states” of pain. The chapter then 
formulates a critique of this uniform account of the workings of pain expressions. 
The critique is based on Wittgenstein’s further investigations of the asymmetry 
between the workings of pain expressions in the first person as opposed to the 
second/third person. This asymmetry challenges the methodological requirement 
that a verification is possible and needed when attempting to understand and 
clarify every proposition whatsoever. I will finally draw some connections 
between the critique of the uniform account of pain expressions and the 
methodological critique of phenomenological language exposed in the third 
chapter. 
  
15 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE RATIONALE OF WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCERN WITH 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
It has been repeatedly suggested that a key to Wittgenstein’s puzzling remarks on 
phenomenology in manuscripts from 1929 and early 1930s may be found in his 
early 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form”5, despite his dissatisfaction 
with it6. The minimal agreement that Wittgenstein’s remarks on phenomenology 
are to be understood against the background of “Some Remarks on Logical Form” 
relies on a plea the paper makes for “the logical investigation of the phenomena 
themselves”. 
This plea and such readings of it raise the question: Why would a resort to 
a logical investigation of phenomena be required in the first place and what would 
its difficulties be, by contrast to a logic taken to be immune to vicissitudes of 
experience? 
 An answer can be provided by reassessing the significance of the 1929 
paper to remarks on phenomenology, considering that the rationale of these 
remarks reaches further back, to a Tractarian view. It is an ultimately problematic 
view, it will be maintained here, that the content neutral account for the syntax of 
connectives provided in the Tractatus is universal and applicable to any domain of 
discourse. Some problems that this view runs into are recognized precisely by 
                                                     
5 E.g. in the 1960s, Spiegelberg was drawing attention to the paper, noticing that it contains “some 
very telling anticipations” of Wittgenstein’s development, and was asking: “What else is missing 
here but the actual name ‘phenomenology’?” (Spiegelberg 1981 [1968]: pp. 207, 208 respectively); in 
the 1970s, Rhees was conjecturing: “Some remarks about ‘phenomenological language’ may refer to 
the earlier view in that paper.” (Rhees 1975: p. 349); in the 1980s, Gier was regarding the paper as 
the point where Wittgenstein “indirectly introduces the phenomenological programme of his 
middle period.” (Gier 1981: p. 106.)  
6 See his letter to Russell from July 1929 (Wittgenstein 1974: p. 99) and reprints of the paper in Copy 
& Beard (1966) and Wittgenstein (1993). The reassessment of the paper herein will suggest, 
however, that one is to take with a grain of salt Anscombe’s surmise that “little value can be set upon 
it as information about Wittgenstein’s ideas” (Copi & Beard 1966: p. 31, footnote). 
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“Some Remarks on Logical Form”, which focuses on the so called colour-exclusion 
case, to which a Tractarian approach turns out to be inconclusive, even for 
Wittgenstein himself by 1929.  
While not subscribing to a reading that may end up being itself exclusive, 
such as one that “Wittgenstein’s first philosophy collapsed over its inability to 
solve one problem – color exclusion”7, it will be observed that his approaches to 
this problem present far-reaching methodological aspects of his development. The 
1929 paper pleas for an approach that will scrutinize domains of discourse – later 
arguably qualified as propositional systems [Satzsysteme] – and will survey logico-
grammatical rules particular to each such domain, rules that ought not be taken, 
not without further investigation, to hold across domains. The survey of such 
rules, eventually carried out by a phenomenology, which Wittgenstein will 
characterize as the logic of content [der Logik des Inhalts], would be domain-
specific and content-sensitive, at odds with a Tractarian account of logical 
grammar.8 
The following discussion thus ultimately questions the view, defended by 
Hintikka, that a continuity between Wittgenstein’s philosophy amounts to an 
implicit employment of phenomenology already in the Tractatus.9 Wittgenstein’s 
concern with phenomenology is rather motivated by his dissatisfaction in the 
middle period with the Tractarian resources for philosophical clarification. The 
focus on the colour-exclusion case is particularly revealing in this respect.   
 This first chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 exposes a doubt about 
the Tractarian account of logical grammar. The doubt, gathered from Ramsey’s 
review of the Tractatus, is whether any proposition taken to express logical 
impossibility – like the impossibility of one visual fleck of two colours 
simultaneously all over – involves, or is analyzable into, contradiction. Section 1.2 
makes a case that Ramsey’s doubt is taken on board by “Some Remarks on Logical 
                                                     
7 Hacker (1972: p. 86). 
8 According to the Tractatus, such an account would have essential [wesentlich] or logical general 
validity [logische Allgemeingültigkeit] as opposed to the accidental general validity [zufällige 
Allgemeingültigkeit], e.g. of the proposition “all men are mortal” (cf. TLP: 6.1232).  
9 Cf. Hintikka & Hintikka (1986), Hintikka (1996). 
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Form”, while it turns out that a proposition asserting that something is of two 
colours simultaneously all over expresses “exclusion”, yet cannot be analyzed into 
contradiction. Section 1.3 reconstructs a mirror-image of early Wittgenstein’s 
approach to the colour-exclusion case, found in Schlick’s approach to a 
proposition asserting that something cannot be of two colours simultaneously all 
over, as expressing necessity and as amounting to tautology. Section 1.4 formulates 
two replies to Schlick’s approach: a mid-Wittgensteinian reply, informed by the 
1929 paper, and middle Wittgenstein’s own reply, recorded by Waismann. Section 
1.5 addresses the question whether a logical investigation of the phenomena 
themselves and the phenomenology it turns into – whether both or one of these, 
amount to a logic or to an application of logic. This distinction is generally 
overlooked in literature on Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and on colour-
exclusion in particular.10  
 
1.1 Colour-exclusion and Ramsey’s review of the Tractatus 
 
A doubt about the Tractatus’s account of logical grammar can be gathered from 
the following passage in Ramsey’s review of the book: 
 
[T]he only necessity is that of tautology, the only impossibility that of 
contradiction. There is great difficulty in holding this; for Mr. 
Wittgenstein admits that a point in the visual field cannot be both red and 
blue; and, indeed, otherwise, since he thinks induction has no logical 
basis, we should have no reason for thinking that we may not come upon 
a visual point which is both red and blue. Hence he says that ‘This is both 
red and blue’ is a contradiction. This implies that the apparently simple 
concepts red, blue (supposing us to mean by those words absolutely 
specific shades) are really complex and formally incompatible. He tries to 
show how this may be, by analysing them in terms of vibrations. But even 
supposing that the physicist thus provides an analysis of what we mean by 
                                                     
10 The distinction is not overlooked by Silva (2012), who provides the most extensive treatment of 
colour-exclusion in Wittgenstein. This treatment is, however, questioned here in some respects. 
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‘red’ Mr. Wittgenstein is only reducing the difficulty to that of the 
necessary properties of space, time, and matter, or the ether. He explicitly 
makes it depend on the impossibility of a particle being in two places at 
the same time. These necessary properties of space and time are hardly 
capable of a further reduction of this kind.11 
 
I will first discuss the Tractarian background of Ramsey’s reading according to 
which, for early Wittgenstein, the only necessity is that of tautology and the only 
impossibility is that of contradiction (subsection 1.1.1). I will then explore an 
attempt at relying on induction while accounting for the issue that a visual fleck 
cannot be both red and blue. As Ramsey observes, the Tractatus rejects such an 
attempt (1.1.2). Finally, I will question Ramsey’s charge that the Tractatus ends up 
relying on physical laws while attempting to account for the impossibility of a 
visual fleck being of two colours simultaneously (subsection 1.1.3). 
 
1.1.1 A Tractarian background 
The first sentence of the quote draws primarily upon two Tractarian remarks. One 
is that: “[Just] as there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical 
impossibility.”12 What is involved here is uniqueness: the only necessity is logical, 
the only impossibility is logical. The other remark is: “The truth of tautology is 
certain, of propositions possible, of contradiction impossible. | (Certain, possible, 
impossible: here we have an indication of that gradation which we need in the 
theory of probability.)”13  What is involved here is an incipient concern with 
modality: certainty, possibility, and impossibility mark the gradations of modality; 
certainty is exhibited by tautology, possibility by propositions, impossibility by 
contradiction.  
                                                     
11 Ramsey (1923: p. 473). 
12 TLP: 6.375. The German “wie” is not a conditional equivalent to the English “since”; the phrase 
“there is only a logical necessity” is not a condition of the phrase “there is only a logical 
impossibility”. 
13 TLP: 4.464; cf. Nb 102: p. 29r [dated 12 November 1914] / N: p. 29. 
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Two observations are in order. On one side, tautology and contradiction 
are characterized in terms of truth. On the other, they are not propositions 
proper. They are limit cases [Grenzfälle] of signs combination, namely, their 
dissolution, or extreme cases [extreme Fälle] of truth-conditions14, the only cases 
where truth-operations yield throughout respectively truth and falsity. Some 
combinations of propositions amount to tautology or contradiction in virtue of 
their logical forms exhibited by truth-operations.  
What such propositions say, their content, is not the primary focus of 
analysis. If form is all-pervasive of content, then form can be exhibited through 
analysis without troubling ourselves, as the Tractatus puts it, with a sense of such 
propositions or a meaning of their words.15 This is a corollary of the truth of 
tautology being certain and that of contradiction being impossible – a corollary of 
tautology having no truth-conditions, being unconditionally true, and of 
contradiction being on no condition true; tautology and contradiction say 
nothing, are senseless, nonetheless not nonsensical: they belong to the symbolism 
of logic like “0” belongs to the symbolism of arithmetic16. 
This is a background of Ramsey’s drawing on the remark involving 
uniqueness and on the one concerning modality to the effect that the only 
necessity would be that of tautology and the only impossibility that of 
contradiction. 
 
1.1.2 Induction and forecast 
Ramsey observes that early Wittgenstein admits that a visual fleck cannot be red 
and blue – red and blue simultaneously all over – and that “cannot” expresses 
impossibility.  
What is in question here? It is not that a fleck is not red and blue or that it 
has not been so. Rather it cannot be so. This is not established by way of 
induction, which, in line with Ramsey’s reminder, does not have a logical basis in 
                                                     
14 TLP: 4.446d, 4.46a respectively. 
15 Cf. TLP: 6.126b; 3.33.  
16 TLP: 4.461b, 4.461a, 4.461c, 4.4611. 
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the Tractatus 17 . Induction could not establish necessity, though it may be 
employed as an aspiration to this, in light of tendencies or constancies of pertinent 
factual cases.  
Induction would rely here upon much less, upon a lack of pertinent 
factual cases. Forecasting that a fleck cannot be red and blue in virtue of induction 
would rely on factual cases of a fleck being so, not being or having been recorded. 
That would not dismiss the possibility that such factual cases could be or could 
have been recorded. “A fleck cannot be red and blue” would be tantamount to “A 
fleck is not (recorded to be) red and blue” or to “A fleck has not been (recorded to 
be) red and blue”. Such propositions would be of the form of “Swans are not 
(recorded to be) black” or “Swans have not been (recorded to be) black”. A 
proposition denying the possibility of a fleck being red and blue would be a 
negation of a proposition affirming the possibility of a fleck being so, just as a 
proposition denying the possibility of swans being black would be a negation of a 
proposition affirming the possibility of swans being black. Both affirmative 
propositions together with their negations would be propositions proper, sensical 
propositions, expressing neither necessity nor impossibility, but possibility 
throughout. A fleck being red and blue would be a possibility – logically – no less 
tenable than a fleck not being so, just as swans being black is a possibility – 
logically – no less tenable than swans not being black. In the end it would be as if 
philosophers, contrarily to their forecast, could in fact witness a fleck being red 
and blue simultaneously all over, just as explorers, contrarily to their forecast, 
have in fact witnessed swans being black more or less all over. 
Ramsey yet appeals to Wittgenstein’s insistence that a visual fleck red and 
blue simultaneously all over is an impossibility. This insistence, coupled with the 
view that the only impossibility is that of contradiction, involves that “This is red 
and blue simultaneously all over” amounts to contradiction. The Tractatus pleas 
for this: “The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at 
the same time, is a contradiction.”18 Nevertheless, that the proposition amounts to 
contradiction is far from obvious. “This is red and blue” is not of the form of p & 
                                                     
17 Cf. TLP: 6.3631; 6.31. 
18 TLP: 6.3751c. 
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not-p, like “This is red and (this is) not red”. “This is blue” is not substitutable with 
“This is not red”: if a visual fleck is blue, then it is not red, but if it is not red it 
need not be blue.19 Then, if “This is red and blue” boiled down to contradiction, it 
would be a contradiction to be unveiled by analysis. That would involve that 
colour concepts like “red” and “blue”, while apparently simple, were complex, 
amenable to a further analysis which would reveal that and where contradiction 
actually occurs.  
  
1.1.3 Analysis: logical and physical 
On the task of revealing a contradiction in this respect, Ramsey charges 
Wittgenstein to not have gone far enough, or to have taken too easy a way out. 
Instead of carrying out a logical analysis of colour-exclusion or pointing a way 
therein, the Tractatus would analyze colour concepts in terms of vibrations, thus 
seeking shelter in physics. The difficulty with the impossibility of one fleck of two 
colours simultaneously, would be made, in Ramsey’s words, to “depend” on the 
impossibility of one particle in two places at one time. Conversely, the necessity 
that one fleck be of no more than one colour at a given time would boil down to 
necessary properties like those of space and time. Ramsey doubts that such a resort 
leads anywhere as far as a logical account of colour-exclusion is concerned.  
Established thereby would be only physical impossibility or physical 
necessity, if anything at all. In the best scenario, a logical analysis of colour-
exclusion would have to be carried out via a logical analysis of propositions 
expressing physical laws, while the unavoidability or even viability of such a 
detour would be far from obvious. If started in this way, logical analysis would 
have to go on, insofar as saying that a particle cannot be in two places at one time 
is not closer, than saying that one fleck cannot be of two colours simultaneously, 
to the point where a contradiction is exhibited. A proposition saying that a 
                                                     
19 Nor is “This is red and blue” mutually substitutable with “This is red and [this is] not red”. For, if 
“This is not red” is taken to say something substantial, that this is of another colour than red, then 
the proposition has a greater logical multiplicity than “This is blue”, as the former allows and the 
latter does not, for something being e.g. green; if “This is not red” is taken to not say anything 
substantial, then it cannot substitute “This is blue”, which does say that something is blue. 
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particle is in the places P1 and P2 at one time is not of the form of p & not-p, like a 
proposition saying that a particle is in the place P1 and not in the place P1.  
In the worst scenario, the detour through physics could lead to a dead-
end, especially if Ramsey is right that necessary properties of space and time are 
not amenable to a further analysis of the kind needed in the first place.  
 The following may not dispel Ramsey’s dissatisfaction, but it may be 
observed that the Tractarian remark in question does not exactly make the 
difficulty “depend” on physical matters. The remark insists that “two colours, e.g. 
to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible” and then 
suggests: “Let us consider how this contradiction presents itself in physics. 
Somewhat as follows: That a particle cannot at the same time have two velocities, 
i.e. that at the same time it cannot be in two places, i.e. that particles in two places 
at the same time cannot be identical.”20 The insight from physics is thus not meant 
to substantiate either a view that one fleck of two colours is an impossibility, or a 
view that saying so is a contradiction or analyzable into one. It is rather a 
reminder of “how this contradiction presents itself [sich… darstellt] in physics”, 
providing an alternative presentation or description of the difficulty. However, it 
is true that a manuscript version of this remark reads:  “That a particle cannot be 
at the same time in two places looks more like a logical impossibility.”21 This may 
justify Ramsey’s understanding of early Wittgenstein’s approach to colour-
exclusion as involving, in one way or another, a resort to physics. Then at least a 
pre-Tractarian surmise that a particle in two places at one time amounts to logical 
impossibility, would simply compete with Ramsey’s surmise that necessary 
properties of space and time are not amenable to a logical analysis that could solve 
the colour-exclusion case. Neither a pre-Tractarian Wittgenstein nor Ramsey yet 
give further clues of how their surmises would turn out to be conclusive.  
There remains the question whether even the only logical impossibility is 
that of contradiction, and in particular whether the logical impossibility of one 
                                                     
20 TLP: 6.3751b. 
21 Nb 103: pp. 46r-47r [dated 16 August 1916] / N: p. 81 tr. mod. 
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fleck of two colours simultaneously all over is analyzable into contradiction.22 If 
the answer turned out to be negative, then the colour-exclusion case would cast 
doubt about a reducibility or analyzability of any proposition expressing logical 
impossibility to or into a contradiction.  
 
1.2 Contradiction and exclusion in “Some Remarks on Logical Form” 
 
Given the exchanges between Wittgenstein and Ramsey after the publication of 
the Tractatus and their conversations after the former’s return to Cambridge, it 
may be expected that Wittgenstein gave some thought to Ramsey’s doubt. It may 
be particularly expected that Wittgenstein attempted to carry out a logical 
analysis of colour ascriptions.23 
This is precisely what “Some Remarks on Logical Form” evinces. 
Accordingly, an ascription of colour, say, red at a time T in a place P can be 
symbolized as “R P T”. Already before analyzing the proposition further, it would 
be “clear to most of us here, and to all of us in ordinary life” that the proposition 
stands in “some sort of contradiction” with “B P T”, an ascription of another 
colour, say, blue at the same time T in the same place B. Wittgenstein adds: 
 
Now, if statements of degree were analyzable – as I used to think – we 
could explain this contradiction by saying that the colour R contains all 
degrees of R and none of B and that the colour B contains all degrees of B 
and none of R.24  
                                                     
22  This account of necessity and impossibility concerns what and how truth-operations with 
propositions exhibit. An eventual necessity of conditions for propositions to make sense does not 
immediately fall within this scope, something Ramsey is aware of: “But not all apparently necessary 
truths can be supposed, or are by Mr. Wittgenstein supposed, to be tautologies. There are also the 
internal properties of which it is unthinkable that their objects do not possess them.” (Ramsey 1923: 
pp. 473-474.) 
23 This attempt to find an expected hidden contradiction is paralleled by – and perhaps triggered –  
middle Wittgenstein’s further concerns with the question of encountering an unexpected hidden 
contradiction (cf. WWK: pp. 120, 127, 174,  208.)  
24 SRLF: p. 33. 
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I will first explain the claim in Wittgenstein’s paper that ascriptions of colour 
degree cannot be further analyzed (subsection 1.2.1). Then I will explore the 
problem posed for the Tractarian approach by the issue that the logical product 
does not handle truth-values of simultaneous colour ascriptions in the way 
foreseeable through truth-tables (subsection 1.2.2). I will end this section by 
pointing out that the problem is aggravated by the fact that other, though not all, 
truth-operations handle truth-values of simultaneous colour ascriptions in 
similarly unforeseeable ways (subsection 1.2.3).  
 
1.2.1 Ascriptions of colour degree are un-analyzabile 
What is questioned in the last quote is whether an expected contradiction 
between ascriptions of colour appears as a contradiction between ascriptions of 
colour degrees across a colour spectrum. Ascribing red would boil down to 
ascribing some colour degree or some interval of colour degrees as opposed to 
ascribing blue, namely, another degree or interval. Colour-exclusion would be a 
matter of contradiction between simultaneous ascriptions of colour degrees to one 
and the same visual fleck.  
However, this approach would not lead far enough: two simultaneous 
ascriptions of colour degrees, just as two simultaneous ascriptions of colour, are 
not of the form of p & not-p. Just as “This is red and blue” is not of the form of 
“This is red and (this is) not red”, “This is of n and n+1 colour degrees” is not of 
the form of “This is of n colour degrees and (this is) not of n colour degrees”. Just 
as “This is blue” is not substitutable with “This is not red”, “This is of n+1 colour 
degrees” is not substitutable with “This is not of n colour degrees”. If something is 
of n+1 colour degrees, then it may be taken to be of n colour degrees too, but if 
something is of n colour degrees, then it is not of n+1 colour degrees. 
What if contradiction is established by analyzing simultaneous ascriptions 
of colour into simultaneous ascriptions of colour degrees, without analysis ending 
there? This is what Wittgenstein admits to have thought “not long” before the 
1929 paper: ascriptions of degree of quality, like degree of colour, may be taken to 
be analyzable into a logical product of single ascriptions of quantity and a 
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completing statement: “As I could describe the contents of my pocket by saying ‘It 
contains a penny, a shilling, two keys, and nothing else.’”25 However, this route  
would not lead far enough either: an ascription of a unit of colour brightness b  to 
an entity E, symbolized as E(b), would involve that an ascription of a double unit 
of brightness to the same entity be symbolized as E(2b), and then E(2b) should be 
analyzable into the logical product E(b) & E(b). But this product yields E(b) 
instead. Another route would be to distinguish between units of brightness and 
thus take E(2b) as the logical product E(b’) & E(b’’). But this would symbolize 
units of brightness as different such that an entity having some unit would raise 
the question which of the two units it actually has; which unit it has would be lost 
on the way of analysis. If an attempt to analyze ascriptions of degree into a logical 
product leads to a dead-end, then Wittgenstein must deviate from a Tractarian 
approach to colour-exclusion: 
 
I maintain that the statement which attributes a degree to a quality cannot 
further be analyzed […] The mutual exclusion of unanalyzable statements 
of degree contradicts an opinion which was published by me several years 
ago and which necessitated that atomic propositions could not exclude 
one another. I here deliberately say ‘exclude’ and not ‘contradict’, for 
there is a difference between these two notions and atomic propositions, 
although they cannot contradict, may exclude one another.26  
 
1.2.2 The logical product of colour ascriptions is logically un-foreseeable  
If a further analysis of ascriptions of degree leads to a dead-end, then such 
ascriptions are unanalyzable, amounting to atomic propositions. How does this 
“contradict” an opinion published in the Tractatus? While seeing contradiction as 
capturing impossibility expressed by combinations of propositions, early 
Wittgenstein regarded impossibility as an extreme or limit case of truth-functional 
combination, to the effect that the only impossibility would boil down to 
                                                     
25 SRLF: p. 32. 
26 SRLF: p. 33. 
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contradiction, that impossibility would be traceable only when contradiction 
were revealed thereby.  
Tractarian logic would not foresee that some truth-operations with 
propositions – be they atomic or not – are to yield falsity throughout without 
these operations reaching a contradiction. This is precisely what one sees through 
an analysis of colour-exclusion, starting from simultaneous ascriptions of either 
colour or colour degree. On one side, that a mutual exclusion, a “collision”27 is 
involved between simultaneous ascriptions of colour and that it persists between 
simultaneous ascriptions of colour degree cannot be overlooked; different 
ascriptions either of colour or colour degree cannot be simultaneously true. On 
the other side, simultaneous ascriptions neither of colour nor of colour degree can 
be analyzed into contradiction.28  This is seen through a truth-table of logical 
product of colour ascriptions. Their logical product reached a contradiction, if it 
yielded falsity throughout, in the four possible truth-combinations of two 
ascriptions: T·T, T·F, F·T, F·F. But this logical product yields T, F, F, F, thus not F 
throughout, as in contradiction. Which requires that:  
 
In this case the top line ‘T T T’ must disappear, as it represents an 
impossible combination. […T]here is no logical product of R P T and B P 
T in the first sense, and herein lies the exclusion as opposed to a 
contradiction. The contradiction, if it existed, would have to be written [as 
allowing T·T=F] but this is nonsense, as the top line, ‘T T F’, gives the 
                                                     
27 Cf. SRLF: p. 34. As this exclusion or collision would be accounted for by a non-truth-functional 
logic, one may envisage here an “extra-logical system of implications and exclusions” (Silva 2012: p. 
13), if “extra-“ meant “non-truth-functional”. Then exclusion “would not be formal, if we think of 
formality collapsing with truth-functionality” (Ibid.: p. 54) and if a logic – which Wittgenstein will 
qualify as “of content” as opposed to “of form” – would be what accounts for exclusion. This leaves it 
yet questionable in what sense “logic in this period begins to depend on a great number of non-
logical facts” (Ibid.: p. 13, italics added), in what sense “we are dealing with a kind of exclusion more 
empirical – or less logical – than the contradiction” (Ibid.: p. 84, italics added). 
28 Even Von Wright’s analysis, through integral Tractarian truth-tables, of ascriptions of colour 
within an alternative colour system of an imagined tribe – does not work when it comes to 
ascriptions of colour degrees, as he himself admits (Von Wright 1996: p. 14). 
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proposition a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual 
possibilities.29     
 
There is no logical product of simultaneous colour ascriptions in the first sense, as 
yielding truth, given the very impossibility of building a true proposition by 
ascribing different colours or colour degrees to one and the same fleck 
simultaneously all over. Stipulating that T·T yields F insofar as simultaneous 
colour ascriptions are concerned may indeed forge the truth-table into one of 
contradiction. This would be done, however, at the expense of ending up with a 
nonsensical notation. The amendment that here T·T yields F “gives the 
proposition a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities”, it 
allows possible ways for logical product to handle truth-values that mismatch 
possible ways thereof foreseeable through truth-tables. In the manuscripts 
Wittgenstein is puzzled by this:  
 
It seems yet obvious that it has sense to say ‘a is either green or red’ […] 
But if ‘p⊻q’ is not nonsensical, then ‘p·q’ can also be not nonsensical.  
The proposition p·q is not nonsense because indeed it does not 
abolish all truth-possibilities, although it turns down all of them. One can 
say that here the ‘and’ has a different meaning, for, in general it means 
[T·T=T, T·F=F, F·T=F, F·F=F], whereas here: [T·F=F, F·T=F, F·F=F].30  
 
This differs from the approach in Wittgenstein’s paper insofar as the amendment 
of the way in which a truth-operation handles truth-values of simultaneous colour 
ascriptions is said there to involve a nonsensical notation. By contrast, it now 
appears to be significant that the logical product of simultaneous colour 
ascriptions does not abolish [wegfallen] all their truth-possibilities, indeed, it 
handles in a foreseeable way their truth-values when at least one of them is F. Yet 
                                                     
29 SRLF: pp. 34-35. 
30  Ms 106: pp. 89-91 [Pichler (1994): ≈ March-April 1929] / PR: § 79. I use “⊻” instead of 
Wittgenstein’s “˅” in order to distinguish the concern here with exclusive disjunction from the 
concern so far with inclusive disjunction.  
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logical product is to turn down [abgewiesen] all of these truth-values, that is, any 
combination of them is to yield falsity. In this light, the difference between a 
truth-table of logical product in the case of two simultaneous colour ascriptions 
(T·F=F, F·T=F, F·F=F) and one of logical product in general (T·T=T, T·F=F, F·T=F, 
F·F=F), is not a mark of the nonsensicality of the analyzed simultaneous colour 
ascriptions, but a mark of the alternative meaning of the connective “and” in its 
unanalyzed employment: “This is red and this is blue”. But even if “and” had a 
different meaning when connecting simultaneous colour ascriptions, this 
difference of meaning would be exhibited precisely in or as a difference between 
the foreseeable way of handling truth-values (T·T=T, T·F=F, F·T=F, F·F=F) and the 
hitherto unforeseeable way (T·F=F, F·T=F, F·F=F).  
 In the end, irrespective of whether the amended truth-table of logical 
product of simultaneous colour ascriptions involved nonsense, or whether “and” 
had a different meaning in such ascriptions, there remains a tension between two 
features of contradiction the Tractatus regards as mutually substitutable: 
contradiction traced by falsity throughout in a truth-table and contradiction 
filling the whole spectrum of pertinent possibilities.31 In the following case, the 
latter feature is satisfied, the former not. For a 2-tone, e.g. black and white – not 
grayscale – photograph, any fleck is either black or white and “This is white” may 
be taken to be substitutable with “This is not black”. Then “This is black and 
white” may be taken to be logically of the form of p and not-p, like “This is black 
and (this is) not black” and, in this sense, a contradiction. Yet still not a 
contradiction in the sense in which one is exhibited through a truth table for the 
logical product of “This is black” and “This is white”, which, when both 
propositions are true, yields truth, rather than falsity as in a truth-table for 
contradiction. 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 Cf. TLP: 4.463c.  
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1.2.3 Further logical operations with colour ascriptions are logically un-
foreseeable 
Also involved would be that what holds for logical product, holds for further 
truth-operations.  
It turns out that neither inclusive disjunction handles truth-values of 
simultaneous colour ascriptions as it is foreseeable through truth-tables. While in 
general, inclusive disjunction T˅T, T˅F, F˅T, F˅F yields T, T, T, F, the inclusive 
disjunction of two simultaneous colour ascriptions is to yield F, T, T, F. This 
would require that the first operation T˅T=T must disappear, or be substituted by 
T˅T=F, considering that there is no inclusive disjunction of simultaneous colour 
ascriptions in the first sense, namely, when both ascriptions are true. Again, it 
cannot be true that a fleck is red or, in an inclusive sense, blue; just as it cannot be 
generally true that it is of n colour degress or, in an inclusive sense, of n+1 colour 
degrees.32  
Central to a Tractarian account of logical grammar is that the handling of 
truth-values by truth-operations is foreseeable throughout, that once an operation 
is introduced, its handling of truth-values in any possible case is thereby 
introduced. Conversely, one ought not witness a case where an operation handles 
truth-values in logically unforeseeable ways.33 Now, such a case is precisely one of 
colour-exclusion, where it turns out that neither logical product nor inclusive 
disjunction handles truth-values of simultaneous colour ascriptions in ways 
foreseeable through truth-tables.  
May foreseeability be maintained once the unforeseen has been 
witnessed? Is it at least foreseeable that any truth-operation handles truth-values 
of simultaneous colour ascriptions in an unforeseeable way, given that some 
operations turn out to do so? This is what the interchangeability of certain 
operations with certain others may seem to involve. For, no less central to the 
                                                     
32 It may be taken to be true that a fleck is of n colour degrees or, in an inclusive sense, of n+1 colour 
degrees – if the fleck is actually of n+1 colour degrees, but not if it is actually of n colour degrees. 
33 Cf. TLP: 5.451. Wittgenstein has been entertaining this idea since as early as his 1913 “Notes on 
Logic” written for Russell: see p. 105 in the version from the Notebooks 1914-1916 and p. 242 in the 
reorganized, so-called Costello, version, from The Journal of Philosophy. 
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Tractatus is the substitutability of any operation, for instance, with negation 
together with logical product.34 Given that logical product handles truth-values of 
simultaneous colour ascriptions in an unforeseeable way, then is it at least 
foreseeable that any other operation – in virtue of its substitutability – handles 
truth-values of simultaneous colour ascriptions in an unforeseeable way? That is 
not foreseeable throughout. Though exclusive disjunction is substitutable with 
negation together with logical product – it does not handle truth-values of 
simultaneous colour ascriptions in any alternative way: T⊻T, T⊻F, F⊻T, F⊻F yields 
F, T, T, F both in general and in the colour-exclusion case.  
 
1.3 Schlick on colour-exclusion and phenomenology 
 
That colour-exclusion is a matter neither of physical impossibility, nor of logical 
impossibility in the sense of boiling down to contradiction, already involves a 
reconsideration of a Tractarian account of logical grammar. Yet, that colour-
exclusion is a matter of mutual exclusion does not lead far enough. The question 
persists: Why is it then that a visual fleck cannot be of two colours simultaneously 
all over? Conversely, what kind of necessity, if any, is expressed by a proposition 
like “This cannot be of two colours simultaneously all over”? This line of 
questioning the colour-exclusion case, taken by Schlick to be decisive for the 
viability of phenomenology, is a mirror image of early Wittgenstein’s.  
 The present section will first present the motivation of Schlick’s interest 
in the case of colour ascriptions. He sees this case as calling into question the 
viability of classical phenomenology, particularly of Husserlian inspiration 
(subsection 1.3.1). Then I will discuss Schlick’s dismissal of the idea that 
propositions like “This cannot be of two colours simultaneously all over” amount 
                                                     
34 The Tractatus  makes explicit substitutability with negation and inclusive disjunction: “We can, 
for example, express what is common to all notations for the truth-functions as follows: It is 
common to them that they all, for example, can be replaced by the notations of ‘~p’ (‘not p’) and 
‘p˅q’ (‘p or q’)” (TLP: 3.3441a). The use of the phrase “for example” is crucial here: negation together 
with inclusive disjunction is only one example of a functionally complete set, other examples being: 
negation together with logical product; NAND (later known as the Sheffer stroke); NOR (later 
known as the Pierce arrow or the Quine dagger). 
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to synthetic or material a priori truths, as phenomenologists would assume. This 
dismissal leads to Schlick’s doubt that such propositions can function as 
groundings of phenomenology (subsection 1.3.2).  
 
1.3.1 Schlick’s forecast on philosophy to come 
The end of Schlick’s 1930 paper “Is There A Factual A Priori?” gives an indication 
of the background of his approach:  
 
The first who, to my knowledge, has given the correct solution of the 
difficulty is Ludwig Wittgenstein (see his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
and a paper in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society), to whom we 
owe fundamental logical clarifications, simply decisive for all future 
philosophy.35 
 
Schlick’s invocation of Wittgenstein as the first who solved the difficulty of the 
colour-exclusion may be puzzling, if only because, as seen, the 1929 paper, on the 
one hand, admits that the Tractatus did not solve the difficulty, and on the other 
hand, does not go as far as solving the difficulty either. Therein would yet be 
found logical clarifications decisive for all future philosophy, by contrast to 
concerns – Schelerian and Husserlian – with a type of knowledge whose viability 
would co-depend with the viability of methods of the approach that employed 
them: phenomenology. Questioning this approach would be questioning this type 
of knowledge and vice versa. Schlick questions directly not the viability of the 
approach 36 , but the viability of what it would establish, that is, rigorous 
knowledge decisive for all philosophy to come: 
 
Which, then, are the propositions which the phenomenologist brings 
forward as proof of his view, and which he believes, as Husserl expressed 
himself, to ground a science [eine Wissenschaft begründen] which ‘gains 
                                                     
35 Schlick (1930: pp. 29-30 / Eng.: p. 169 tr. mod.) 
36 Except by charging Husserl of obscurantism as to how the Wesensschau would deliver universally 
valid knowledge (cf. Schlick 1930: p. 23 / Eng.: p. 163-164).  
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an abundance of knowledge most rigorous and decisive for all philosophy 
to come’? It is famously judgments as these, that every tone has one 
intensity and one pitch, that one and the same surface could not be 
simultaneously green and red [...].37 
   
Such knowledge is meant to consist in what Husserl would count as material a 
priori truths, a type of synthetic a priori truths. Schlick’s strategy is to dismiss the 
very possibility of the synthetic a priori – and together with it the possibility of 
the material a priori – meant to constitute groundworks of phenomenological 
science. 
In another paper from the same period, “The Future of Philosophy”, 
Schlick opposes again the aspiration of philosophy to become a science as “a  
theory, i.e. a set or system of true propositions” – which he regards as a hopeless 
desideratum – and regards philosophy instead as an ongoing activity of 
clarification38, which is precisely the task he embraces. The future of philosophy 
would belong not to phenomenology, but to a descendant of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical logic: logical empiricism.  
“Is There A Factual A Priori?” reads: 
 
The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on that, all 
assertions, principally speaking, are either synthetic a posteriori or 
tautological; synthetic propositions a priori seem to it to be a logical 
impossibility. Must it give up this standpoint, which it has been able to 
defend with ease against the Kantian philosophy, in the face of the 
propositions which Husserl and his school have apparently made the 
groundworks of a new philosophy?  
                                                     
37 Schlick (1930: p. 24 / Eng.: p. 165 tr. mod.) 
38 Schlick (1930b: p. 173). The Wittgensteinian resonance of this qualification is echoed in this paper 
by  the positive reference to Wittgenstein. The 1932 extensive version of the paper suggests further 
that “Science should be defined as the ‘pursuit of truth’ and Philosophy as the ‘pursuit of meaning’” 
(Schlick 1932: p. 126), while “[t]here can be no science of meaning, because there cannot be any set 
of true propositions about meaning” (Ibid.: p. 128). 
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Is it some synthetic assertion a priori that every tone has a 
determinate pitch, that a green spot is not also simultaneously red?39  
 
1.3.2 The dismissal of the possibility of the material a priori 
Schlick’s attempt to undermine the alleged groundworks of phenomenology 
involves questioning whether there could be propositions both synthetic and a 
priori and why some of these propositions have come to be counted as material? 
This interrogation proceeds by claiming that “[a]ccording to [the logical-
empiricist] programme, we ask how such propositions are factually used, in what 
circumstances they occur in general. Here we establish in a remarkable way that 
neither in science nor in life are they utilized, if we overlook a purely rhetorical 
use (an orator might perhaps exclaim: ‘What is black, is however not white!’); 
only in the phenomenological philosophy do they play a role. This must already 
make us suspicious.”40 The suspicion is whether such propositions – in lack of an 
actual use either scientific or common – are sensical in the first place. Their 
alleged use as groundworks of phenomenology would not suffice to establish that 
such propositions actually have a sense.  
If someone told me a lady wore a green dress, it would be odd to ask: “Can 
I take it the dress was not red?”; the interlocutor would insist: “I have already told 
you it was green.” If an explorer told us that lions of normal yellow were 
encountered, which were also blue from tip to toe, we should immediately point 
out that this is impossible; if the interlocutor replied that our disbelief was due to 
our not having encountered a colour entirely yellow that was also entirely blue, 
this would not make us change our standpoint. 
 While it is by experience that we can come to know that a certain dress 
was uniformly green or that lions are of a certain yellow (case 1), once we know 
that, it could not be denied that we need no further experience to know that the 
dress was not uniformly red too, that lions entirely yellow are not entirely blue 
too (case 2). “These two cases stand on completely different levels [völlig 
                                                     
39 Schlick (1930: p. 25 / Eng: p. 166 tr. mod.) 
40 Schlick (1930: p. 25 / Eng: p. 166 tr. mod.) 
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verschiedener Stufe].”41 Which is to say that “to know” in the two cases does not 
mean one and the same thing: 
 
We must admit that an unbridgeable difference, of principle, subsists: it 
lies simply in that we only a posteriori know [wissen] what clothes this or 
that person wears, or how people in general dress up; that we however a 
priori know [wissen] that a green dress is not a red dress, and a yellow 
skin, not a blue one.42 
  
Thus, insofar as phenomenologists would contend that propositions like “A dress 
green all over is not red all over” or “A skin entirely yellow is not entirely blue” 
are not ordinary judgments of experience, Schlick would agree with them. Where 
they would diverge was at the point where phenomenologists would contend 
further that at the same time “these propositions really convey a knowledge 
[Erkenntniss], that they were contentful [sachhaltig], that they had a material 
[material], not merely formal character”43.  
What speaks for this contention? That the propositions in question 
“appear [schein] to be factually [tatsächlich] about colours, about sounds, so about 
the content [dem Inhalte], the material [Material] of sensations”. What speaks 
against this contention? The very “triviality [Trivialität] of the propositions in 
question, which we find elsewhere only in tautological, nothing-saying 
[nichtssagenden] propositions, which alone in virtue of their form are true and 
convey nothing upon reality.”44 
 Schlick regards the triviality, tautological character, of these propositions 
as given proof, and thus more reliable than an appearance of their conveying a 
content or material of sensations of colour or sound. His preliminary verdict is: 
  
                                                     
41 Schlick (1930: p. 26 / Eng: p. 166 tr. mod.) 
42 Schlick (1930: p. 27 / Eng: p. 167 tr. mod.) 
43 Schlick (1930: p. 27 / Eng: p. 167 tr. mod.) 
44 Schlick (1930: p. 27 / Eng: p. 167 tr. mod.) 
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Our ‘material’ a priori  propositions are in truth of purely conceptual 
nature, their validity is a logical one, they have tautological, formal 
character.45 
 
In the final analysis, propositions taken to be material a priori and groundworks of 
phenomenology do not convey substantial knowledge [Erkenntnis], but boil down 
to tautological knowing [Wissen]; and express not factual or material necessity, 
but conceptual or logical necessity, showing nothing more than “only the content 
of our concepts [Inhalt unserer Begriffe], i.e. the way we utilize our words”46. The 
final verdict on alleged material a priori propositions would be:  
 
As nothing-saying formulae, they contain no knowledge and cannot serve 
as the groundworks of a special science. Such a science as the 
phenomenologists have promised us does not even exist in fact.47 
 
Schlick’s strategy is reminiscent of the interrogation in the Prolegomena of Kant, 
to whom he refers positively several times. Phenomenologists would claim that 
their science is a reality and grounded on material a priori propositions. By 
stressing that propositions like “A surface cannot be simultaneously green and red 
all over” are a priori yet simply analytic, rather than a priori and at the same time 
synthetic, Schlick insinuates that the very groundings of phenomenology are 
either void of sense (if they recognized as tautologies) or logically impossible (if 
taken as synthetic a priori or material a priori). Either what phenomenology takes 
itself to be grounded on would be a vacuum or phenomenology would not be 
grounded at all. Either way, phenomenology would not be a given science after 
all, it would be not real and perhaps even not possible. 
                                                     
45 Schlick (1930: p. 28 / Eng: p. 168 tr. mod.) 
46 Schlick (1930: p. 30 / Eng: p. 170 tr. mod.). Cf.: “im ersten Falle würde die Notwendigkeit der 
Geltung jener Wahrheiten eine sachliche […], im zweiten Falle aber ein rein logische” (Schlick 
1930: p. 27).   
47 Schlick (1930: p. 30 / Eng: p. 170 tr. mod.) 
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 What would a mid-Wittgensteinian, or indeed middle Wittgenstein’s 
own, take on this mirror-image of his early approach to colour-exclusion be? 
 
1.4 Two replies to Schlick 
 
A case can be made for two replies to Schlick’s critique of phenomenology and of 
synthetic/material a priori. I will first formulate what I take to be a mid-
Wittgensteinian reply to Schlick on the basis of the above discussion of the paper 
“Some Remarks on Logical Form” (subsection 1.4.1). Then I will discuss middle 
Wittgenstein’s own reply to Schlick from a conversation recorded by Waismann. 
This reply shows Wittgenstein sharing Schlick’s reluctance regarding the notion 
of synthetic a priori. But Wittgenstein’s mentioned reluctance is independent 
from his positive conception of phenomenology (subsection 1.4.2.). 
 
1.4.1 A Mid-Wittgensteinian reply 
If Schlick’s approach to colour-exclusion is a mirror image of early Wittgenstein’s, 
this, if one was to use Schlick’s own phrasing against him, may already make us 
suspicious. What would arouse suspicion? The very approach to colour-exclusion 
in “Is There A Factual A Priori”, as inheriting a Tractarian approach in a way not 
fully unacknowledged by Schlick. What would suspicion involve? That Schlick’s 
attempt to account for propositions like “This cannot be of two colours 
simultaneously all over” in terms of tautology is not more viable than early 
Wittgenstein’s attempt to account for propositions like “This is of two colours 
simultaneously all over” in terms of contradiction. 
 What Schlick takes to be the strength of his approach may in fact turn out 
to be its weakness, namely, a co-extensiveness or mutual substitution between the 
notions of necessity and tautology. He writes: 
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Our empiricism establishes the claim that in general there are no other a 
priori judgments than the analytic or, as we like to say today, that only 
tautological propositions are a priori.48 
 
A tautological proposition may express a triviality, but it is true in virtue of its 
form49. Schlick takes both the triviality and the tautological character of alleged 
material a priori propositions as given proof, as obvious. Now, whether they 
express trivialities or not, may not be decidable as easily as whether they have a 
tautological character or not.  
Just as propositions like “This is red and blue” turned out to not be 
analyzable into p and not-p, so that analysis would end up with a form of 
contradiction, propositions like “This cannot be green and red” are not analyzable 
into p and p, so that analysis would end up with a form of tautology.  
Schlick himself makes it clear that “[a]n analytic proposition [...], or – as 
we more clearly say – a tautology, [...] presents only a purely formal 
transformation of equivalent expressions and serves therefore only as a technical 
means within a proof, a deduction, a calculus.” 50  While this may fit early 
Wittgenstein’s conception of tautology, it is not obvious how it would 
accommodate propositions inquired into by Schlick. Indeed, it may not. On the 
one side, “This is green” and “This is red” are not equivalent expressions, namely, 
mutually substitutable, anymore than “This is green” and “This is red” are 
contradictory expressions, or than “This is red” is mutually substitutable with 
“This is not green”. On the other side, while an analysis of propositions like “This 
is red and blue simultaneously all over” in terms of logical product did not end up 
with falsity throughout, an attempt at analysing propositions like “This cannot be 
green and red simultaneously all over” would not end up with truth throughout. 
Either Schlick’s  propositions in question are denials of early 
Wittgenstein’s propositions in question,  in which case the negation of the last 
                                                     
48 Schlick (1930: p. 23 / Eng: p. 164 tr. mod.) 
49 Cf. “die Trivialität der fraglichen Sätze […], die wir sonst nur bei tautologischen, nichtssagenden 
Sätzen finden, welche allein vermöge ihrer Form wahr sind” (Schlick 1930: p. 23). 
50 Schlick (1930: p. 23 / Eng: p. 164 tr. mod.) 
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column of the logical product of simultaneous colour ascriptions, T, F, F, F, yields 
F, T, T, T – thus not truth throughout like in tautology. Or Schlick’s propositions 
are not denials of Wittgenstein’s, in which case it is not clear how they may be 
analysed in terms of any other Tractarian operation so as to end up with 
tautology. The difficulty with them is that cannot – when taken to express logical 
impossibility – is not reducible to not; if that was so, logical impossibility would 
be no more than physical impossibility. 
Then propositions like “This cannot be green and red simultaneously all 
over” would express logical necessity on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
would not be analyzable into tautology. This irreducibility of some propositions 
taken to express logical necessity to tautologies is the mirror image of the 
irreducibility of some propositions taken to express logical impossibility to 
contradictions, which comes to one and the same difficulty that Wittgenstein’s 
paper recognized in the Tractatus and admitted to not having solved either. The 
two faces of the difficulty are in fact alluded to in the paper, where propositions 
like “One colour cannot have two degrees of brightness simultaneously all over” 
are regarded – not as tautologies – but as being “in some sense tautologies”, just as 
simultaneous colour ascriptions are considered to involve – not a contradiction – 
but “some sort of contradiction”51. 
Schlick may be right in invoking early Wittgenstein as an influence to his 
conduct of the colour-exclusion case, yet he is not closer than middle 
Wittgenstein in the 1929 paper to a solution to the difficulty. 
 
1.4.2 Middle Wittgenstein’s reply 
The above is not what middle Wittgenstein actually replied, at least on one 
particular occasion, to Schlick’s reservation to phenomenology and to the 
synthetic/material a priori. In a late 1929 conversation Waismann recorded and 
entitled “Anti-Husserl” Schlick asks Wittgenstein:  
 
                                                     
51 SRLF: pp. 32, 33 respectively. 
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What can one reply to  a philosopher who means that the assertions of 
phenomenology are synthetic judgments a priori?52  
 
Wittgenstein replies by first noting that propositions like “I have no stomach 
ache” or “I have no money” have a denial which they presuppose and viceversa 
[setzt ... voraus und umgekehrt], meaning that they are sensical propositions, 
propositions with sense. Now, by a proposition like “An object is not red and 
green simultaneously” do I merely want to say that I have not so far seen such an 
object? Obviously not. (And thus not that such an object is unlikely to be seen, 
which would amount simply to a forecast from induction). Rather I want to say: “I 
cannot see such an object”, “Red and green cannot be in the same place”. What 
does the word “can” mean here? It is “obviously [offenbar] a grammatical (logical) 
concept, not a factual [sachlicher] one”53. By contrast to the former propositions 
about pain and money, the latter proposition is not sensical, it does not have 
sense, it lacks a denial which it would presuppose and viceversa.  
Wittgenstein further employs a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that 
propositions in question were synthetic judgments and the word “cannot” meant 
logical impossibility. Since a proposition is the negation of its negation [die 
Negation seiner Negation], there should be also propositions like “An object can 
be red and green”, which would be in their turn synthetic. As synthetic 
propositions, they would be sensical, namely, the situation they present can 
subsist, is possible. However, since “cannot” meant logical impossibility, one 
would come to a conclusion that the impossible is possible. As this is absurd, 
propositions like “An object cannot be red and green” cannot be both synthetic (in 
which case they would express possibility) and a priori (in which case they would 
express impossibility or, in another case, necessity). Wittgenstein adds: 
 
                                                     
52 WWK/WVC: p. 67 tr. mod. 
53 WWK/WVC: p. 67 tr. mod. 
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Here there remained for Husserl only the way out that he clarified there is 
yet a third possibility. Thereto I would reply: one can find words; but I 
can think beneath of nothing.54  
 
Insofar as this dismisses a third possibility – of the synthetic a priori – 
Wittgenstein would follow Schlick to an extent. At this stage in his development, 
he would perhaps go as far as Schlick agreeing that there is an unbridgeable 
difference, of principle, between sensical propositions, expressing possibility, and 
those propositions lacking sense, expressing logical impossibility. 
 Wittgenstein does not yet say with Schlick that propositions like “An 
object cannot be red and green” are either analytic or tautologies, not even that 
they are trivial or that they boil down to trivialities. Wittgenstein’s approach here 
is purely negative, simply dismissing the possibility of the synthetic or material a 
priori. The approach diverges from Schlick’s insofar as it points to a difference 
between propositions employing “cannot” and propositions employing “not”. This 
questions the reducibility of cannot – when taken to express logical impossibility 
– to not, thus casting doubt on the eventual way above to analyze what Schlick 
takes as the groundworks of phenomenology into tautologies. 
 Wittgenstein’s approach diverges further from Schick’s, insofar as it 
dismisses the possibility of the synthetic or material a priori, without dismissing 
either the reality or the possibility of phenomenology however conceived of. In 
fact, someone else close to Wittgenstein, Drury, recollects:  
 
Professor Schlick from Vienna was due to read a paper to the Moral 
Science Club entitled ‘Phenomenology’. 
WITTGENSTEIN: You ought to make a point of going to hear this paper, 
but I shan’t be there. You could say of my work that it is 
‘phenomenology’.55   
 
                                                     
54 WWK/WVC: p. 68 tr. mod. 
55 Drury (1984: p. 116). 
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Middle Wittgenstein’s replies to Schlick leaves open not only the eventuality of 
phenomenology not being or not even needing to be grounded on the synthetic or 
material a priori, but also the eventuality of phenomenology being possible after 
all. Wittgenstein’s solitary remarks on phenomenology in manuscripts from the 
same period even consider phenomenology to be real, real at least to the extent of 
something worth being given a chance. Without, or at least apart from, giving a 
further chance to the synthetic or material a priori.56  
 
1.5 Phenomenology: a logic or a logic’s application? 
 
In order to do justice to cases like colour-exclusion, “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form” pleas for “the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves”57. This 
plea involves the reconsideration of a Tractarian account of logical grammar, an 
account criticized by Ramsey for its construal of impossibility as inescapably 
involving contradiction and further criticized by middle Wittgenstein for a 
reliance, to too great an extent, on logical foreseeability. 
 The present section will first discuss a Tractarian appeal that can be made 
against the charge of the problematic reliance on logical foreseeability. The 
appeal, relying on early Wittgenstein’s distinction between logic and its 
application, turns out to be unsuccessful (subsection 1.5.1). Then I will discuss 
middle Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with the Tractatus as touching a more 
central view expressed in it. It is that the rules for the coupling of propositions 
exhibited by truth-tables can provide an exhaustive account of logical syntax 
(subsection 1.5.2). This dissatisfaction leads to his conception of phenomenology 
                                                     
56 Thus, it should be expected that a claim that Wittgenstein embraced the synthetic or material a 
priori makes not more compelling (as assumed e.g. by Gier 1986: pp. 155-183) but more vulnerable a 
claim that Wittgenstein embraced a phenomenology (as seen e.g. in a reply to Gier by Monk 2014). 
Cf. “it stands open if some – or, indeed, any – grammatical propositions could be held in any sense as 
synthetic a priori, insofar as it seems to be, at least  in this context, an undesired hybrid between 
logic and empiria. As we have discussed, this represents a phenomenological temptation against 
which Wittgenstein always tried to protect himself.” (Silva 2012: p. 265) 
57 SRLF: p. 35. 
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as a logic of propositional content as opposed to the Tractarian logic of 
propositional form (subsection 1.5.3).  
 
1.5.1 A Tractarian appeal  
A Tractarian appeal may yet be made: “Not only must a proposition of logic be 
capable of being refuted by no possible experience, but it must also not be capable 
of being confirmed by any such. | Now it becomes clear why one often feels as 
though ‘logical truths’ are to be ‘postulated’ by us. We can in fact postulate them 
in so far as we can postulate an adequate notation.”58 Accordingly, insofar as a 
truth-table was a proposition of logic and part of an adequate notation, it would 
not be confirmable or disconfirmable by any possible experience. In particular, a 
Tractarian truth-table exhibiting syntax for logical product would be immune in 
the colour-exclusion case, whether the latter is approached as involving any actual 
or possible experience, phenomena, or talk thereof.59  
The Tractatus has more to say in its defence: “The application of logic 
decides what elementary propositions there are. | What lies in the application 
logic cannot foresee [vorausnehmen].” 60  Accordingly, insofar as the logical 
investigation of the phenomena themselves is employed by “Some Remarks on 
Logical Form”, while introducing ascriptions of degree as atomic or elementary 
propositions, this approach would amount, from a Tractarian vantage point, not to 
logic, but to its application [Anwendung]. Tractarian logic may not foresee that 
among atomic propositions there are ascriptions of degree, yet again, from a 
Tractarian vantage point, foreseeing this was not a job of logic in the first place. In 
                                                     
58 TLP: 6.1222-6.1223, Ogden  tr. mod. 
59 This, however, leaves it still questionable whether in the Tractatus there is a “normative appeal of 
Logic [that later] has to be mitigated, [t]he current language before being regimented by the 
authoritative tractarian thread to avoid philosophical nonsense” (Silva 2013: p. 155), even if a pre-
Tractarian Wittgenstein may have considered a view that truth-tables are “criteria” rather than 
“results” of analysis (cf. Silva 2012: pp. 109-112). Still, something postulated – be it as adequate 
notation – need not be normative. 
60 TLP: 5.557a-b, Ogden  tr. mod.  
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this sense it may seem that the Tractatus has been charged for not doing 
something that it was anyway not meant to do.61  
The remark yet goes on: “This is clear: logic may not collide with its 
application. | But logic must have contact with its application. | Therefore logic 
and its application may not infringe one another.” 62  Now this reinforces the 
charge against the Tractatus, insofar as its logic proves itself precisely to collide 
[collidieren] with, or to infringe [übergreifen] upon, the logical investigation of 
the phenomena themselves. Indeed, the latter witnesses that a Tractarian account 
of syntax for truth-operations is not applicable without amendments in the 
colour-exclusion case. What Wittgenstein’s 1929 paper questions then is whether 
or to what extent one may rely on logical foreseeability while “postulating” a logic 
without carrying out its application, such that not only a contact between logic 
and its application be maintained, but further a contact between logic and 
experience.63 
 
1.5.2 Logical syntax reconsidered 
An early middle Wittgenstein, one of early 1929, would maintain his trust in the 
Tractarian syntax for connectives, which may be amended here and there – like in 
the colour-exclusion case – by way of introducing further rules and eventually 
mending the problem of a nonsensical or not non-sensical notation thus reached. 
In this scenario, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves would 
                                                     
61 Then, at least in this sense, there would be no “curse of the tractarian project [as] always having to 
indefinitely postpone its end”, no “collision of two central tractarian theses: the logical 
independence of elementary propositions and the demand for complete analysis” – as charged by 
Silva (2013: pp. 162, 154 respectively; cf. 2012: p. 53). What early Wittgenstein would demand is an 
end or completeness of analysis by logic and what he would intend to – not postpone – but leave 
aside is an end or completeness of analysis by application of logic. The problem though is that the 
application of logic was expected to remain faithful to the syntax for connectives exhibited by 
Tractarian truth-tables.  
62 TLP: 5.557c-e, Ogden  tr. mod. 
63 Friedlander notes in this respect: “It is Wittgenstein’s distinction between the completion of the 
task of logic and the later appropriation of the form of experience […] that needs to be reassessed.” 
(Friedlander 2001: p. 216) 
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amount not to a logic, but to an application of Tractarian syntax for connectives. 
Yet, cases like colour-exclusion bring into question not only a matter of notation 
amendment and one of logical foreseeability, but also further and further 
interconnected matters, like inference or negation.  
A late middle Wittgenstein, one of late 1929  and beginning of 1930s’, 
encountering such proliferating problems, finds himself pressed to reconsider the 
contact between logic and a logical investigation of phenomena. Even while 
skipping episodes, outcomes of this development can be observed.  
In a 1930 conversation with Schlick recorded by Waismann, Wittgenstein 
remarks: 
 
As a summary one can say: the coupling of propositions of a truth-
function builds/pictures [bildet] only one part of a syntax. The rules I laid 
down at that time [i.e. the time of the Tractatus] are now constrained by 
the rules that stem from the inner syntax of propositions and which 
prohibit that two propositions ascribe to reality different co-ordinates. All 
truth-functions are allowed that are not prohibited by these rules.64 
 
Rules exhibited by truth-tables turn out to be, instead of a whole, only one part of 
a syntax.65 One fleck of two colours simultaneously all over can be counted as a 
logical impossibility without simultaneous colour ascriptions having to be 
analyzable into contradiction. The logical impossibility in question then boils 
down to “rules that stem from the inner syntax of propositions”, not rules for 
                                                     
64 WWK: p. 80 [dated 2 January 1930] / WVC: p. 80 tr. mod.; cf. Ms 108: p. 52 [dated 1 January 1930] 
/ PR: § 83. 
65 By opposition, in line with the Tractatus, one may say that “there would be nothing logically 
relevant inside the elementary propositions” (Silva 2012: p. 140) or rather: nothing truth-
functionally relevant; and that the “the rules for the connectives given in the Tractatus were 
incomplete” (cf. Hacker 1973: p. 110) or that “Wittgenstein had already given up or was about to 
give up one of the central claims of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, that of the completeness of 
its truth-functional logic, which is expressed in proposition 6.” (Marion 1998: p. 110.) If Tractarian 
logical syntax falls short of completeness, it is a completeness not of the extended truth-table for all 
logical connectives itself, but the completeness of this table to be maintained in its application.  
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coupling of propositions. On the one side, the former rules constrain [eingeengen] 
those of truth-functional coupling, a constraint which solves the puzzle of why 
some lines are to disappear from some truth-tables when analyzing simultaneous 
colour ascriptions. On the other side, rules that stem from the inner syntax of 
propositions would prohibit [verbieten] that two propositions (e.g. simultaneous 
colour ascriptions) ascribe to reality (e.g. a fleck) different coordinates (e.g. “red” 
and “blue”) and would allow [erlauben] only certain truth-functions in certain 
cases. 66  Thus, while according to the Tractatus, in Ramsey’s words, the only 
impossibility is that of contradiction, middle Wittgenstein’s approach to the 
colour-exclusion case calls for a conception of impossibility as involving logico-
grammatical prohibition without contradiction, and a conception of necessity as 
involving logico-grammatical demand without tautology.  
 
1.5.3 The logic of form and the logic of content 
“Some Remarks on Logical Form” pleas for a logical investigation of the 
phenomena themselves as application of logic, allowing for eventual amendments 
to truth-functional syntax. In subsequent manuscripts, Wittgenstein is puzzled 
whether that which this investigation and analysis will turn into – 
phenomenology – is a logic in its own right, along with truth-functional logic: 
 
The distinction between the logic of content [Inhalt] and the logic of 
propositional form [Satzform] in general. The former seems, as it were, 
multicoloured, the other faint; one seems to handle that which the picture 
presents, the other is like the frame of the picture, a characteristic of the 
pictorial form.67 
 
                                                     
66 In manuscript Wittgenstein admits: “In my old conception of an elementary proposition there was 
no determination of the value of a co-ordinate; although my remark that a coloured body is in a 
colour-space, etc., should have put me straight on to this.” (Ms 108: p. 53 [dated 1 January 1930] / 
PR: § 83.) 
67 Ms 109: p. 130 [dated 12 September 1930] / PG: 217
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The question of phenomenology as logic, immediately becomes the question of 
the relation between such a logic of content to a logic of form, like a truth-
functional logic:  
 
And how does what we feel express itself, that namely the truth-functions 
are more fundamental that the phenomenological? For, I believe, only in 
the grammar must that also express itself. 
And in these one must – if I am right – see also the distinction between 
the phenomenological and the non-phenomenological. There would be 
there a chapter on colours where the use of the colour-words was 
regulated; but that would not be comparable to what was said in the 
grammar on the words not, or, etc. (the ‘logical constants’). 
It would e.g. follow from the rules that the latter words were to be applied 
to every proposition (but not the colour-words).68   
 
One may have a feeling that truth-functions are more fundamental than the 
phenomenological, in that their ways to exhibit logical grammar are immune to 
any possible experience, phenomena, or talk thereof. This feeling may be 
reinforced by a view that truth-functional account of the syntax of words for 
logical constants was logically general, applicable to every proposition, while a 
syntax of words for colours was not. In short, it may appear that truth-functional 
logic as logic of form is a fundamental logic, at least more fundamental than 
phenomenology as logic of content, an allegedly regional logic (e.g. for a domain 
of discourse or propositional system devoted to colours). The manuscript yet 
questions this appearance: 
 
But it is strange that in the grammar there must be given an essential and 
an unessential generality. 
A logical and a phenomenological one. But wherein they 
differentiate themselves from one another?69 
                                                     
68 Ms 109: p. 120 [dated 9 September 1930]. 
69 Ms 109: p. 121. 
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That twofold kind of generality would be so odd as if of two rules of a 
game both holding equally invariably, one was talked about as being the 
more fundamental. 
As one could thus decide if the king or the chessboard was 
essential to the game. Which of the two was more essential, which more 
accidental.70 
 
If it is strange [merkwürdig] or odd [seltsam] that there be a twofold kind of 
generality, it is not because what is established is that there is one – essential, 
fundamental, truth-functional generality – and what is questionable is whether 
there is, besides or along with it, another – unessential, regional, 
phenomenological generality. It is the very status of truth-functional generality as 
fundamental that becomes questionable, once a Tractarian account of logical 
grammar has been questioned by Ramsey for its construal of impossibility as 
inescapably involving contradiction and by Wittgenstein for its construal of 
logical foreseeability. Logical generality is solicited in a Tractarian account of 
logical grammar, as truth-functional analysis is taken to exhibit, from a vantage 
point of a general propositional form, a syntax for all propositional combination. 
Insofar as truth-functional analysis decomposes compound or complex 
propositions, yet not atomic or elementary ones, it yet has a blind-spot: rules that 
stem from the inner syntax of propositions.71 These rules will turn out to constrain 
truth-functional rules, whose logical generality was taken to be intimately related 
to a general form of the proposition.72  
Then if talking about a collapse of Wittgenstein’s first philosophy be 
justified or useful, it would be a collapse of the general form of the proposition, 
                                                     
70 Ms 109: pp. 129-130. 
71 Cf. Early “Wittgenstein was able to get his truth-functional apparatus going, without having to 
know in advance whether elementary propositions consist of dyadic or 27-termed relations!” 
(Marion 1998: p. 115.) 
72 In 1929 Wittgenstein makes this relation explicit: “The general form of the proposition can be 
nothing else than the general form of truth-functions.” (Ms 106: p. 59 [Pichler (1994): ≈ March – 
April 1929].) 
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accompanied by a reconsideration of logical generality involved in a Tractarian 
account of logical grammar.  
As a logic of content, phenomenology would involve a point of departure 
from ordinary propositions, heading towards a point of exhibiting a syntax of their 
use and ultimately inner rules. The point of departure of phenomenological 
analysis would be within such and such a space of intelligibility or conceivability, 
like colour-space or tone-space – spaces devoted to domains of discourse or 
propositional systems of colour and tone respectively. The point of arrival of 
phenomenological analysis would yet be within such spaces, not within an all-
pervasive space of intelligibility or conceivability. Such a space, a Tractarian 
logical space, would become questionable. Indeed, immediately after considering 
the unforeseeable way of handling truth-values of simultaneous colour-ascriptions 
by logical product and the eventual alternative meaning of “and” thereof, middle 
Wittgenstein raises the following question in manuscript:  
 
Is there given for all propositions which I can connect logically one space 
in which they ‘go together, or not’? If I e.g. say, I see red and hear a sound, 
these go both in time with one another. They order themselves in time, I 
mean, they lay themselves in time one next to the other. I.e. they lie both 
in time and do not disturb one another.  
It is then as though the sense of more propositions lied spread in 
logical space so far as they could not disturb one another, while others 
may rise a claim for the same place.73 
 
A further discussion of the question of the unicity of an all-pervasive logical space 
falls outside our scope. It may however be observed that, if there was no all-
pervasive logical space, neither would colour-space, tone-space etc. be regional 
fields of investigation, nor would phenomenology be a regional investigation. At 
least not regional as opposed respectively to one fundamental logical space and to 
a fundamental truth-functional logical investigation. 
                                                     
73 Ms 106: p. 93 [Pichler (1994): ≈ March – April 1929].  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 
 
This chapter will explore Wittgenstein’s methodological reflections pertaining to 
his conception of phenomenology. How is phenomenology supposed to be 
actually carried out according to these reflections? And what does this conception 
involve in terms of philosophical tools and devices?  
 An incipient answer to these questions, provided by secondary literature, 
is that his concerns with phenomenology are co-extensive thematically and 
chronologically with his concerns with what he calls “phenomenological 
language”. The difficulty is that the remarks on phenomenological language are 
not less puzzling than the ones on phenomenology. It is generally agreed that 
Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology involves – at least for a while – a so-
called phenomenological language. But it is not clear what a phenomenological 
language involves or amounts to. In the literature one can find very diverse 
accounts of phenomenological language, which can be categorized as ranging 
from robust to deflationary readings. According to robust receptions, 
phenomenological language is a full-blown means of expression, a language in its 
own right, meant to replace ordinary language for philosophical purposes of 
clarification. Some of such readings find a kinship between Wittgenstein’s 
consideration of phenomenological language and conceptions of 
phenomenological reduction in continental philosophy.74 According to readings 
that can be qualified as deflationary, phenomenological language is merely a 
means of identification of objects of experience in terms of demonstratives such as 
“this” or “that”.75 Perhaps the most striking view put forward more recently is that 
phenomenological language “is not a language at all, but a technical apparatus for 
the production of pictures”76. 
                                                     
74 Cf. Gier (1981), Morgan (2003). 
75 Cf. Hintikka (1996: pp. 75-76). 
76 Kienzler (1997: p. 119). 
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 In what follows, I will formulate a relatively new reading of the 
conception of phenomenological language, while closely attending to 
Wittgenstein’s notions of “hypothesis” and “verification”. These notions have not 
received much attention so far. My claim, however, is that they are precisely the 
kernel of the conception of phenomenological language. In this light, the rationale 
of Wittgenstein’s consideration of phenomenology and in particular of 
phenomenological language appears as being faithful to his longstanding aim of 
philosophical clarification. Taken in this way, these considerations become less 
puzzling than they may seem at first sight. Indeed, from 1929 onwards 
Wittgenstein does not develop an entirely new programme in his philosophical 
writings. His early 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” is still concerned 
with central Tractarian tenets. Above all it is concerned with the task of 
elaborating philosophical tools and devices for clarifying language and thought. 
The reflections on phenomenology are motivated by the same task. Significantly 
in this respect, the Tractatus, the 1929 paper, and subsequent manuscripts all 
regard ordinary language as logically in order. Namely, ordinary language is in 
order as it is, in everyday uses, for daily purposes. Problems arise when ordinary 
language is employed philosophically, as a means for philosophical expression. 
According to the 1929 paper, ordinary language disguises logical structure and 
thus does not prevent the formation of pseudo-propositions like “Red is higher 
than green”. Manuscripts from the same period provide a more fleshed-out 
account of the inadequacy of ordinary language as means for philosophical 
expression. Attending to the account of ordinary language in terms of 
“hypothesis” will be particularly revealing in this respect.  
 Thus, on the one hand, ordinary language is prone to confusions. On the 
other hand, it cannot be employed philosophically in order to clear away 
confusion. In this sense, ordinary language does not suffice for, or is not amenable 
to, a philosophical clarification of itself. Clarification then calls for an alternative 
medium of expression. The conception of phenomenological language explicates 
the workings of language and its formal relation to reality, a relation which is not 
readily available in ordinary use. To the purpose of clarification the Tractatus puts 
forward a logical notation, inheriting Frege’s Begriffschrift, as a method of 
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elucidation or dissolution of philosophical problems. “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form” points out some difficulties with the Tractarian approach, while still 
envisaging ways in which a truth-functional notation can be amended in order to 
do justice to logical grammar. The notion of phenomenological language is a 
subsequent tool for clarification. Like the Tractarian Begriffschrift and the logical 
symbolism that the 1929 paper discusses, the phenomenological language is meant 
to be devised in order to handle ordinary language, or rather dimensions of it, in 
logically clear ways.  
The method of clarification which comes with the notion of 
phenomenological language is the method of verification. How a proposition is 
meant or taken on a particular occasion can be elucidated in terms of what counts 
as its agreement or disagreement with reality on that particular occasion. Now, 
one and the same  proposition used on a particular occasion can be taken to agree 
or disagree with one and the same situation in multiple ways. Saying that 
“Somebody is playing the piano in the other room” can account for a sound of 
piano coming from somewhere else than the present room. Or it can account for 
the available fact of someone being seen through a door as sitting in front of a 
piano. Or it can account for something that happens regularly, perhaps according 
to the schedule of a neighbor who repeatedly plays the piano. Clarifying the 
workings of ordinary language requires, initially for middle Wittgenstein, a more 
generic inquiry into the availability of a proposition of ordinary language to be 
meant or taken in multiple ways. It is essentially an inquiry into the formal 
relation of language with reality through the method of verification. This relation 
is veiled by the multitude of ways in which one and the same proposition can be 
used in order to account for one and the same situation. The notion of hypothesis 
will shed light on this multitude of ways in which a proposition can be meant or 
taken. Against this background, an ordinary-language proposition can be 
characterized as being multivocal and as having a multifaceted grammatical 
structure. 
The characterization of ordinary propositions as hypotheses is reminiscent 
of a Tractarian view that “In the language of everyday life it very often happens 
that the same word signifies in two different ways – and therefore belongs to two 
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different symbols – or that two words, which signify in different ways, are 
apparently applied in the same way in the proposition.”77 However, from 1929 
onwards, a clarification of this multivocality of ordinary language by way of a 
purely truth-functional account of logical grammar is considered to be insufficient 
and to a certain extent misleading. This is because the Tractatus turns out to have 
envisaged a method of clearing away the multivocality of ordinary language for 
philosophical purposes by relying on the view that logical constants are 
nevertheless univocal. This view involved the fact that even in the colour-
exclusion case the meaning of the connective “and” is exhibited by the syntax of 
the truth-table for logical product in general. From 1929 Wittgenstein’s considers 
the view that the meaning of the connectives between propositions is not 
univocal. However, he envisages a way to analyze the subject-matter of 
propositions such that the analysis ends up with univocal propositions. 
   
Phenomenological language consists in propositions that are univocal and 
have a single-facetted grammatical structure. Unlike ordinary language, 
phenomenological language is not readily available. It is rather a means of 
expression to be achieved or constructed. This construction involves an isolation 
of the multiple facets of a proposition of ordinary language, of the multiple ways 
in which such propositions can be meant or taken to agree or disagree with 
reality. The aim is to reach propositions like “This sound is a C major” – arguably 
involved in propositions like the one above about the piano. Propositions of the 
former kind are taken to agree or disagree with reality in no more than one way. 
Whence the envisaged univocality of a proposition of phenomenological language 
or its single-faceted grammatical structure.  
The following discussion touches upon a debate in the literature about 
whether Wittgenstein endorsed a notion of reduction akin to the notion of 
reduction in the phenomenological tradition. Previous studies suggest that the 
transition from ordinary to phenomenological language calls for or amounts to a 
genuine phenomenological reduction78; others admit no more than a linguistic 
                                                     
77 TLP: 3.323. 
78 Peursen (1959: p. 181), Gier (1981: pp. 104, 106f, 210), Morgan (2003: p. 246). 
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reduction, namely, a reduction carried out merely within or on the side of 
language 79 ; some authors, insofar as middle Wittgenstein or Wittgenstein in 
general is concerned, dismiss the very idea of reduction – phenomenological80 or 
linguistic81 – being ever at work in his works. My discussion reveals an element in 
middle Wittgenstein’s writings that has not received attention by authors 
discussing the question of whether he endorsed a method of reduction. This 
element is his conception of the isolation of different sensory fields and of 
different facets of ordinary propositions and phenomena – an isolation required by 
the construction of a phenomenological language.    
 This second chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2.1 focuses on the 
approach in “Some Remarks on Logical Form” which claims that ordinary 
language is inadequate for philosophical expression and clarification. While 
ordinary language disguises logical structure, Wittgenstein calls for an alternative 
symbolism which would exhibit this structure in particular domains of discourse. 
The call for such a symbolism echoes the call for a phenomenological language in 
the manuscripts, as alternative means of expression and clarification. Section 2.2 
adds more flesh to the view on ordinary language formulated in the paper. The 
section discusses Wittgenstein’s approach to ordinary propositions as hypotheses 
in manuscripts and recorded conversations. The conception of hypothesis provides 
a richer account of the way in which ordinary language disguises logical structure. 
Section 2.3 explores the idea of phenomenological language by contrast to 
ordinary language, which disguises logical structure due to its hypothetical 
character. Phenomenological language is meant to exhibit the formal connection 
with reality of particular ordinary propositions at a given moment. Unlike 
ordinary propositions, phenomenological statements can be verified by 
comparison to immediate experience. While being univocal, each 
phenomenological statement provides one of the many senses that a single 
ordinary proposition can have.  
  
                                                     
79 Ihde (1975: pp. 48, 49, 54), Hintikka (1996:  pp. 70-71, cf. 65). 
80 Ricoeur (1967: pp. 210-211), Reeder (1979: p. 44), Park (1998: pp. 2, 46f, 55, 189-191, 194). 
81 Arrington (1978: p. 299). 
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2.1 Ordinary language disguises logical structure 
 
Wittgenstein’s idea of phenomenological language is motivated by the concerns 
with ordinary language which he summarized in “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form”. Another look at this paper, focusing on aspects that I have not discussed so 
far, is in order here. The conception of phenomenological language as a means for 
philosophical clarification springs from some insights into the ways in which 
ordinary language disguises logical structure and the philosophical remedy for this 
envisaged by the paper.  
 I will first explore the general view of the paper on the syntax of ordinary 
language and I will suggest that at stake here is a distinction between a surface, 
apparent syntax and a deep, logical syntax (subsection 2.1.1). Then I will discuss 
Wittgenstein’s two-plane analogy, which throws light on this distinction 
(subsection 2.1.2). This gives the background for an exploration of his call for a 
precise symbolism or a clarificatory notation (subsection 2.1.3). I will then point 
out that this notation differs from the Tractarian one insofar as it employs 
numbers in some cases of analysis (subsection 2.1.4). I will finally turn to the 
notion of logical multiplicity, which Wittgenstein inherits in the 1929 paper from 
the Tractatus. In the paper this notion involves a correspondence between the 
new symbolism and actual phenomena scrutinized by a logical investigation 
envisaged there (subsection 2.1.5).    
 
2.1.1 Ordinary syntax and philosophical nonsense 
Wittgenstein’s paper conceives of syntax first in a “general sense of the word”, 
meaning, “the rules which tell us in which connections only a word gives sense, 
thus excluding nonsensical structures.”82 According to this conception:  
 
                                                     
82 SRLF: p. 29. 
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The syntax of ordinary language, as is well known, is not quite adequate 
for this purpose. It does not in all cases prevent the construction of 
nonsensical pseudo-propositions.83  
 
The syntax of ordinary language may not prevent the formation of pseudo-
propositions. To take an example from the paper: “The Real, though it is an in 
itself, must also be able to become a for myself”.  Uttered in a common situation, it 
may not be clear how this construction may be meant or taken at all. The use of 
some of its individual words may make sense in ordinary utterances, however. For 
instance, it makes sense to qualify a certain gain as “real” in a situation when it is 
doubtable that something has or has not been achieved.  It may make sense to 
distinguish between regarding a gain “in itself” and “for myself”, as a distinction 
between what a certain salary amounts to and what it allows me to do with it. The 
individual words in the above proposition can be employed on innumerable 
occasions to construct sensical utterances.  
The above proposition, however, as it appears is an alleged philosophical 
statement. What is questionable is whether in this particular connection the 
words have been assigned any meaning at all. That is, whether the proposition 
conveys any sense, while its formulation is not motivated by any practical 
concerns. The syntax of language does not prevent such departure, from a 
practically motivated use to an intended philosophical use. In a way, the 
proposition can be regarded as being grammatically in order. That is, if what is at 
stake is to tell whether its particular concatenation of words fits certain syntactical 
patterns involving a subject and predicate or such morphological patterns 
involving a noun and a verb. But a scrutiny of the proposition as scrutiny of its 
syntax in such senses, however, does not suffice to establish its sensicality or 
nonsensicality. Syntax as syntactical or morphological structure allows for certain 
propositional constructions, which at a closer scrutiny may turn to not actually 
convey any sense.   
                                                     
83 Ibid. 
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 This suggests that a distinction is already at work in the way Wittgenstein 
is dealing with the example above. It is a distinction between a surface, apparent 
syntax of language and its deep, logical syntax. The surface syntax  is what one 
may regard as grammatical in a text-book sense of the word. “The Real, though it 
is an in itself, must also be able to become a for myself” seems to have the 
structure of a subject and predicate proposition. Accordingly, “the real” can be 
taken to be a subject or noun and what is predicated upon it may be taken to be 
that it is “in itself”. According to this surface syntax, regarded in this case as 
involving a subject-predicate or noun-verb pattern, the proposition appears as 
being in order. But this pattern is not to be immediately taken as exhibiting the 
actual, logical structure of every proposition. It is precisely “where ordinary 
language disguises logical structure”84, presenting it in terms of a subject-predicate 
pattern, that it allows for the formation of pseudo-propositions. The apparent 
subject-predicate pattern is one of the features of ordinary language that disguises 
its actual, logical structure. Yet, how is it that logical structure may be actually 
hidden? How does language actually disguise it?  
 
2.1.2 The two-plane analogy 
In the paper, Wittgenstein talks not only of a logical structure of language, but 
also of a structure of phenomena. The thought is that language shares its actual, 
logical structure with the structure of phenomena or facts. At this point, there is 
no categorical distinction between phenomena and facts, both notions being used 
interchangeably throughout the paper with such notions as “reality” or “entities”. 
From the very beginning of the paper Wittgenstein’s call for clarification thus 
involves a turn to phenomena and he regards it as “surprising if the actual 
phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure”.85 Thus, on the 
one hand ordinary language disguises logical structure. On the other hand, 
ordinary language shares logical structure with phenomena or reality. He 
                                                     
84 SRLF: p. 29. 
85 SRLF: p. 30. 
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thematizes the way in which logical structure is disguised by language by way of 
an analogy of two planes.86  
 Given two parallels planes, on the first one figures are drawn such as 
ellipses and rectangles. Wittgenstein specifies that these figures are of different 
sizes and shapes. Thus the first plane may contain rectangles of various sizes, that 
is, not merely regular but also irregular rectangles. The task is to provide an image 
of these figures on a second plane, parallel with the first one. There are multiple 
ways of achieving this, for instance, devising various methods of projection 
according to different rules or norms. Essentially, however, on the second plane 
the figures will not be the exact figures of the first plane. Corresponding to ellipses 
on the first plane there would be circles on the second one. Corresponding to 
rectangles on the first plane there would be squares on the second one.  
 Conversely, and this is a main point of the analogy, there would be no 
way to infer exactly from the figures of the second plane the corresponding 
figures on the first plane. One could tell only loosely that to a certain square on 
the second plane there corresponds a rectangle on the first plane, but the exact 
size and shape of the rectangle could not be inferred. Wittgenstein explains: 
 
The case of ordinary language is quite analogous. If the facts of reality are 
the ellipses and rectangles on plane I the subject-predicate and relational 
forms correspond to the circles and squares in plane II. These forms are 
the norms of our particular language into which we project in ever so 
many different ways ever so many different logical forms. And for this 
very reason we can draw no conclusions – except very vague ones – from 
                                                     
86 This analogy questions aspects of two traditions. On the one hand, it questions an inclination to 
take forms like subject-predicate as basic or ultimate logical forms, as commonly done in Aristotelian 
logic. On the other hand, it questions the assumption that basic logical forms are necessarily 
relational, something Wittgenstein finds questionable in Carnap (cf. “we cannot proceed by 
assuming from the very beginning, as Carnap does, that the elementary propositions consist of two-
place relations” (WWK / WVC: p. 182 [dated 9 December 1931]). 
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the use of these norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena 
described.87 
 
The specification that on the first plane figures have different sizes and shapes is 
essential in the analogy. So is the fact that these specific sizes and shapes are not 
conserved in the second plane of the analogy. Conversely, in order “to get in a 
single instance at the determinate shape of the original we would have to know 
the individual method by which, e.g. a particular ellipse is projected into the 
circle before me”. The mention of “method” is crucial here. A method of 
projection would allow for a systematic way of rendering not just any square, but 
a square of a specific size on the first plane, starting from not just any rectangle, 
but a specific rectangle on the second plane. Such a systematic method of 
projection cannot be assumed in the relation between the two kinds of syntax of 
ordinary language. There is no reliable criterion according to which one could 
render deep, logical syntax from surface, apparent syntax. Instead, what the 
surface syntax of ordinary language presents is forms of the subject-predicate kind 
and relational forms. The variation of actual logical forms is forced into, and 
veiled by, surface forms. 
 One could not get at the actual logical structure of language and 
phenomena, by loosely or vaguely inferring it from the surface syntax of language. 
Such an approach would in fact disguise logical structure no less than the surface 
syntax of language does. Wittgenstein considers propositions like “This paper is 
boring” or “The weather is fine”. According to their surface syntax, these 
propositions seem to be of a subject-predicate kind. Yet, he makes it explicit at the 
same time that such propositions have nothing in common with one another. That 
is, they may have nothing in common insofar as their actual logical syntax is 
concerned.   
 The two-plane analogy is not meant to suggest though that the only means 
of access to the figures on the first plane is via the figures on the second plane. 
The point of the analogy is rather the need to look elsewhere than on the second 
                                                     
87 SRLF: pp. 30-31. 
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plane. Clarification of the workings of ordinary language is not to be achieved by 
way of ordinary language itself. On the one hand, clarification cannot be achieved 
by focusing solely on ordinary language, especially as its surface syntax turns out 
to be misleading. On the other hand, and for the same motives, the means or 
medium of expression cannot be ordinary language itself. Ordinary language 
cannot be, according to the 1929 paper, either the sole focus or the expressive 
means of clarification. Wittgenstein envisages a way to scrutinize logical 
structure, on the first plane in the analogy, by devising a distinct logical 
symbolism in order to account for facts of reality or phenomena:  
 
The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary 
language leads to endless misunderstandings.88 
 
What would an appropriate symbolism look like and what would it involve?  
 
2.1.3 The need of a symbolism for deep syntax 
If ordinary language cannot serve as the means to clarification, how can an 
appropriate symbolism be devised? And what would the relation of this 
symbolism be to ordinary language? According to the 1929 paper: 
 
[W]e can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one by 
inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to 
understand their logical multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at a 
correct analysis by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the 
phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by 
conjecturing about a priori possibilities.89 
 
An imprecise symbolism would be an account of the workings of language 
immediately derived from surface syntax. Such a symbolism would be imprecise 
in that the forms presented by the surface syntax would not exactly match the 
                                                     
88 SRLF: p. 29. 
89 SRLF: p. 29. 
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actual forms of logical syntax. An imprecise symbolism would be one exhibiting 
logical syntax as consisting, for example, in subject-predicate patterns or relational 
forms.  
 Wittgenstein argued already in his early writings that it would be 
misleading to try to derive logical syntax directly from the surface syntax of 
language. And that such an attempt would end up with an imprecise symbolism. 
According to the Tractatus: 
 
From [ordinary language, Umgangssprache] it is humanly impossible to 
gather immediately the logic of language. 
Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the 
clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the 
external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than 
to let the form of the body be recognized.90 
 
The solution to the task of revealing the logic of language involves in the 
Tractatus the employment of a truth-functional symbolism. This symbolism is 
meant to be applicable not only to the surface syntax of language. Indeed, the 
syntax of truth-functions is envisaged there as exhibiting combinations of 
propositions of whatever kind, including of atomic propositions. As such, the 
Tractarian approach is able to,  as it were, by-pass the surface syntax of language. 
But the focus of this approach remains language, or rather its own structure. 
 The Tractarian truth-functional approach is meant to by-pass not only the 
surface syntax of language, but also any inquiry into experience as a correlate of 
language use. For early Wittgenstein’s purely logical account of the workings of 
language, any resort to experience or phenomena would be a mark that 
clarificatory activity has already taken a wrong track.91 The present call for an 
inspection of phenomena seems to be at odds with a Tractarian approach. There is 
                                                     
90 TLP: 4.002. 
91 Cf. “Our fundamental principle is that every question which can be decided at all by logic can be 
decided off-hand. | (And if we get into a situation where we need to answer such a problem by 
looking at the world, this shows that we are fundamentally on a wrong track.) (TLP: 5.551) 
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indeed at stake a reconsideration of the viability of Tractarian account of logical 
syntax. This reconsideration amounts to Wittgenstein’s paper admitting that the 
Tractatus did not give an entirely satisfactory account of logical grammar in the 
particular case of colour-exclusion. The syntax of Tractarian logical product is 
meant to exhibit the syntax of any use of the connective “and” irrespective of the 
subject-matter of propositions. But the sensitivity of the meanings of connectives 
to the subject-matter of propositions turned out to be precisely a blind-spot of the 
Tractarian approach.  
 By contrast, the investigation called for by Wittgenstein’s paper is a 
posteriori in the sense of being sensitive to the subject-matter of the propositions 
in the domain of discourse to be clarified. Propositions that account for certain 
properties of phenomena, properties that admit gradations, turn out to have a 
particular form, that a purely truth-functional account of their workings does not 
capture. Along with a scrutiny of phenomena, which are the subject-matter of 
propositions, the Tractatus also by-passed the question of the particular forms of 
atomic or elementary propositions. While Wittgenstein’s paper maintains that the 
structure of any proposition can be accounted for in terms of truth-functional 
logic, it also contends that once we are dealing with atomic propositions, the 
investigation of their forms reveals, at least in certain cases, numbers as part of 
them.  
 So a clear symbolism that would avoid misunderstandings turns out to 
involve not only a truth-functional notation for the combination of propositions 
but also an appeal to numbers, possibly to equations, to ultimately spell out the 
forms of atomic propositions.  
 
2.1.4 When does symbolism involve numbers? 
The view put forward in the beginning of Wittgenstein’s paper is still faithful to 
the general spirit of the Tractatus: 
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If we try to analyze any given propositions we shall find in general that 
they are logical sums, products or other truth-functions of simpler 
propositions.92 
 
In early 1929 Wittgenstein still thinks that any language can be scrutinized in 
terms of truth-functional notation. Any proposition can be regarded as a truth-
function of simpler propositions, except for propositions that cannot be further 
analyzed. Such propositions, atomic propositions, mark the end-point of truth-
functional analysis. A truth-functional account of logical grammar provides rules 
for the combination of propositions, both atomic and complex. Yet, it leaves the 
question of the inner forms of the simplest propositions, of atomic propositions, 
aside.  
 In the Tractatus, the question of the forms of atomic propositions is 
regarded as irrelevant to its task. The forms of atomic propositions are taken to 
have nothing to do with the ways in which propositions combine with one 
another. Neither would truth-functional combination have any bearing on the 
inner forms of atomic propositions, nor would atomic forms influence or restrict 
at any point or in any case the ways in which propositions combine with one 
another.93  
 Yet, unlike the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s paper regards a scrutiny of 
atomic forms as urgent. This is to be understood not merely as a search for a 
solution to the colour-exclusion case, now given Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment 
that the Tractatus did not succeed in providing a satisfactory account in this 
respect. Rather, the case of colour-exclusion casts doubt more generally on the 
tenet that the inner structure of atomic propositions is independent from the ways 
in which more complex propositions combine with one another. As soon as an 
account of the forms of atomic propositions turns out to be vital for a viable 
clarification of the workings of language, an investigation of phenomena is not 
something that can be by-passed anymore. Clarifying language in cases such as 
colour-exclusion calls for an attendance to atomic forms, whose finding in its turn 
                                                     
92 SRLF: p. 29. 
93 Cf. WWK / WVC: p. 80.  
63 
 
calls for a consideration of the kinds of phenomena that colour ascriptions are 
about.94  
In this respect, Wittgenstein’s paper contains not only programmatic and 
methodological points, but also thematic commitments concerning atomic forms. 
The incipient logical investigation of phenomena carried out there provides a clue 
as to what forms atomic propositions involve. Wittgenstein writes: 
 
And here I wish to make my first definite remark on the logical analysis of 
the actual phenomena: it is this, that for their representation numbers 
(rational and irrational) must enter into the structure of the atomic 
propositions themselves. It is a characteristic of these properties that one 
degree of them excludes any other.95 
  
And a few lines below:  
 
And numbers will have to enter these forms when – as we should say in 
ordinary language – we are dealing with properties which admit of 
gradation, i.e., properties as the length of an interval, the pitch of a tone, 
the brightness or redness of a shade of colour, etc.96 
 
The requirement that numbers must enter the forms of atomic propositions may 
be puzzling to say the least.97 Before going into the details of this requirement, it 
should be observed though, that it is introduced by way of a conditional. It is not 
                                                     
94 In a later conversation recorded by Waismann, Wittgenstein is still convinced that a logical 
account of phenomena is the only means by which one can reveal the forms of elementary or atomic 
propositions: “Only when we analyze phenomena logically do we know what form elementary 
propositions have.” (WWK / WVC: p. 42 tr. mod. [dated 22 December 1929]. 
95 SRLF: p. 31. 
96 SRLF: p. 32.  
97 However, Wittgenstein’s seems to have entertained this view at least until the end of 1929. Cf. 
“The real number or something similar to the real number can appear in the elementary proposition, 
and this fact alone proves how completely different the elementary proposition can be from all other 
propositions.” (WWK / WVC: p. 42 [dated 22 December 1929]). 
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that the form of every atomic proposition must contain numbers, but that it does 
so only when we are dealing with properties which admit of gradation, such as 
the brightness of a shade of colour.  
 The specificity of this remark about constituents of atomic forms as 
concerning solely propositions ascribing degrees may be easily overlooked. 
Indeed, Hintikka seems to draw a general conclusion that, at this point in his 
development, “what Wittgenstein has in mind is precisely the invasion of 
numbers and equations into language-world relations”98. Hintikka in fact argues 
that Wittgenstein at this stage “replaced the truth-function theory by an 
arithmetic calculus as the mediator between elementary and complex 
propositions.” 99  However, Wittgenstein’s remarks above about numbers as 
constituents of atomic forms are neither that general nor that radical.  Again, the 
view that numbers must enter the forms of atomic propositions is meant for cases 
that involve the ascription of degrees of a property, such as colour or sound. 
Further, Wittgenstein does not regard numbers as mediating between elementary, 
or atomic, propositions and complex, or molecular, propositions. The concern 
here is only with the question of the forms of atomic propositions. In addition, the 
beginning of the paper is explicit, as pointed out above, in that the analysis of any 
proposition ends up with simpler propositions combined in terms of truth-
functional logic.  
So the requirement that numbers must enter logical forms does not 
concern atomic propositions in general, but is confined to the domain of atomic 
propositions which ascribe a degree to a property. Making an unbounded claim 
even about the forms of atomic propositions in general would go against precisely 
Wittgenstein’s warning. Atomic forms cannot be given a priori. Atomic forms 
cannot be given otherwise than on the basis of attending to particular domains of 
discourse and for those particular domains of discourse actually investigated, such 
as propositions about colours or sounds. These propositions may be quite different 
in terms of logical forms, from propositions about, say, weather. This particular 
view does not mark a discontinuity with the Tractatus. Yet, the Tractatus regards 
                                                     
98 Hintikka (1996 [1988]: p. 86). 
99 Ibid. 
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the investigation of particular atomic forms as amounting not to logic, but to an 
application of logic. As such, the Tractatus does not need to say something definite 
about the inner structure of atomic propositions, except that they consist of 
names. How particular names are concatenated within particular atomic 
propositions is something that an application of logic, falling outside the scope of 
the Tractatus, is to establish.   
If the 1929 paper calls for a resort to an inspection of phenomena, it is not 
a resort to be carried out once and for all, such that atomic forms can be given 
straightaway, for any domain of discourse. In this sense, Hintikka’s view that 
Wittgenstein replaces a logic of truth-functions with a logic of equations is, from a 
certain point onwards, misleading. A logic of equations is not put forward as an 
exclusive approach that would solve the problem of the inner structure of atomic 
propositions in general. Furthermore, the relations between propositions are still 
regarded as truth-functional or amenable to a truth-functional account. The 
requirement that numbers enter atomic forms, if it can be said to involve a logic at 
all, concerns merely specific atomic propositions ascribing degrees of quality.   
The requirement that numbers must enter atomic forms in specific cases is 
a requirement that specific descriptions of specific phenomena have the right or 
correct logical multiplicity. A closer look at Wittgenstein’s notion of logical 
multiplicity will shed more light on his call for a clearer symbolism.  
 
2.1.5 Completeness and logical multiplicity 
The notion of logical multiplicity, which the Tractatus equates with 
“mathematical multiplicity”100, involves a correspondence between a description 
and that which it describes. The 1929 paper characterises as “logical” not only the 
investigation, but also the very structure of phenomena. Just as it employs the 
phrase “logical multiplicity” to qualify phenomena too 101  and not only their 
                                                     
100 The Tractarian remark 4.04 mentions Herz as the source of these equivalent notions. The German 
for “multiplicity” is in the Tractatus “Manigfaltigkeit” and in writings around 1929 both 
“Man(n)igfaltigkeit” and “Multiplizität”. 
101 SRLF: p. 30. 
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description 102 . The logical multiplicity of the phenomenon stands for the 
multitude of a phenomenon’s properties and of their gradations. The logical 
multiplicity of the description of a phenomenon stands for the reflection of these 
properties and gradations in the formal construction of the proposition that 
account for the phenomenon in question.103  
 Already according to the Tractatus, any fleck has around it a “colour-
space”104 and, by the same token, any tone has around it a pitch-space, any tactile 
object a hardness-space etc. That is, any fleck has to have some colour, any tone 
some pitch, any tactile object some hardness. Any phenomenon lies in a spectrum 
of pertinent possibilities, it has a range of possible properties. These properties in 
their turn have a range of possible configurations or, in some cases, possible 
gradations. Now, the paper calls for an investigation of the gradations, transitions, 
and combinations of phenomena and their properties. Accordingly, a precise 
symbolism involves one’s giving atomic propositions that have the correct 
multiplicity. An atomic proposition has the correct multiplicity if it is able to 
account in principle not only for the actual properties (e.g. redness or round 
shape) of a phenomenon (e.g. a visual fleck), but also for its possible pertinent 
properties (i.e. its possible greenness or its possible square shape). Moreover, the 
proposition has to be capable to account in principle not only for these properties’ 
actual gradations (e.g. a particular brightness of red), but also for their other 
possible pertinent gradations (i.e. other possible brightness of red). In the case of 
atomic propositions ascribing degrees, their having the right multiplicity requires 
that numbers are part of their logical construction. This is because the relation 
between numbers, unlike truth-functional relations, is able to reflect in the 
symbolism the exclusion between degrees. If a phenomenon is of a certain colour 
of a certain degree, that already excludes that its colour is of any other degree. Just 
                                                     
102 SRLF: p. 31. 
103 Cf. “The multiplicity of spatial description is intrinsically given by the fact that the description 
has the right multiplicity when it is capable to describe all conceivable configurations.” (Ms 106: p. 
69 [Pichler (1994): ≈ March – April 1929].)  
104 TLP: 2.0131. 
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as, if a person is of a certain height, that already excludes that the same person is 
of any other height.  
It is not only a symbolism accounting for colours that involves numbers, 
but also a symbolism accounting for the position and shape of a fleck. An account 
of the position and shape of a fleck can be given by way of the atomic proposition 
“[6-9, 3-8] R”, where “R” stands for “red” and “6-9” and “3-8” are the abscissa and 
ordinate intervals of the fleck in a coordinate system. Wittgenstein admits that 
this description is “not complete” because it does not take into account time, 
among other possible aspects of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the employment 
of two-dimensional space by this account may not be viable to every clarificatory 
purpose. This description of the position and shape of a phenomenon is an overly 
simplified one. Its rationale is, however, to point in the direction of the kind of 
symbolism required. Above all, the description exemplifies how numbers, given 
that they must enter atomic forms, are to actually appear in the symbolism to be 
devised.  
Despite its not being complete, Wittgenstein finds it “clear that this 
description will have the right logical multiplicity, and that a description which 
has a smaller multiplicity will not do”.105 So in order to be complete, a description 
must have the right multiplicity, but it need not be complete in order to have the 
right multiplicity. The criterion for a description having the right multiplicity is 
set by the particular purpose of devising a symbolism on a particular occasion. If 
the purpose is to account for the shape and position of the phenomenon, then a 
description such as the one above involving numbers already has the right 
multiplicity. Such a description accounts for the minimal features of the 
phenomenon which are relevant to its shape and position. The description yet 
falls short of completeness. But it is not clear how completeness may be achieved 
at least in the context of the paper. Wittgenstein does not give further indications 
as to what may be decisive in regarding a description as complete or not. If a 
complete description requires an account of each and every possible feature of a 
phenomenon, and not only of those that are relevant to a particular clarificatory 
                                                     
105 SRLF: p. 31. 
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aim, it is difficult to see how or indeed whether a description can ever be regarded 
as complete in this sense. This notion of completeness may be one of the reasons 
why Wittgenstein was in the end dissatisfied with the paper. What remains clear 
in his example is that some descriptions may be at least dismissed on the basis of 
their having a smaller multiplicity than the one required by their purpose. For 
instance, trying to describe the position and shape of a fleck by accounting merely 
for its coordinates on the abscissa in the system will obviously not suffice.  
A description with a greater or higher multiplicity is also to be regarded as 
inadequate. This is the diagnosis of the attempt to account for colour-exclusion in 
terms of a modified truth-table for logical product. In that case, the first line, 
namely T T F, is characterized as giving “a greater multiplicity than that of the 
actual possibilities”106. That is, such a modified table mismatches the possible ways 
in which Tractarian logical product handles truth-values.  
 In this respect, the paper has an open end, calling for further inquiry in 
order to arrive at an appropriate symbolism, with the correct logical multiplicity. 
The emphasis is on the need for an “analysis of the phenomena in question 
[which], as we all know, has not yet been achieved”107. The trajectory and at least 
incipient achievements of such an analysis are yet envisaged in the paper:  
 
If, now, we try to get an actual analysis, we find logical forms which have 
very little similarity with the norms of ordinary language. We meet with 
the forms of space and time with the whole manifold of spatial and 
temporal objects, as colours, sounds, etc., etc., with their gradations, 
continuous transitions, and combinations in various proportions, all of 
which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression.108  
 
This emphasis on the need for an actual analysis goes hand in hand with the 
previous view that ordinary language is not a viable means of philosophical 
expression or a viable tool for clarification. While logical forms have little 
                                                     
106 SRLF: p. 35. 
107 SRLF: p. 35. 
108 SRLF: p. 31. 
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similarity with the norms of ordinary language, Wittgenstein’s paper, envisages, as 
it were, a deep account of the structure of language. This account would be 
sensitive to the inner forms of atomic propositions. According to the incipient 
inquiry of the paper, the forms of atomic propositions ascribing degrees contain 
numbers. What the forms of other atomic propositions are remains an open 
question at this stage.  
What is, however, established is that an account of atomic forms is 
inseparable from a consideration of kinds of phenomena that analyzed 
propositions describe. Insofar as phenomena are the subject-matter of analyzed 
propositions, they share their logical forms with the latter. The connection 
between a scrutiny of the structure of phenomena as clarificatory means and the 
finding of atomic forms as clarificatory end is maintained by Wittgenstein in 
other sources from the same period as well. A remark of Wittgenstein recorded by 
Waismann later in 1929 reads: 
 
Only when we analyze phenomena logically shall we know what form 
elementary propositions have. Here is an area where there is no 
hypothesis.109  
 
This remark supports the requirement of a logical analysis of phenomena while 
introducing a further element: the notion of hypothesis. In what follows, I will 
discuss Wittgenstein’s conception of hypothesis as central to his view on ordinary 
language in his manuscripts from 1929 onwards and further sources. The notion of 
hypothesis will prove itself to be decisive in understanding the relation between 
his approach to ordinary language and his idea of phenomenological language in 
this period.  
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2.2 Ordinary propositions as hypothesis-laden descriptions 
 
Manuscripts from roughly the same period as Wittgenstein’s paper present a 
distrust, similar to the one above, with ordinary language. Not only does he insist 
that a clarification of the workings of language cannot focus solely on this form of 
expression, which cannot serve as a means for philosophical expression. The 
manuscripts emphasize that philosophical clarification  involves a systematic 
account of the structure of reality or phenomena. The unreliability of ordinary 
language as the sole focus or means of analysis was thematized in the paper in that 
ordinary language was said to disguise logical structure. The manuscripts make the 
same point by readdressing the relation between ordinary language on the one 
hand and reality or phenomena on the other hand. Ordinary language is seen as 
shedding a distorting light on objects:   
 
All our forms of speech are taken from normal physicalist [normalen 
physikalischen] language and are not to be used in theory of knowledge or 
phenomenology without casting a distorting light on the object.110 
 
This section will proceed as follows. First, I will present an interpretative puzzle 
posed by Wittgenstein’s twofold characterization of ordinary language as 
“physikalische” and as “hypothetical” (subsection 2.2.1). Then I will argue that 
part of this difficulty is already removed if one takes “hypothesis” as a technical 
notion. I will discuss two models of hypothesis, one as informing a conception 
that Wittgenstein opposes, the other as informing a conception that he endorses. 
The latter conception accounts for ordinary propositions as multifaceted 
grammatical structures (subsection 2.2.2). Then I will explore the account that the 
conception of hypothesis provides for the sense and truth of ordinary propositions 
(subsection 2.2.3.). This account will turn out to be complicated by Wittgenstein’s 
regarding phenomena and situations in their turn as having a multifaceted 
structure (subsection 2.2.4).  
                                                     
110 Ms 107: p. 160 [dated 11 October 1929] / PR: § 57  tr. mod. 
71 
 
 
2.2.1 Physikalische Sprache and its characterization as hypothetical 
The terms “physicalist” in the previous quote may strike one as unusual in 
conjunction with the notion of language. In the manuscripts the term 
“physikalisch” often qualifies not only the notion of “language”, but also notions, 
which will be discussed later on, such as “space”. In connection to the notion of 
“language”, the word “physikalisch” has been often translated as “physical”, both 
in translations of manuscripts from this period111 and in secondary literature112. 
This translation may invite a misunderstanding of the status of “physikalische 
Sprache”. “Physikalische Sprache” is not strictly meant by Wittgenstein as the 
discourse of physics. “Physikalische Sprache” is further qualified above as normal. 
“Physikalische Sprache” is normal in that it has a colloquial, everyday, or ordinary 
use. But “physikalische Sprache” is not confined to ordinary uses. Wittgenstein’s 
conception not only allows for, but considers, an overlap between language in 
ordinary use and the discourse of the sciences, particularly that of physics.113 Yet 
he is concerned not with the question of which words or sentences may be used in 
one as well as in other forms of discourse. What is at stake here is an objectifying 
function of language, whether used ordinarily or within the sciences. The 
question of this commonality between ordinary discourse and the discourse of 
physics is touched upon by Wittgenstein’s conception of hypothesis.  
 Surprisingly, this conception has not received much attention in the 
literature. Even among readings which do give some attention to the notion of 
hypothesis, there is a wide disagreement as to what it amounts to. One view is 
that Wittgenstein is concerned with scientific hypotheses, that is, “hypotheses 
                                                     
111 See, for instance, the original translation of the above quote in the Philosophical Remarks § 57. 
112 See, for instance, the recurrent translation of “physikalisch” as “physical” in Hintikka (1996). 
113 According to Noë, the discourse of physics includes language in ordinary use: “It is plausible to 
suppose that under the rubric ‘physics’ Wittgenstein included ordinary talk about physical objects.” 
(Noë 1997: p. 10.) But the opposite would be a better way to put it, given that Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on ordinary language by far outnumber the ones concerned with physics. Or perhaps 
talking in terms of inclusion is itself misleading here, while seeing the relation at stake in terms of an 
overlap does most justice to Wittgenstein’s view.  
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from physics, physiology, and empirical psychology”114. Another view is that for 
Wittgenstein hypotheses are to be understood as prejudices115. What is generally 
agreed upon is that, at this point in his development, Wittgenstein aims at 
providing a philosophical method in order to avoid hypotheses, whatever they 
may amount to. As suggested by the above two readings, the oscillation in the 
interpretation of the conception of hypotheses is closely tied to an oscillation in 
the interpretation of “physikalische Sprache”, as either a medium for expression in 
science or an ordinary means of expression.  
 In what follows, I attempt to provide an account of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of hypothesis by focusing primarily on two sources, where this 
conception is unfolded at length. One source is constituted by parts of the 
manuscripts 105, 107, and 108 which contain relevant remarks written at various 
points mostly during 1929 and early 1930. The other source is constituted by a 
series of conversations of Wittgenstein recorded by Waismann from late 1929 
onwards. My claim is that the notion of hypothesis is a technical term for 
Wittgenstein. Indeed, it has recently been argued that a historical source of 
Wittgenstein’s concern with hypotheses is a lecture of Brower, arguably attended 
by Wittgenstein in 1928.116 Furthermore, Wittgenstein was explicitly concerned 
with the way in which his own conception of hypothesis differs from one 
developed by Poincaré.117  
 One can start by observing that the notion of hypothesis is not confined 
by Wittgenstein to the discourse of the sciences but rather qualifies ordinary 
language: 
 
Every proposition that we express in ordinary life seems to have the 
character of a hypothesis.118 
                                                     
114 Spiegelberg ([1968] 1981: p. 216). 
115  Kienzler argues that Wittgenstein’s phenomenology seeks a prejudice-free description 
[vorurteilsfreie Beschreibung] (Kienzler 1997: p. 106). 
116 Cf. Marion (2008). 
117 Cf. WWK / WVC: p. 211. 
118 Ms 107: p. 249 [dated 20 January 1930]. 
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This remark already questions a reading of the notion of hypothesis as concerning 
strictly or solely a domain of discourse of a particular science. On the other hand, 
hypotheses do not simply amount to prejudices. While such and such a 
proposition can be regarded on a particular occasion to be a prejudice, 
Wittgenstein is qualifying every ordinary proposition as a hypothesis.  
 While characterizing ordinary propositions in terms of hypotheses, 
Wittgenstein is in fact putting forward a grammatical account, meant to spell out 
their objectifying tendency along with their complex structure. The conversations 
recorded by Waismann provide two models of hypothesis that will be explored 
here.  
 
2.2.2 Hypothesis as multifaceted grammatical structure 
The models of hypothesis that the Waismann conversations provide seem quite 
similar at first sight. However, they inform divergent conceptions. One of these 
models informs a conception which Wittgenstein opposes. The other informs a 
conception which he endorses. The first model is the following: 
 
On a field of ruins fragments of columns, capitals, pediments are dug up 
and it is said: That was a temple. The fragments are completed, gaps are 
filled up in the imagination, lines are traced. This is a likeness for a 
hypothesis.119 
  
In the recorded conversation there follows a drawing of a column, several parts of 
which are missing and are only sketched. According to this model, a hypothesis 
seems to be an incomplete construction. Some of its fragments have been lost or at 
least have not been conserved in the original form.  
 This likeness informs the following conception of hypothesis, which 
Wittgenstein does not endorse. According to this conception, an ordinary 
statement is a hypothesis in that its truth is not firmly established. It may be that 
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one may have not checked all pertinent situations which may help in firmly 
establishing the truth of the statement in the first place. Or perhaps some 
situations, although considered to be crucial to such an establishment, have not 
been accessible somehow. It may seem that the criterion for the establishment of 
truth of an ordinary proposition is, as Wittgenstein puts it, a historical one120. In 
this light the truth of an ordinary proposition as a hypothesis may be regarded as 
more or less firmly established, according to how much evidence is available or 
has been gathered for or against it. 
Wittgenstein is reluctant to endorse such a notion of hypothesis because 
he is reluctant to endorse a notion of truth coming in degrees. Thus he states: 
“according to my conception, however, a hypothesis is from the outset a 
completely different grammatical structure”121. 
The other model of hypothesis, which informs a conception that 
Wittgenstein endorses, is the following: 
 
A hypothesis always has different sides [Seiten] or different sections 
[Schnitte], like a three-dimensional body, which can be projected in 
different ways.122  
 
According to this model, the hypothesis is not incomplete. As a three-dimensional 
body, it has different sides or different sections. The multitude of sides or sections 
of a hypothesis, may yet invite a misunderstanding as to its relation to reality. The 
many ways in which a hypothesis can be projected against reality may be taken as 
many ways in which it can be verified. But this would still involve an assumption 
of the questioned conception of hypothesis, according to which there may be 
alternative and possibly conflicting situations that are relevant for the 
establishment of the truth or falsity of one and the same proposition. Wittgenstein 
regards this as a mere appearance: “in cases where we appear to have verified the 
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same proposition in different ways, we have in reality verified different cross-
sections of the same hypothesis”123.  
 Wittgenstein does not deny that a hypothesis can be said to agree or 
disagree with reality. Nor does he deny that in ordinary life propositions can be 
rightly said to be true or false. What he wants to keep apart is an ordinary sense of 
truth and falsehood from a technical sense which involves verification. As seen in 
a moment, to apply the method of verification to a hypothesis is misleading. Only 
the facets of a hypothesis can be verified. Verification involves the isolation of 
these facets from one another and their comparison with immediate experience.  
 
2.2.3 The sense and the truth of a hypothesis 
The notion of hypothesis as a multifaceted grammatical structure is tied to 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the sense of ordinary propositions as their agreement 
and disagreement with reality or experience. What an ordinary proposition means 
cannot be decided off-hand, apart from the way in which it is actually used on 
particular situations. If there is something necessary in order for a proposition to 
have sense, it is that it agrees or disagrees with reality somehow. The particular 
way in which it does agree or disagree settles the question of what sense it 
actually has: 
 
All that is necessary [nötig] for our propositions (about reality) to have 
sense, is that our experience in some sense or other agrees with them or 
does not agree with them. That is, immediate experience must confirm 
only something about them, some facet [Facette] of them. And in fact this 
picture is immediately taken from reality, since we say ‘There is a chair 
here’, when we only see one side of it.124 
 
In order for a proposition like “There is a chair here” to have sense, what is 
necessary is that this proposition have some contact with experience. This contact 
need not amount strictly to an agreement with experience, in which case the 
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124 Ms 107: p. 205 [dated 25 November 1929] / PR: § 225  tr. mod.  
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proposition would count as a true one. The proposition may also make contact 
with experience by disagreeing with it. In this case, the proposition would be 
false, yet it would still have sense. Both the truth/falsity and the sense of the 
proposition are settled by the particular way in which it is meant or taken. 
The contact established between the proposition “There is a chair here” 
and the situation satisfies the minimal requirement that the proposition has sense. 
The proposition may be meant as part of an inventory of the furniture in a room. 
Or it may be meant as an answer to a request to point out objects of a certain 
colour. Or indicate obstacles of considerable size that are in the way. What counts 
as the proposition having any one of these particular senses is given by what is 
pertinent for its counting as a true or false proposition. The chair in the particular 
situation may well be counted as part of the furniture in the room. This can be 
done without indicating its being of a particular colour. Or the chair may be of the 
colour invoked by the request without its counting as an obstacle of considerable 
size and thus in need of being removed out of the way. The proposition “There is a 
chair here” may have different senses and it may be true or false in different ways 
according to how it is actually meant or taken. That a situation makes available a 
side of the chair only satisfies the requirement that the proposition has some 
contact with experience. That is, that among the possible uses of the proposition 
there are pertinent ones on a certain occasion. 
 These different ways of meaning or taking the proposition count as 
different facets of the hypothesis as a grammatical construction. Pushing 
Wittgenstein’s model further, one could say that a survey of the pertinent senses 
of a proposition in a given situation would involve a rotation of the hypothesis as 
a multifaceted structure in three-dimensional space. When the proposition counts 
as true, one particular facet depicts what a particular situation makes available. 
The question of the contact between a proposition and a situation is more 
complicated, since Wittgenstein conceives also of phenomena and situations as 
multi-facetted grammatical structures.  
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2.2.4 Multifaceted phenomena unified by a hypothesis 
On the one hand, Wittgenstein regards a hypothesis as a multi-dimensional 
grammatical structure. On the other hand, he regards phenomena and situations 
accounted for by hypotheses as having multi-dimensional structures. For example, 
a conversation recorded by Waismann reads: 
 
Phenomena are simply different facets [Facetten], which are unified 
[verbunden] by a hypothesis.125 
 
The view can be spelled out against the background of the same example of the 
chair he gives in manuscript. A chair is not ordinarily seen from several angles at 
the same time. This may be thought to be achieved perhaps, by way of a system of 
mirrors. But this would still not make available every angle from which the chair 
can be seen. For example, certain sides of the seat and of the legs would still 
remain unseen. Above all, the notion of “facets” does not simply stand for visual 
sides of the chair, for what one may see when looking at a chair. There are also 
facets which may not immediately come to one’s mind, yet which may well be the 
subject-matter of discourse about a chair. For instance, its volume. Or its weight. 
Other features count as facets of the chair as phenomenon and each of these may 
be the subject-matter of discourse on various occasions.  
 What is at stake here is not a metaphysical claim that the chair itself 
somehow consists of all facets that may be the subject-matter of discourse. That is, 
that the chair has inherent features, each of which may be accounted for sooner 
or later on a pertinent occasion. Nor is this a claim that the facets of the chair 
could turn out to be infinite. That is, that the chair would be made up of an 
infinite number of features, lying inherently in or as a chair.  
 This view of phenomena as multitude of facets is rather a grammatical 
device meant to account for the fact that one and the same content of experience 
makes available a multitude of ordinary descriptions. Just as the view of 
hypothesis as a multidimensional grammatical structure is meant to account for 
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the fact that one and the same ordinary proposition can be meant or taken in a 
multitude of ways. Wittgenstein makes this point not only with regard to 
particular phenomena, but also with regard to more complex situations. Like 
phenomena, situations provide a multitude of features that make them describable 
in a multitude of ways. Like the facets of a phenomenon, the features or 
“symptoms” of a situation make available alternative descriptions by way of one 
and the same hypothesis. The talk of symptoms is occasioned, in Waismann’s 
recordings, by a question Schlick poses to Wittgenstein. Schlick first mentions 
propositions of physics and the fact that they can be verified in different ways. He 
asks: “How can one in general say that one proposition is verified in different 
ways?”126 Then he suggests that it is the laws of nature that connect the different 
kinds of verification. Wittgenstein’s answer immediately moves the question into 
the field of ordinary life: 
 
Just a minute!  That does not occur only in science, does it?, but also in 
everyday life. For instance, I hear piano-playing in the next room and say, 
‘My brother is in that room’. If I were now asked how I knew, I would 
answer, ‘He told me that he would be in the next room at that time’. Or, ‘I 
heard the piano being played and I recognize his way of playing’. Or ‘Just 
now I heard steps that sounded just like his’ etc. Now it seems as if I 
verified the same sentence in ways that were different every time. But this 
is not so. What I have verified are different symptoms of something else. 
(I have called them ‘symptoms’ in my manuscript). The playing of the 
piano, the steps, etc. are symptoms of my brother’s presence.127   
 
The hypothesis as grammatical structure unifies not only multiple facets of one 
and the same phenomenon, but also multiple features of one and the same 
situation. The question is not how many features a certain situation affords or 
offers. Nor is it that one situation may afford or offer an infinity of features. 
                                                     
126 WWK / WVC: p. 158  tr. mod. [dated 4 January 1931]. 
127 WWK / WVC: pp. 158-159. For a further use of the notion of “symptom” in relation to the one of 
hypothesis in the manuscript, cf. e.g. Ms 108: p. 141 [dated 1 May 1930]. 
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Features rather count as contents of experience made available by particular 
occasions. Such contents may be the visual image of a person in front of a piano, 
sounds of the piano, or sounds of steps. Now it may seem that one and the same 
proposition, “My brother is in that room”, can be verified in different ways, 
according to which features of the presence of the piano-player are made available 
by the situation. But Wittgenstein replies that it is not the proposition itself that is 
verified in different ways. What is verified is each time a different symptom of the 
situation. The aim of Wittgenstein’s answer is twofold. On the one hand, it 
counteracts Schlick’s suggestion that each time it is one and the same proposition 
that is verified in different ways. On the other hand, it counteracts Schlick’s 
surmise that the unity of these different ways of verification is given by a physical 
law.  
The latter concern is not only with the unity of ordinary propositions, but, 
as the beginning of Wittgenstein’s answer suggests, also with propositions of 
science. Indeed, his conception of hypothesis informs a way to account for a 
certain commonality or overlap between the use of propositions both in ordinary 
life and in science. However, in neither of the two cases does his account of this 
commonality appeal to scientific insights or laws. It may be tempting – as evinced 
by Schlick’s question – to take the unity of multiple ways to verify a proposition as 
given by laws of nature or laws expressed by physics. This may suggest that the 
unity of the chair as phenomenon is due to laws such as that of gravity, according 
to which the chair will remain on the floor provided nobody lifts it. Or due to 
laws concerning the continuity of matter, according to which, the physical 
constitution of the chair will remain unchanged, provided nobody tears it apart or 
sets it on fire. Wittgenstein does not deny that such accounts of the unity of 
phenomena can be given. His account of the unity at stake is, however, 
grammatical. The notion of hypothesis as grammatical structure is meant to make 
intelligible how different verifications can be carried out by comparison with 
reality, while none of these is a verification of the hypothesis, but each time of a 
different facet of it. If a hypothesis can be explicated in different ways, that does 
not mean that the hypothesis does not account for one and the same 
phenomenon. If different grounds can be given for asserting that someone is 
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playing the piano in another room, that does not mean that each time it is a 
different person that is talked about, or that each time it is another room that is 
invoked.  
So far we have seen that, while the 1929 paper regards ordinary language 
as disguising logical structure, subsequent sources put forward an account of 
ordinary propositions as having a hypothetical grammatical structure, which sheds 
further light on the mode of this disguise. The paper approaches ordinary 
language in terms of a difference between surface, apparent syntax and actual, 
logical syntax. Subsequent sources approach ordinary propositions in terms of 
multifaceted grammatical structures, each of these facets amounting to a mode of 
projection of an ordinary proposition on to reality. From both the paper and 
subsequent sources explored so far, a grammatical account of ordinary language 
transpires, according to which ordinary propositions have a certain depth or 
multidimensionality. It is this depth or multidimensionality that makes ordinary 
language, at this point in Wittgenstein’s development, unreliable as a means of 
philosophical expression or as the sole focus of the activity of clarification.   
  Wittgenstein’s qualification of ordinary propositions as hypotheses shows 
that the latter notion does not stand for hypothetical entities or approaches from 
physics, physiology, and empirical psychology, as previously suggested in the 
literature. Hypotheses in his use of the term are not mere prejudices either. 
Wittgenstein’s characterization of both ordinary propositions and propositions 
from physics as hypotheses, nonetheless, points to a certain commonality between 
such diverse uses of language. Both ordinary uses of language and the discourse of 
physics account for the content of experience in terms of physical objects. In 
ordinary language, this objectifying tendency is the corollary of its surface 
grammar presenting subject-predicate forms. Ascribing a predicate to a subject, or 
a property to an object seems to be a basic form of utterance. Likewise physics – or 
perhaps rather mechanics, which Wittgenstein seems to have in mind primarily 
when referring to physics – accounts for relations between physical objects, their 
behaviour under certain circumstances, and laws governing such relations and 
behaviours.   
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This conception of hypothesis involves an attempt to account for the 
structure of language and its workings. This conception, however,  amounts only 
to one half of the account. The other half is given by the notion of 
phenomenological language. The next section will discuss this notion against the 
background of the conception of hypothesis introduced above.  
 
2.3 Phenomenological statements as hypothesis-free descriptions 
 
Elucidating the notion of phenomenological language boils down, in the end, to 
an elucidation of its relation to ordinary language. This is indeed an interpretive 
tenet at work also in the extensive writings of Hintikka on the subject. Hintikka 
suggests that the distinction between physicalist and phenomenological language 
is in fact a distinction between an object-oriented, public identification of persons, 
events, places etc. and an ostensive identification in terms of demonstratives such 
as “this” or “that”128. He insists that “we are not dealing with two different classes 
of objects in the usual sense of the word but with two modes of identification”.129 
Hintikka’s focus on the idea of phenomenological language is motivated, however, 
by an attempt to trace a strong continuity between Wittgenstein’s early writings 
and the works around 1929. The main claim meant to substantiate this continuity 
is that phenomenological language is not a new concern for Wittgenstein from 
1929 onwards. Rather, it is a concern implicitly present in the Tractatus, where 
phenomenological language constitutes the bottom end of logical analysis.130 
 According to the first chapter above, Wittgenstein’s conception of 
phenomenology is, in contrast to Hintikka’s interpretation, motivated by his 
dissatisfaction with the Tractarian account of logical grammar. The present 
reconstruction of his conception of phenomenology, however, is consistent with 
the idea of a minimal continuity between various stages of his development. This 
minimal continuity amounts to the fact that the aim of both early Wittgenstein’s 
method of analysis and the explicit conception of phenomenological language is 
                                                     
128 Hintikka (1996: pp. 75-76). 
129 Hintikka (1996: pp. 219-220).  
130 This is a recurrent claim in Hintikka & Hintikka (1986).  
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philosophical clarification. The means of the two approaches are, nonetheless, 
quite different from one another. The Tractarian logical analysis is meant to be 
carried out, as it were, vertically throughout language. This analysis accounts for 
the composition of molecular propositions from simpler and simpler propositions, 
until atomic propositions are thus reached. The idea of phenomenological 
language involves an analysis of ordinary language in a novel way. This analysis 
amounts to an isolation of facets of ordinary propositions which have a 
multidimensional grammatical structure. Essentially, these facets are not bound 
together in ways to be expressed by rules of syntax provided by Tractarian truth-
tables. At the same time, Wittgenstein does not account for a unity of ordinary 
language as the unity of hypotheses by way of a Tractarian general form of the 
proposition.  
 The conception of hypothesis as central to the relation between 
phenomenological and ordinary language is virtually missing from Hintikka’s 
reading of this relation. However, according to one of Wittgenstein’s most 
straightforward remarks on phenomenological language, the notion of hypothesis 
is clearly central in this respect: 
 
Phenomenological language: the description of the immediate sense-
perception without hypothetical addition [hypothetische Zutat].131  
 
The term “hypothesis” appears here in an attributive form, qualifying a possible 
addition. An addition to what? From the angle of phenomenological language, its 
relation to ordinary language appears as involving an addition: the addition of a 
hypothetical element to a description of immediate perception. From the angle of 
ordinary language, its relation to phenomenological language appears as involving 
a subtraction or, as Wittgenstein will put it, an “isolation”. That is, a subtraction or 
an isolation of facets of an ordinary proposition.  
 The present section will proceed as follows. First I will revisit the view 
that hypotheses are not themselves verifiable. Wittgenstein reserves the notion of 
                                                     
131 Ms 113: p. 123r [dated 19 May 1932]. 
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verification for phenomenological statements, namely, for the facets of 
hypotheses. The category of verification is tied to a particular notion of truth and 
falsity (subsection 2.3.1). Then I will suggest that, while phenomenological 
language is restricted to what is verifiable, this requires that such a language needs 
to be richer than a form of expression consisting purely in demonstratives, as 
Hintikka characterizes it (subsection 2.3.2). Indeed, in order that a 
phenomenological statement be verifiable, it needs to consist in a facet of an 
ordinary proposition, which is a description of the actual data of experience. 
Verification requires not only an isolation of facets of hypotheses, but also a 
twofold isolation on the side of experience. This is the isolation of sensory fields 
from one another and the isolation of actually available facets of phenomena from 
the ones that are not actually available at a given moment (subsection 2.3.3). 
 
2.3.1 The verification of phenomenological statements 
The concern with the isolation of the facets of a hypothesis is tied with 
Wittgenstein’s specific use of the category of verification. His account of ordinary 
language turned out at several points above to oppose the application of the 
category of verification to ordinary propositions or hypotheses. The hypothesis is 
not itself verified in different ways by comparison with different aspects of 
experience. What is actually verified is each time a different facet of a hypothesis. 
The first model of hypothesis in terms of a fragmentary column was one which 
informed a conception of hypothesis as incomplete, whose truth would come in 
degrees and would be established more or less firmly, according to the amount of 
relevant evidence. The second model of hypothesis, that of a three-dimensional 
object, opposed this view of truth coming in degrees. This latter model of 
hypothesis in the Waismann conversations finds further substantiation in the 
manuscripts, where Wittgenstein writes:  
 
If I say that a hypothesis is not definitively verifiable, by that it is not 
meant that there is a verification for it which one may approach ever 
more nearly, without ever reaching it. That is nonsense and one into 
which one often lapses. Rather a hypothesis has with reality simply 
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another formal relation than that of verification. Hence, of course, here 
the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ are also not to be applied, or have a different 
meaning.132 
 
Verification does not admit degrees, as the wrong application of this category to a 
hypothesis would suggest. The clarification of the workings of a hypothesis as a 
multidimensional grammatical structure does not need a complete inventory of 
the ways in which a hypothesis can agree or disagree with reality. What is needed 
is to account for particular ways in which a hypothesis can be projected against 
reality. According to a manner of projection, one specific facet of the hypothesis – 
namely, a way in which the hypothesis may be meant or taken – is considered and 
compared with pertinent features of the phenomenon.  
 If the hypothesis has with reality a different formal relation from that of 
verification, then the categories of truth and falsity established by verification are 
not be to applied to the hypothesis either. Or, if these categories are applied to the 
hypothesis, then they must have a quite different meaning from the case when 
they are applied to a proposition that can itself be verified. Which are the 
propositions that are true or false in the sense of verification?  
 
True and false are only the findings through verification, i.e. the 
phenomenological statements.133 
 
Phenomenological statements are true and false in the sense of verifiable, but they 
are not readily available, in the sense in which ordinary propositions are. It is 
through an analysis of ordinary propositions that phenomenological statements 
are given. How can phenomenological statements be given?  
 The finding of phenomenological statements involves an isolation of the 
facets of an ordinary proposition. The ordinary proposition “There is a chair here” 
can be explicated in terms of diverse descriptions of the content of experience. As 
Wittgenstein puts it, one may say “There is a chair here” when one may see only a 
                                                     
132 Ms 107: p. 254 [dated 23 January 1930] / PR: § 228  tr. mod. 
133 WWK/WVC: p. 101 [dated 22 April 1930]. 
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side of the chair. This side, however, has certain features that enables the 
recognition of the content of experience as a chair. The ordinary proposition in 
question, according to how it is used on the particular occasion, may account for 
some of these features considered relevant at a given moment. For example, that 
the chair has a certain hardness and that one can sit on it. Or, that the chair has a 
certain colour and that it can be arranged so that it matches other pieces of 
furniture of a similar palette. Phenomenological statements, amounting to such 
different facets of the hypothesis, pinpoint these particular accounts of the 
content of experience and exhibit their immediate correlation with it. A 
proposition meant to account for the red colour of a chair, purified of hypothetical 
addition, yields a phenomenological statement about a fleck of red colour. This 
fleck has a certain shape and size and a certain place in the visual field. The 
finding of phenomenological statements involves not only an isolation of facets of 
hypothesis. It involves also a restriction to what is verifiable by comparison to 
experience.  
 
2.3.2 The restriction to what is verifiable 
The motivation for the isolation of facets of ordinary propositions so that one 
reaches phenomenological propositions also leads to a concern of Wittgenstein’s 
with the status of hypotheses as presentations or descriptions of the world: 
 
The hypothesis is only an assumption upon the [practical | correct ?] mode 
of presentation. 
Is now this hypothetical [element] essential to every description of 
the world?134 
 
According to the initial version of this remark, a hypothesis is an assumption upon 
a practical mode of presenting a phenomenon or a situation. According to 
Wittgenstein’s subsequent correction of the remark, the hypothesis is an 
assumption upon the correct mode of presentation. However, this does not seem 
                                                     
134 Ms 105: p. 108 [Pichler (1994): ≈ August 1929]. 
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to be a satisfactory formulation either: the question mark added with the 
correction is indicative in this respect. But the crucial question is not whether the 
assumption is upon a practical or correct mode of presentation in everyday life. 
The main question is whether the assumptions involved by hypotheses in general 
are essential to every description or presentation of the world, or, in particular 
cases, of a given phenomenon.  
 The clarification of language involves a separation of what is essential and 
what is not essential to describing or presenting a phenomenon. 
Phenomenological language is meant to capture what is essential to a description 
or presentation. As such, it leaves any addition or assumption aside. This is 
envisaged as being achieved by way of a restriction to describing or presenting 
only what can be verified:  
 
The phenomenological language describes the very same [thing] as the 
ordinary, physicalist one. It must only restrict itself [sich beschränken] to 
what is verifiable.135 
 
In what sense does phenomenological language describe what ordinary language 
describes? Phenomenological and ordinary language account for the same “thing” 
in that, say, coloured flecks isolated by the former are nothing else than facets of a 
phenomenon described by the later. While it is yielded by an analysis of a 
discourse about physical objects into a discourse about flecks, shapes, or colours, 
phenomenological language does not account for a different world than the one 
that ordinary language describes. However, phenomenological language restricts 
itself to that which is verifiable, namely, the availability of such flecks, shapes, or 
colours.  
Let us consider in this respect Hintikka’s view on the relation between 
ordinary and phenomenological language. In his view, ordinary language 
identifies phenomena in terms of an object-oriented, public identification of 
phenomena or events, such as chairs and situations of someone playing a piano. 
                                                     
135 Ms 105: p. 108 [Pichler (1994): ≈ August 1929]. 
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Phenomenological language identifies the same phenomena or events along the 
lines of demonstratives.  
Now, if that meant that phenomenological statements consisted of mere 
indications such as “this” or “that”, it would still be unclear how or why 
phenomenological language is meant to restrict itself to what it verifiable. For, 
identifying a chair while uttering “This” or “That” does not provide enough 
propositional content to make what is actually meant readily available. In 
ordinary use, the wider linguistic context and the particular occasion of uttering a 
proposition may indeed provide enough indication as to what “This” or “That” is 
meant to identify. But if phenomenological statements were meant to restrict 
themselves to demonstratives like “this” or “that”, then this restriction would at 
the same time involve their losing the grip upon reality. In order that 
phenomenological statements be qualifiable as true or false and that 
phenomenological language be a verifiable discourse, these statements and this 
language need to involve more than just a use of demonstratives. The scope of 
phenomenological language needs, in the end, to be richer than the scope of 
demonstratives while that which phenomenological language is verified against 
needs to be poorer than the content of ordinary experience. I will try to clarify 
this by arguing that the construction of phenomenological language involves not 
only an analysis of ordinary propositions, but also an analysis or an isolation on 
the side of experience.  
 
2.3.3 Verification and isolation 
Wittgenstein conceives of phenomenological language by contrast to ordinary 
language not only with respect to the hypothetical addition of the latter, but also 
with regard to their ways of accounting for the content of different fields of 
perception:  
 
Our ordinary language is also phenomenological, only that it does not 
allow apprehensibly to isolate [trennen] the sensory fields [...]. 
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Its space is the combined visual-, tactile-, and muscular-feeling-
space, whence I can in this space ‘turn around’ and look at ‘what goes on 
behind me’ etc.136 
 
Phenomenological language is a description of phenomena or situations that does 
isolate sensory fields from one another. This isolation goes hand in hand with the 
isolation of the facets of hypotheses. By contrast, an ordinary proposition about a 
chair draws not merely on a visual perception of the chair, but also on tactile 
perception and even motor perception insofar as the chair is an object that affords 
one’s sitting on it. Here we have an indication of the source or nature of the 
hypothetical addition that Wittgenstein finds at play in ordinary language. There 
are two correlative ways of understanding this addition. On the one hand, much 
of what ordinary propositions say about physical objects cannot be immediately 
verified against the content of perception. What can be said without being 
verifiable is the addition to what is verifiable here and now, to phenomenological 
statements about flecks and colours and sounds. On the other hand, the 
hypothetical addition contained by ordinary language as opposed to 
phenomenological language is due to the former’s not allowing for an isolation of 
sensory fields.  
 The isolation of sensory fields from one another is an approach 
Wittgenstein envisages to get to the actual data of perception. It is a description of 
the data of perception that would be void of hypotheses. This would be a 
description confined to, say, the data of visual perception, isolated from the data 
of, say, aural perception. If the hypothetical structure of ordinary language is due 
to the combination of sensory fields, then the hypothetical addition can be 
eliminated by isolating data provided by one sensory field from data provided by 
other sensory fields.  
 The hypothetical character of ordinary language is due not only to the 
addition of data from different sensory fields to one another. There is also an 
addition of different kinds of data from within one and the same sensory field. 
                                                     
136 Ms 107: p. 3 [Pichler (1994): September – December 1929]. 
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This is why the isolation to be performed in order to get to a phenomenological 
language is twofold: inter-sensorial and intra-sensorial. Wittgenstein refers more 
explicitly to the inter-sensorial isolation involved by phenomenological language: 
 
[P]henomenological language isolates [trennt | isoliert] visual space and 
what goes on in it from everything else.137 
 
This is not to say that phenomenological language is to provide an exclusive 
account of visual space. It can just as well provide an account of tactile-space, that 
is, of tactile sensations, while isolating it from other sensory fields. However, it is 
true that Wittgenstein’s reflections on phenomenology and phenomenological 
language pay most attention to vision among perceptual modalities. In this case, 
the isolation of visual-space from tactile-space is just one of the prerequisites of 
analysis. In this respect, the visual data of a phenomenon would have to be 
accounted for apart from its tactile data, olfactory data and other data provided by 
further sensory modalities.  
 The other moment of the analysis required by phenomenological language 
is the intra-sensorial isolation. This involves a distinction between what ordinary 
language invokes with regard to the visual perception of a phenomenon and what 
the immediate visual experience actually provides. In the example of the chair, 
Wittgenstein considers that what immediate visual experience makes available is 
in fact just one side of the chair. Other sides, such as the back side, are not readily 
available at a given moment in immediate experience. However, in ordinary 
propositions, the chair is accounted for as three-dimensional physical object, as if 
the unseen sides of such the phenomenon are yet there, part and parcel of them. 
The requirement that phenomenological language is to restrict itself to what is 
verifiable is a requirement of describing the phenomenon by attending solely to 
what immediate experience makes readily available at a given moment. Now, 
what is it that immediate experience provides as opposed to the ordinary 
experience of phenomena?  
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The reconstruction of the idea of phenomenological language starting 
from the hypothetical character of ordinary language brings us to Wittgenstein’s 
concern with sense-data. Conversely, he makes explicit that this concern with 
sense-data is tied with, and motivated by, the initial account of hypothesis: 
 
The talk of sense-data [Sinnesdaten] and of immediate experience has the 
sense that we are searching a non-hypothetical presentation.138 
 
The hypothetical character of ordinary language goes hand in hand with its 
objectifying tendency. Removing the hypothetical addition involves doing away 
with this objectifying tendency. While ordinary language describes experience in 
terms of physical objects, phenomenological language is meant to account for the 
same objects by restricting itself to actually available facets of a phenomenon. 
These facets consist in the sense-data that immediate experience provides at a 
given moment.  
 
  
                                                     
138 Ms 107: p. 249 [dated 20 January 1930] / PR: § 226  tr. mod.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ABANDONMENT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 
 
The present chapter addresses the question of Wittgenstein’s abandonment of 
phenomenological language. According to the dominant view among interpreters, 
Wittgenstein endorses the idea of a phenomenological language for a definite 
period of time, generally taken to cover most of the year 1929. Then he is taken to 
suddenly become critical of this idea, for motives that, however, are often 
regarded to be not entirely clear. According to this reading, the emergence of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology is just as puzzling as his alleged 
sudden critique of it. In my view, most of these puzzles are due to the fact that 
interpreters tend to put most weight on the explicit remarks, be they positive or 
negative, on phenomenological language.139 This chapter will provide a detailed 
discussion of the assumptions and implications of Wittgenstein’s abandonment of 
phenomenological language. The discussion will show that both Wittgenstein’s 
positive and negative attitude to phenomenological language as less puzzling than 
it appears at first sight.140 
 In what follows, I argue that his critique of the idea of phenomenological 
language does not amount to a sudden turn, but rather involves a gradual scrutiny 
and questioning from a diversity of angles. A close reading of the manuscripts 
around 1929 reveals the fact that this scrutiny and questioning emerges roughly at 
the same time as the positive remarks on the idea of phenomenological language.  
 My view is thus that in his middle period Wittgenstein did not fully 
endorse for a definite period of time the notion of a phenomenological language 
                                                     
139 But even a chronological consideration of some of the explicit remarks on phenomenological 
language already questions the view of its full endorsement followed by its sudden abandonment. 
For instance, after Wittgenstein seems to acknowledge in manuscript an abandonment of 
phenomenological language in October 1929 (cf. Ms 107: p. 176), he invokes it positively in March 
1930 (cf. WWK/WVC: p. 101).  
140 Spiegelberg was the first to regard as a puzzle Wittgenstein’s allegedly inexplicable concern with 
phenomenological language and phenomenology more generally in Spiegelberg ([1968] 1981).  
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and then suddenly abandoned it. 141  Wittgenstein’s positive remarks on 
phenomenological language in their original context are rather mingled with 
reflections on the difficulty of the task of constructing this medium of expression. 
The latter reflections will indeed turn out to be decisive and the abundance of 
difficulties and problems emerging thereby will lead to a gradual dissolution of the 
conception of phenomenological language. This reading of the fate of 
phenomenological language converges in its general outline in a reading advanced 
by Noë. Noë questions the earlier influential interpretation defended by Hintikka 
& Hintikka (1986), according to which the phenomenological language is 
suddenly abandoned: 
 
[In his middle period] Wittgenstein’s position early on was very unstable 
and full of conflict [...]. Indeed, one difference between the account 
offered here and that of the Hintikkas [...] is that I see the transition in 
Wittgenstein’s thinking as a gradual process, with some ideas falling into 
place early on, only later to acquire deeper significance, other ideas being 
tentatively embraced, only to be rejected again before their final 
acceptance.142  
  
Or before their final dissolution, we may add. Wittgenstein’s critique of 
phenomenological language is to be reconstructed from his scrutiny of several 
notions closely connected to it. One such notion is that of verification, namely, 
the method required by a clarification of the sense of ordinary statements and the 
means to construct phenomenological language by way of an analysis of ordinary 
language. The conception of verification turns out to be developed in light of a 
particular kind of proposition to be clarified. These are propositions in the present 
tense and which were taken to be expositions or reports of experience (e.g. “The 
frame of the bed is brown.”). Thus, one of Wittgenstein’s doubts about the 
viability of phenomenological language is informed by his coming to realize that 
                                                     
141 This idea of a full endorsement followed by a sudden abandonment is a central assumption also in 
Kienzler’s reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s transition to his late philosophy (cf. Kienzler 1997). 
142 Noë (1997: p. 18). 
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verification is very difficult to achieve in cases not initially considered. One such 
case is that of propositions about more complex situations and events and also 
propositions about the past (e.g. “My neighbour has been elected mayor”).  
 A second trajectory of Wittgenstein’s critique of phenomenological 
language can be gathered from his remarks on the notion of hypothesis, which is 
no less central than the notion of verification to the conception of 
phenomenological language. So far we have discussed Wittgenstein’s reflections 
on hypothesis only insofar as they favoured the construction of a 
phenomenological language. Wittgenstein, however, develops the notion of 
hypothesis not merely under the tutelage of his conception of phenomenological 
language, but also in connection with what he calls the value or aim of ordinary 
propositions. While some of his remarks envisage a hypothesis-free 
phenomenological language, other remarks come to consider the hypothetical 
element as important to the sense of ordinary propositions. The aim in the use of 
ordinary propositions that goes hand in hand with their  hypothetical character 
also comes to be considered as being an essential aspect of their sense. On the 
other hand, the aim to which an ordinary proposition can be used is a blind spot 
of the analysis by phenomenological language.  
 A third line of critical inquiry into phenomenological language is 
constituted by Wittgenstein’s reflections on the relation of language with time. 
Phenomenological statements were meant to achieve their hypothesis-free 
character by being verifiable in the present. The notion of the present involved 
thereby is not that of the ordinary conception of time. Wittgenstein refers to the 
latter conception as that of physical time or historical time. In line with this 
conception, we ordinarily build statements about the past, present or future and 
order events or situations according to certain temporal categories, such as days or 
weeks, years or centuries. But in order that a phenomenological statement be 
hypothesis-free, it is required to be verifiable in the present of immediate 
experience. This notion of the present is categorically different from the notion of 
physical time. It is rather a notion of the present in ongoing flux, which 
Wittgenstein calls memory time or primary time. Many positive remarks on 
phenomenological language occur in contexts where Wittgenstein is trying to 
94 
 
develop a notion of flowing present as the source of the concept of time in the 
physical or historical sense. Many of the critical remarks touching upon 
phenomenological language are in fact critical remarks on the notion of memory 
time, which call into question the verifiability of such a language and ultimately 
its very intelligibility. The attempt to describe what occurs in the memory time of 
immediate experience, as opposed to the physical time of ordinary experience, 
will turn out to be just as misleading as the attempt to construct a 
phenomenological language by purifying ordinary language of its hypothetical 
element.   
  This third chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 discusses 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on the replacement of phenomenological language by 
means of analysis allowing for a reliance on ordinary language. The remarks do 
not provide clear motives for his dissatisfaction with phenomenological language. 
They rather expose alternatives for clarifying ordinary language by comparing 
different descriptions of one and the same phenomenon. These remarks, however, 
amount to an incipient critique of the idea a single mode of analysis unjustifiably 
privileged by the notion of phenomenological language. Section 3.2 reinforces the 
critique of this unjustified privilege by exposing the difficulty of achieving a 
verification by phenomenological language in cases not previously considered. I 
will focus there on the case of propositions about past situations or events. In light 
of this focus I will explore a tension Wittgenstein comes to consider. This is the 
tension between the rigidity of the notion of verification and the diversity of the 
functions and roles that ordinary propositions can have. Section 3.3 scrutinizes the 
requirement for phenomenological language to provide an immediate description 
of immediate experience. On the one hand, one’s providing an immediate 
description turns out to be problematic even in the most charitable conditions 
Wittgenstein imagines for it. On the other hand, the concern with immediate 
experience is questionable insofar as it involves a confused notion of a flowing 
present removed from physical time.  
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3.1 The replacement of phenomenological language 
 
This section will start by focusing on Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the distinction 
between a primary and a secondary language (subsection 3.1.1). I will then discuss 
alternative means of clarification relying on ordinary language that he comes to 
consider. This consideration is part of Wittgenstein’s gradual rejection of the 
privilege he gave to phenomenological language as the single, ultimate method of 
clarification (subsection 3.1.2). I will finally argue that the rejection of the 
privileged mode of analysis through phenomenological language is in fact a 
rejection of an inclination to explain rather than describe experience. This 
inclination is informed by a misleading ideal of clarity foreign to ordinary 
language (subsection 3.1.3). 
 
3.1.1 A turn to ordinary language 
One of clearest examples of Wittgenstein’s replacement of the analysis by 
phenomenological language is provided by the following remark recorded by 
Waismann: 
 
I used to believe that there was the everyday language that we all usually 
spoke and a primary language that expressed what we really knew, 
namely phenomena. I also spoke of a first system and a second system. 
Now I wish to explain why I do not adhere to that conception any more. 
I think that essentially we have only one language, and that is our 
everyday language. We need not invent a new language or construct a 
new symbolism, but our everyday language already is the language, 
provided we rid it of the obscurities that lie hidden in it.143 
 
This remark opposes the very dissatisfaction with ordinary language as a means 
for philosophical expression, a dissatisfaction formulated already at the beginning 
of “Some Remarks on Logical Form”. It was this dissatisfaction that informed the 
                                                     
143 WVC/WWK: p. 45 [dated 22 December 1929]. 
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subsequent need for a primary, phenomenological, language. Ordinary language 
was regarded as a description of ordinary experience, of the so-called secondary 
system. It was taken to be an expression in terms of physical objects and events, 
involving hypotheses about those objects and events. Clarification was meant to 
be achieved by phenomenological language by way of a strict account of 
phenomena of the so-called first system. Phenomena in the first system were 
conceived of in terms of sense-data, or various facets such as patches of colour or 
sounds of different qualities. So the need for a phenomenological language in the 
first place was informed by the idea that ordinary language expresses much more 
than experience actually provides. Phenomenological language was needed as a 
means of expressing what we really know [was wir wirklich wissen], namely, 
what we actually experience in the first system. 
 At this point Wittgenstein dismisses the very need to invent or construct a 
new language, namely, a phenomenological language. That ordinary language is 
“the language” means not only that it remains the ultimate object of clarification, 
but also that it can be used as a means for clarification. 144  Thus, the idea 
transpiring from “Some Remarks on Logical Form” that ordinary language does 
not suffice for a clarification of itself is implicitly dismissed. Yet, it is not that 
ordinary language can be used as a means for philosophical expression as it stands. 
Wittgenstein still thinks that in order to tackle philosophical puzzles by way of 
ordinary language, one must trace obscurities that may not lie at its surface, but 
need to be revealed. 
 The rejection of phenomenological language is not only a rejection of a 
constructed means for philosophical expression. It is also the rejection of the idea 
of an alleged real knowledge, underlying or paralleling what ordinary statements 
already express. This idea of a knowledge to be first revealed by 
phenomenological language is informed by the conception of ordinary statements 
                                                     
144  Some manuscript remarks are more explicit in this respect. Cf. “The assumption that a 
phenomenological language was possible and that it would adequately first say what we in 
philosophy want to say is – I believe – absurd. We must manage with our ordinary language and 
only understand it correctly. I.e. we may not let ourselves be tempted by it to speak nonsense.” (Ms 
107: p. 176 [dated 22 November 1929].) 
97 
 
as saying on given occasions much more than that which experience on those 
occasions actually substantiates. By contrast, the sense-data or facets provided by 
immediate experience would be the real knowledge in light of which ordinary 
statements can be analyzed, by isolating their strict descriptive content from their 
hypothetical addition. Now the notion of a real knowledge, allegedly underlying 
what ordinary propositions convey, is shown to be as illusory as the need for a 
phenomenological language that would first convey that knowledge. 
 
3.1.2 Alternatives to phenomenological language 
If the above remark recorded by Waismann dismisses the distinction between a 
primary, phenomenological discourse and a secondary, ordinary discourse, does 
Wittgenstein provide any alternative to analysis by means of a primary language?   
In the following manuscript remark he reflects further on the relation between 
the clarificatory means provided by ordinary and phenomenological language: 
 
Phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I called it, 
does not strike me now as a goal [Ziel], I hold it no longer to be possible. 
All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential to our 
language from what is inessential [das Wesentliche unserer Sprache von 
ihrem Unwesentlichen zu sondern]. 
I.e. if one as it were describes the class of languages which fulfil 
their purpose [Zweck], then one has thereby shown what is essential to 
them and has thereby immediately presented immediate experience. 
Each time I say that such and such a presentation could be 
replaced by this other one, we take a further step towards the goal [zu 
dem Ziele] of grasping the essence of what is presented. 
A recognition of that which is essential to our language and that 
which in it is inessential to the presentation, a recognition of which parts 
of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a 
phenomenological language.145 
                                                     
145 Ms 107: pp. 205-206 [dated 25 November 1929]. 
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Despite Wittgenstein’s referring to phenomenological language as a past goal 
[Ziel], this language was never a goal in itself or for its own sake. As a method of 
clarification of ordinary language and of describing immediate experience, 
phenomenological language was in fact envisaged as a means to dispel 
philosophical puzzles by grasping the logical structure of language and its relation 
to reality.  
 In this first version of the remark, phenomenological language is held as 
no longer possible [nicht mehr für möglich]. The revised version of this remark, 
occurring in later typescripts and which opens the Philosophical Remarks, 
contains a slight change of phrase. There Wittgenstein writes that he takes 
phenomenological language to be, instead of no longer possible, rather no longer 
necessary [nicht mehr für nötig]. 146  It has been suggested that this revision 
indicates Wittgenstein’s subsequent acknowledgment (presumably by May 1930) 
that his initial dismissal of the possibility of phenomenological language (in 
November 1929) was too hasty. Wittgenstein would thus admit that his critique of 
phenomenological language does not manage to dismiss more than its necessity or 
unavoidability as a method.147   
 I take, however, Wittgenstein’s oscillation between regarding 
phenomenological language as not possible and not necessary as indicative less of 
the chronological development of a critique of this conception. The oscillation 
indicates first of all that Wittgenstein’s abandonment of phenomenological 
language was not as radical or sudden as it has been taken to be by some 
commentators.  
The alternative clarificatory approach sketched in the previous quote does 
not by itself altogether dismiss the idea of phenomenological language. The new 
approach aims at separating what is essential from what is inessential to our 
language. Yet, the further methodological details provided make it clear that what 
is at stake here is not to provide the essence of language as a whole, or what is 
essential to each and every proposition, or what makes a proposition a genuine 
                                                     
146 Cf. Ts 209: p. 1 [Pichler (1994): May 1930] / PR: § 1. 
147 Cf. Hintikka & Hintikka (1986: pp. 137-139, 172). 
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one.148 The alternative method Wittgenstein now envisages instead involves the 
comparison of different descriptions of one and the same phenomenon. According 
to the method of phenomenological language, a particular expression was to be 
regarded as a hypothesis amenable to an analysis into various facets. These facets, 
namely, phenomenological statements, were then to be verified by isolating the 
corresponding phenomenon or situation in their turn into its facets, or sense-data 
of immediate experience. Once the analysis ends up with phenomenological 
statements verified in this way, the analysis is considered to be complete.  
 The alternative approach to clarification does not involve this ideal of 
completeness. One is rather to consider different expressions that can do the job of 
the initial expression to be clarified. If the initial expression can be replaced by 
other presentations, then its clarification would amount to several reformulations 
of what was initially conveyed.  
In the remark Wittgenstein uses variations of the term essential 
[wesentlich], qualifying both language and experience. The aim of the new 
approach is to reveal the actual structure of language and phenomena described, 
which was indeed the aim tied to the conception of phenomenological language. 
But the new conception of clarification is informed by a notion of clarity much 
closer to ordinary understandings of this notion. According to the final part of the 
remark, a recognition of what is essential and what is inessential to the 
presentation is really a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels 
turning idly [welche Teile unserer Sprache leerlaufende Räder sind]. In the last 
section of this chapter, it will be seen that Wittgenstein is ready to qualify even 
some of his own expressions as wheels turning idly. For example, the need for a 
verification by way of phenomenological language was underlined by the view 
that “only the experience of the present instant has reality”. According to 
Wittgenstein’s ultimate critique of the alleged field of description of 
phenomenological language as the present immediate experience, this field will 
                                                     
148 The view that Wittgenstein aims at accounting for the essence of language in this sense may do 
more justice to the project of the Tractatus, rather than to the new clarificatory approach sketched 
here.   
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turn out to be ill outlined. His critique will boil down to acknowledging the 
notion of a flowing present of immediate experience as a wheel turning idly.     
 Wittgenstein’s way of introducing at this point the method of comparison 
of alternative presentations is to an extent misleading. Here it seems that the 
comparison of alternative presentations that can be mutually substituted achieves 
exactly the same goal as the phenomenological language. Namely, the goal of an 
immediate presentation of immediate experience or grasping the essence of what 
is presented by one privileged means. Yet, if the task of clarification can be 
achieved by way of alternative presentations of one and the same phenomenon or 
situation, this already makes it doubtful whether a privileged presentation can be 
regarded as immediately conveying the content of experience. Insofar as the 
expression to be clarified can be reformulated by way of alternative expressions, 
its meaning is scrutinized already in the transition from one expression to 
another. This becomes clearer against the background of Wittgenstein’s further 
reflections that question the idea of  a privileged description.  
 
3.1.3 Against a privileged description and its ideal of clarity 
In the beginning of the section entitled “Phenomenology” in the Big Typescript, 
Wittgenstein questions the need to privilege a single description and to regard it 
as the ultimate clarification of a proposition or the ultimate account of a particular 
experience. After rephrasing one of the paragraphs of the previous quote149, he 
raises the issue: “Given that my visual image was two red circles of equal size on a 
blue background: what does occur here in two’s and what once?”. A candidate 
answer would be: one colour occurs in two locations. Another candidate answer 
would be: red, like circular, is one property of two distinct objects, namely two 
spots, that are spatially related to each other.  
The need to choose between these alternative answers involves a final 
decision as to whether colour is ultimately an object or merely the property of an 
                                                     
149 Compare “Jedesmal, wenn wir erkennen, daß die und die Darstellungsweise auch durch eine 
andre ersetzt werden kann, machen wir einen Schritt zu diesem Ziel.” (Ts 213: p. 437) and “Jedesmal 
wenn ich sage die und die Darstellung könnte man auch durch diese andere ersetzen machen wir 
einen Schritt weiter zu dem Ziele.” (Ms 107: p. 206.) 
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object. But Wittgenstein immediately notes that a decision of this kind would be 
specific to an approach from physics. The case would be handled similarly with 
the case when one asks “What sorts of red circles are those that I see over there?” 
and one answered “Those are two red lanterns”. To pose the question and to 
answer in this way, Wittgenstein observes, amounts to giving a physical 
explanation. The answer would be an attempt at establishing what the red circles 
really are. If such a final decision was made in philosophy, that would amount, 
according to him, to a metaphysical mistake. He writes that “wanting to remove 
our dissatisfaction with an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics” 150 . To 
answer the initial question “what is there here in two’s and what once?” by 
regarding colour as either ultimately an object or ultimately a property would be 
tantamount to attempting to give a philosophical explanation. Thus, by 
explanation Wittgenstein means in this context an account involving a decision 
made once and for all as to whether colour is either an object or the property of an 
object.  
A philosophical explanation is considered to be already tantamount to a 
mistake of metaphysics, namely, a claim that x is y in virtue of the very nature of 
x and y. By contrast, the task of the clarifying activity would be to first point out 
that the grammar of both answers is in order, both of them being equally justified 
descriptions. According to Wittgenstein: “Of course instead of the first sentence 
I’m allowed to say: ‘I see two spots with the properties of red and circular and in 
the spatial relationship of being next to each other’ – and equally well: ‘I see the 
colour red at two circular locations next to each other’ – if I stipulate that these 
expressions are to mean the same thing as the sentence above.”151 Colour may well 
be regarded as either a property or an object. The question “what is there here in 
two’s and what once?” is misleading in the first place, insofar as it requires 
privileging a description of the visual image in terms of colour as ultimately an 
object or as ultimately a property. To give privilege to one description over others 
would be to attempt at giving a philosophical explanation, thus ultimately making 
a metaphysical mistake.  
                                                     
150 Ts 213: p. 438. 
151 Ibid. 
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 The construction of phenomenological language would then involve a 
mistake of metaphysics, in that phenomenological statements would be privileged 
descriptions. They would be regarded as ultimate accounts of the actual structure 
of language and of the actual structure of experience. Indeed, as an envisaged 
immediate description of immediate experience, phenomenological language 
dismisses the eventuality of competing, ordinary descriptions. It dismisses the 
very idea that alternative descriptions can be given for one and the same 
phenomenon or situation. 
 Wittgenstein does not deny that for specific purposes, a certain 
description may be favoured in light of given philosophical problems. In 
particular, he does not forbid that colour be regarded as an object or as a property 
of an object according to the philosophical task at hand. For instance, if the aim is 
to give an account of the possible ways in which colours can combine with one 
another, then colour may well be regarded as an object.152 But if the task is to 
account for the various differences between two patches on a surface, then colour, 
along with, say, shape, may be better regarded as a property of the patches, taken 
as objects. What Wittgenstein dismisses is a readymade preference that 
phenomenological language would give to one presentation over others. A 
readymade preference would be made in advance of considering any particular 
tasks that presentations may be given.153    
 Wittgenstein criticizes phenomenological language not only in that it 
involves a metaphysical mistake of unjustifiably privileging a single mode of 
description once and for all. What is equally questionable is an ideal of clarity that 
goes hand in hand with the privilege given to the description by 
                                                     
152 In this respect, the paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form” referred to “the whole manifold of 
spatial and temporal objects, as colours, sounds, etc., etc.” (SRLF: p. 31.) 
153 A preference is dismissed not only if it involves a ready-made decision that an entity is to always 
count as an object or a property. Wittgenstein is equally critical of the inclination to regard certain 
phenomena as more philosophically relevant than others. Cf. “There is not – as I used to believe – a 
primary language as opposed to our ordinary language, the ‘secondary’ one. But one could speak in 
opposition to our language of a primary one in so far as it would not permit the expression of a 
preference for certain phenomena over others; it would have to be, so to speak, absolutely 
impartial.” (Ms 108: p. 29 [dated 21 December 1929] / PR: p. 54 tr. mod.) 
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phenomenological language. In a later notebook remark from the mid 1930’s he 
reflects retrospectively upon this issue: 
 
“Phenomenological language”. Think of its necessity. It seems our 
language were somehow raw, an incomplete presentation of the situation, 
and were to understand only as raw, incomplete picture. As if philosophy 
must improve, refine it in order to be able to understand the structure of 
the world. Then it would be obvious that [philosophy] must understand, 
i.e. recognize, language as it is, since the goal is not a new clarity that the 
old language does not provide, but the removal of philosophical 
labyrinths, bewilderment.154 
 
The idea of the necessity or need of phenomenological language was thus 
informed by a conception of ordinary language as a raw means of expression of 
phenomena and situations. One may recall that, according to “Some Remarks on 
Logical Form”, ordinary language was considered to not be able to capture the 
combinations and transitions between entities like colours or sounds. In order to 
understand the structure of the world and in the end the logical structure of 
language, a new mode of expression was envisaged. This mode of expression, to be 
achieved by improving and refining ordinary language, was the very 
phenomenological language. In the end, phenomenological language was taken to 
express the structure of the world and the structure of language with greater 
clarity than their expression by ordinary means.  
 Like the previous remarks discussed before, the last remark does not reach 
as far as questioning decisively the necessity or the possibility of 
phenomenological language. Wittgenstein’s notes explored up to this point 
reconsider the expressive means of ordinary language and its viability as a means 
to clarification. The ideal of clarity of phenomenological language first appears 
here as problematic in that this clarity is not found in ordinary language, but is 
rather foreign to it. It is an ideal imposed by the philosophical task of clarification, 
                                                     
154 Nb 152: p. 92 [Pichler (1994): 1936]. 
104 
 
an ideal taken to be achieved by the method of verification.155 The following 
section will explore some problems with the method of verification that 
Wittgenstein comes to consider.     
  
3.2 Problems for verification 
 
The present section will begin by exposing a requirement that verification be 
carried out strictly in the present. This leads to Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment of 
the difficulty of achieving a verification in the case of propositions about the past 
(subsection 3.2.1). Then I will show that the confinement of verification to the 
present is tantamount to a rigidity of the method of verification that fails to do 
justice to the diversity of the functions and roles of language (subsection 3.2.2). I 
will finally maintain that the notion of hypothesis which informs the need for a 
phenomenological language develops also independently from the latter. It thus 
becomes questionable whether, while removing the hypothetical addition of 
ordinary statements, phenomenological language would manage to fully capture 
their sense (subsection 3.2.3). 
 
3.2.1 Propositions about the past 
One aspect of phenomenological language that raises questions springs from the 
very method of verification that this language was taken to involve. The 
verification of the facets of ordinary propositions, namely, of hypotheses, was 
required to be carried out in the very instant of the use of a proposition. This 
requirement motivates Wittgenstein’s extensive concerns with the concept of 
time in 1929 and early 1930s. In particular, it motivates his concern with a 
peculiar notion of the present involved by the conception of phenomenological 
language: 
 
The verification of language – thus the act by way of which it maintains 
its sense – occurs in any case in the present before it.156   
                                                     
155 Thomson observes in this respect that the dream of constructing a phenomenological language 
falls victim to its own uncritical pursuit of clarity (Thompson 2008: 73). 
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Wittgenstein refers here to verification not as a philosophical method, but as an 
act [Akt], through which language would maintain its sense. His twofold use of 
the term “verification”, both as a method of clarification and as a qualification of 
the workings of language itself is indicative of the goal of phenomenological 
language. It is the goal of accounting for the actual logical structure of ordinary 
language and experience. The analysis involved by phenomenological language 
was taken to isolate the actual facets of ordinary propositions and verify them by 
comparison  to facets of phenomena made available by immediate experience. 
 Yet, this conception of verification as both an act of language and a 
method of accounting for its relation to reality turns out to be problematic in light 
of some cases we have not discussed so far. In a conversation recorded by 
Waismann, Wittgenstein acknowledges the following: 
 
Sometimes verification is very difficult, for example ‘Seitz has been elected 
mayor.’ How should I set about verifying this proposition? Is the correct 
method to go and make inquiries about it? Or to ask the people who were 
present? But one was watching from the front and the other one from 
behind. Or should I read about it in the newspapers?157  
 
This example raises the issue whether the conception of verification tied to the 
notion of phenomenological language was not misleadingly developed by focusing 
too closely on some cases and overlooking others. Wittgenstein’s methodological 
remarks discussed in the previous chapter were informed by his consideration of 
cases when the propositions to be clarified were taken to be mostly declarative 
statements about the content of perception in a given situation. Propositions about 
pieces of furniture or about the sound of piano were taken to be analyzable into 
phenomenological statements to be verified by comparison with the content of 
immediate experience.  
                                                                                                                                           
156 Ms 105: p. 122 [Pichler (1994): ≈ August 1929]. 
157 WWK/WVC: p. 48 [dated 29 December 1929]. 
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But in more complex situations it is not altogether clear how verification 
is to be carried out. The proposition “Seitz has been elected mayor” accounts for 
such a complex situation. First of all, the situation accounted for by the 
proposition is not a situation happening at the moment when the proposition is 
uttered. The election referred to has already happened before the proposition 
about the election was formulated. Since the moment of the election is not readily 
available as a present moment, the clarification of the proposition could not be 
carried out in light of an available experience.  
One may try, however, to get some access to the past situation. Different 
routes may be taken in this respect. One may try to make inquiries into the past 
election. Or one may try to ask people who were present at the event, perhaps 
asking them to describe their immediate experience of the election. But different 
people would provide different accounts of their experience insofar as they had 
different vantage points. Trying to get some access to the actual event of election 
by reading the newspapers will not lead very far either. The newspapers would 
account for the event from still other vantage points, as different and varied as the 
people who attended the election.  
 Thus if one tried to recover an account of the past situation, different 
sources would first present themselves as equally reliable or unreliable. If one 
wanted to sort out sources that are more reliable than others, the criterion for this 
selection could still not be their comparison with an actual experience of the 
election.       
 Now, can the difficulty with verifying propositions about the past be 
eased, by attempting to carry out the verification in more flexible ways? That is, 
by allowing various written and spoken sources as reliable backgrounds against 
which verification can be carried out? We can consider in this respect 
Wittgenstein’s other remarks on propositions about the past, such as accounts of 
historical events: 
 
The proposition about Caesar [“Julius Caesar crossed the Alps”] is simply a 
framework (like that about any other person), which allows most different 
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verifications, although not all that would be allowed in the case of other 
e.g. living persons.158 
 
In order for a proposition about a past figure to allow for a method of verification, 
the very notion of verification has to be loosened. The clarification of the sense of 
such propositions obviously cannot be the method of analyzing them into facets 
and comparing the facets to present experience. Instead, says Wittgenstein, a 
proposition about historical events could count as a framework compatible with a 
variety of verifications. Such verifications could involve the consultation of books 
of history, of visual depictions of the event in question or even of archaeological 
relics considered to substantiate historical statements. 
 But this approach would again face a difficulty. Among the variety of 
these methods of verification allowed for historical events, there would be some 
that would not be viable in the case of propositions about living persons. So a 
single universal method of verification cannot be applied to the two cases. Above 
all, the very need of diverse methods of verification undermines the privilege of 
the one single method of verification – the one carried out in the present – tied to 
the conception of phenomenological language.  
 So even if the notion of verification can be loosened in order to allow for a 
variety of sources that can substantiate historical statements, this very move 
remains problematic in what phenomenological language is itself concerned. 
Insofar as this conception involves a very specific procedure for verification, one 
single method of clarification by phenomenological language would not be 
applicable throughout language.159 
                                                     
158 Ms 108: p. 6 [Pichler (1994): January – February 1930] / PR: § 56 tr. mod. 
159 At one point, Wittgenstein suggests that the method of verification specific to phenomenological 
language may be in the end applicable only to propositions which have a direct sense, namely, 
which really account for the content of a present experience. The difficulty with verification arises 
in propositions which have a more indirect sense, such as the historical statement about Caesar. Cf. 
“If I utter the proposition: ‘I see a red fleck crossing a green one’, the possibilities provided for the 
case ‘Julius Caesar crossed the Alps’ are not given here, and that is what I mean when I say that the 
proposition about Caesar has its sense in a more indirect way than the first one.” (Ms 107: pp. 6-7 
[dated 13 December 1929] / PR: § 56 tr. mod.) 
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 In the end, loosening the method of verification may accommodate an 
analysis of propositions about the past, but then the analysis would not be the one 
by phenomenological language. On the other hand, already the specific 
verification in the present by phenomenological language turns out to be at odds 
with what Wittgenstein calls the multiplicity of language, or the diversity of 
functions and roles that ordinary propositions can perform. Let us have a closer 
look at this issue.   
 
3.2.2 The rigidity of verification and the multiplicity of language   
So one problem with phenomenological language is that its conception does not 
allow for loosening the method of verification in the first place. The construction 
of a phenomenological language requires a strict analysis of ordinary propositions 
taken as hypotheses by isolating their facets and comparing them with present 
experience. Most importantly, this comparison is to be carried out in the present, 
involving that the proposition to be clarified is uttered at the same time as when 
the experience it accounts for occurs. This method of verification turns out to be 
too rigid to be applicable to the wide variety of propositions of ordinary language. 
Wittgenstein is troubled by this problematic contrast, between a very specific 
notion of verification and the considerable variety of ordinary propositions: 
 
In order to determine the sense of a proposition, I should have to know a 
very specific procedure for when to count the proposition as verified. In 
this respect everyday language oscillates very much, much more so than 
scientific language.160 
 
Now, the conception of phenomenological language does prescribe a very specific 
procedure for verifying facets of any proposition. The problem is not the lack of a 
very specific procedure of verification, but the requirement of such procedure that 
                                                     
160 WWK/WVC: p. 47 [dated 22 December 1929]. Wittgenstein’s reference here to an ordinary 
proposition being itself verifiable is inexact. The previous chapter has discussed his emphasis at 
various points on the idea that what is verifiable is not the proposition or the hypothesis itself, but 
facets of the proposition conceived as a multi-dimensional hypothesis. 
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cannot be fulfilled in certain cases. The difference between statements about the 
past and statements about the present content of experience is just one instance of 
the oscillation of language between different functions or roles that its 
propositions can have. In ordinary language this oscillation is presumably much 
more considerable than in scientific discourse, by which Wittgenstein means 
mainly or primarily propositions of natural science. 
 Ordinary language contains propositions that pose further problems for 
the notion of verification. The propositions to be considered in this respect, along 
with statements about the past, are instructions or orders. This consideration 
informs Wittgenstein’s analogy between language and a signal tower: 
 
Language must be of the multiplicity of a signal-tower, inducing actions 
which its propositions correspond to.  
To understand an instruction before one follows it has a relationship to 
wanting an action before one’s carrying it out.  
The chemist who understands a receipt.161 
 
The case of instructions expressed by ordinary propositions is a reminder of the 
wide variety of functions and roles of language. In the case of instructions, 
especially the ones about an action to be performed at once, the relevant 
experience of the situation or of the settings is not necessarily lacking, as in 
propositions about the past. But the sense of an instruction cannot simply be 
traced back to an account of the immediate experience of the situation or of the 
settings. Instructions rather convey something to be done, they instil an action to 
be performed upon the situation. To understand an instruction is not to simply 
attend to details of immediate experience in the situation in which the instruction 
is formulated. It is to get what is to be performed, to get how one is to act upon 
the situation.  
The example of the chemist who understands a receipt and thus acts upon 
a written instruction is revealing in this respect. The receipt is obviously not 
                                                     
161 Ms 107: p. 231 [dated 11 January 1930]. 
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meant as a description of the medication available at the chemist’s. Nor is it an 
account of what the chemist or indeed anyone else may perceive in the chemist’s 
shop. The receipt rather prescribes certain actions that the chemist is to carry out 
once he or she understands the instruction.  
  Then one problem that the case of instructions poses for the method of 
verification is the irreducibility of action to the content of experience. The 
conception of phenomenological language does not provide any methodological 
resources to handle instructions, just as it is unable to analyze propositions about 
the past by way of verification in the strict sense.   
  What is equally problematic is the difficulty or indeed inability of the 
method of verification to handle what Wittgenstein will call the pointing of 
propositions to the future. Already instructions account for actions to be carried 
out, thus actions that are not performed at the moment when an instruction is 
formulated and not necessarily at the moment when an instruction is understood 
either. But in the end, the difficulty of the rigidity of the method of verification is 
encountered not merely in the case of propositions about the past and 
instructions. Wittgenstein inquires into the broader issue of the pointing of 
propositions to the future in terms of their aim. This line of inquiry elaborates 
upon his notion of hypothesis exposed in the previous chapter. In this respect, his 
conception of hypothesis will end up questioning the viability of 
phenomenological language as a means of clarification.     
 
3.2.3 The aim of ordinary propositions 
So far we have discussed two main problems for the method of verification and its 
implications. One problem is that the strict method of verification cannot be 
carried out in the case of propositions about the past. A further problem is that the 
rigidity of this method turns out to be at odds more generally with the variety of 
functions or roles that ordinary propositions can have. These discussions have 
strengthened the doubt about whether phenomenological language is a viable 
approach to clarifying language in its diversity. The discussion so far leaves room 
for an attempt at salvaging this method of analysis at least for a particular case, 
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namely, for propositions which have been taken to simply account for the content 
of experience.  
 Wittgenstein’s continuing reflections on the notion of hypothesis also 
constituted a questioning of this attempt at salvaging phenomenological language. 
What is doubtful in the end is not only whether the method of verification can be 
carried out in any particular case of language use. It remains equally doubtful 
whether, in the process of the elimination of the hypothetical element of ordinary 
language, phenomenological language manages to do full justice to the sense of 
ordinary propositions, or as Wittgenstein puts it, to their value or aim.  
 Wittgenstein’s conception of hypothesis develops in two interrelated 
directions. On the one hand, it informs the idea of verification as means of 
clarification and the need for the construction of a phenomenological language. 
On the other hand, it starts by accounting for the allegedly misleading workings 
of presentations through ordinary language but becomes the background against 
which Wittgenstein reflects on what is essential to presentations. 
 At one point Wittgenstein writes the following concerning the 
hypothetical character of presentations in general: 
 
Now it appears however that the presentation in general loses its value 
when one leaves the hypothetical element in it to fall apart, because then 
the proposition does not point to the future anymore but is, as it were, 
self-satisfied and thus valueless.162 
 
This reflection questions both the view on ordinary language inherited from 
“Some Remarks on Logical Form” and the privileged status given to 
phenomenological language. The view developed in subsequent manuscripts from 
the 1929 paper was that the hypothetical character of ordinary language was 
precisely what made it unable to account accurately for experience. The 
hypothetical element was to be removed in order that the sense of ordinary 
propositions become transparent and their relation to reality become clear. But 
                                                     
162 Ms 107: p. 249 [dated 20 January 1930]. 
112 
 
this approach turns out to not be able to achieve its clarificatory goal. An analysis 
by phenomenological language would lose sight of a significant aspect of ordinary 
propositions. While analyzing them into descriptive accounts of the content of 
experience, phenomenological language would lose sight of ordinary propositions 
pointing to the future. A proposition analyzed in this way, however, now turns 
out to become inert. Wittgenstein reflects further on the way in which ordinary 
propositions point to the future in terms of their aim or the expectations they 
raise: 
 
 The sense of a proposition is its aim [Zweck]. 
If I say to someone “There is a chair here”, then I want to evoke to him 
certain expectations and ways of acting.163  
 
The expectations that an ordinary proposition raises are indicative of the aim of its 
use. In this light, an ordinary proposition like “There is a chair here” cannot be 
taken anymore to be merely a descriptive account of the content of experience in 
a particular situation. Its analysis by phenomenological language is thus not able 
to fully capture the sense of such a proposition, insofar as the use of the 
proposition evokes expectations and instils a way of acting upon a situation. So the 
method of verification turns out to be too rigid a method of analysis not only 
when it comes to propositions about the past, but even for propositions in the 
present.   
The reflection feeds a further worry. The worry is whether this means of 
analysis of ordinary propositions does not result in its turn in inert statements. 
While the aim of ordinary propositions is recognized as an essential aspect of their 
sense, the question of the very importance of phenomenological language 
becomes pressing: 
 
But of what importance [Wichtigkeit] can then this description of the 
present phenomenon be? It seems as if the occupation with this question 
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was directly childish and I got myself into a dead-end. And yet it is a 
meaningful dead-end, for it attracts everything to go in there, as if it was 
there to look for the ultimate solution of the philosophical problem.164  
  
This diagnosis of the importance of the search for a phenomenological language is 
rather discouraging. If this search was meaningful at all, it would have in the end 
merely the broad meaning of a lesson to be learned or of an approach to be 
avoided. The motivation for the search is a misleading hope that a 
phenomenological language could serve as a universal method of clarification. As 
if the goal of shedding light on the workings of any description or presentation 
and of dissolving any philosophical confusion could be reached at once by way of 
an ultimate solution. But the search for such an ultimate means of analysis is 
recognized as leading to a dead-end. The idea of phenomenological language leads 
to a dead-end not simply because Wittgenstein would lose interest in pursuing its 
method. According to the final section of this chapter, Wittgenstein’s search for a 
phenomenological language ultimately comes to a dead-end, as he becomes 
critical of the very project of providing an immediate description of immediate 
experience.  
 
3.3 The critique of the immediate description of immediate experience 
 
The present section starts by exposing the background of one of Wittgenstein’s 
most powerful critiques of phenomenological language. This background amounts 
to the distinction between two notions of time, namely physical time and memory 
time (subsection 3.3.1). Then I will discuss Wittgenstein’s concern that 
phenomenological language can ultimately be a hypothesis-free description only if 
it does not unfold by way of signs in physical time. But such an immediate 
description would in the end amount to an inarticulate expression (subsection 
3.3.2). This critique of the notion of immediate description will be followed by a 
critique of the way in which the field of description is delimited for 
                                                     
164 Ms 105: p. 118 [Pichler (1994): February – March 1929]. 
114 
 
phenomenological language. The very notion of the flowing present of immediate 
experience removed from physical time is shown by a closer scrutiny to amount to 
a wheel turning idly (subsection 3.3.3).   
 
3.3.1 Physical time and memory time  
Some of Wittgenstein’s most critical reflections on phenomenological language 
are motivated by a series of attempts to follow the implications of this notion to 
their end. In this respect he further inspects the requirement that 
phenomenological language is to provide an immediate description of immediate 
experience. In this way, phenomenological language would be the means of 
expression to achieve utmost clarity and directness. By way of a series of analogies 
Wittgenstein finally shows that this ideal of the immediacy of a presentation is 
unfulfillable. 
 On the other hand, he also scrutinizes further the idea that verification 
through phenomenological language occurs in the present of immediate 
experience. The time of immediate experience is conceived of as being an ongoing 
flux of memory, removed from what Wittgenstein regards as time in an ordinary 
historical sense. A series of remarks on the concept of time finally point out that 
this concern with an ever flowing present of memory is problematic. 
 But why should Wittgenstein be bothered with a notion of time of 
memory as ever flowing present in the first place? The aim of grasping what goes 
on in the flowing present of memory is informed by the initial need of removing 
the hypothetical element from ordinary language. Wittgenstein took the alleged 
fact that ordinary propositions fail to account for what we really know to be tied 
with the fact that some of those propositions recall past experiences and others 
anticipate future aspects of situations not yet experienced. One remark on the 
notion of hypothesis is revealing in this respect:  
 
What is essential to a hypothesis is, I believe, that it raises an expectation 
in that it allows for a future confirmation.165  
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When I say ‘There is a chair over there’, this proposition has a relation to a 
series of expectations. I believe I will be able to go there, to touch the 
chair and be able to sit on it, I believe it is of wood and I expect from it a 
certain hardness, inflammability etc. etc.166 
  
Such expectations contribute to the hypothetical character of ordinary 
language.167 Thus the hypothetical addition has a certain history, leading back to 
what was experienced in similar situations and what was learned or heard about 
similar situations. The hypothetical addition also points to the future, in that even 
a proposition taken to be about the content of experience on a certain occasion 
can raise various expectations about the phenomena given by that experience. 
 Wittgenstein took the envisaged hypothesis-free feature of 
phenomenological language to be given by the fact that the immediate experience 
it is meant to describe does not occur in time in an ordinary sense of the word. He 
thus distinguishes between ordinary, physical time [physikalischen Zeit] and 
memory time [Gedächnisszeit]: 
 
The data of our memory are ordered; we call this order memory time in 
opposition to the physical time of the order of events in the physical 
world.168  
 
Physical time is the order of objects and events in physical experience, the 
experience that ordinary language accounts for. Thus physical time is tied to 
personal past experiences and expectations, but also to the narratives of other 
people, and social mechanisms for measuring time (e.g. clocks) or standards of 
reference to time (e.g. weeks.) By contrast, memory-time is the order of facets of 
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phenomena or sense-data in immediate experience, the experience that 
phenomenological language is meant to describe.  
If it is to provide a hypothesis-free account of immediate experience, the 
phenomenological language is to amount to an immediate description of 
immediate experience. This requirement is one major source of the problems with 
the conception of phenomenological language which are addressed by 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on the ideal of the immediacy of description.   
  
3.3.2 Critique of the notion of immediate description 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the capacity of phenomenological language to provide 
an immediate description of experience is ultimately a critique of the attempt at 
providing a verification by way of memory. The resort to memory is motivated by 
his coming to realize a tension. On the one hand, strict verification is to be 
fulfilled only at instants. On the other hand, ordinary propositions as used or 
usable propositions unwind in physical time.169 A liaison would somehow have to 
be maintained between written or spoken propositions that unfold in time and 
immediate experience taken to be momentary.  
 Around 1929 and the early 1930’s Wittgenstein uses the term memory in 
several senses, some of which are somewhat counterintuitive. By memory he 
sometimes means an act of recognition of what immediate experience provides. 
Memory in this sense is an awareness of what goes on in the fleeting instant, as 
opposed to the experience of ordinary objects that is unfolded in physical time. 
Connected to this notion, he also uses the term memory to designate the retention 
of that which goes on in immediate experience. By way of memory in this sense, 
the facets of phenomena gathered from the flowing present of immediate 
experience are ordered in physical time. The ordinary experience of objects thus 
gains its consistency and stability. However, to what we regard as physical objects 
in ordinary experience there would correspond a flux of sense-data or facets of 
phenomena in immediate experience. At one point Wittgenstein realizes that the 
immediate presentation requested from phenomenological language would have 
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to be in fact a presentation that cannot rely on written or spoken signs. Could it 
then be a presentation of what memory recognizes in immediate experience, a 
presentation carried out by memory as retention of the immediately given? 
 Wittgenstein formulates a series of analogies in order to assess what an 
immediate presentation of immediate experience would involve. One such 
analogy is that of plaster-cast figures that would present what is immediately 
given. Another analogy is that of a mechanism that produces automatically 
descriptions or pictures of visual images. In his study of Wittgenstein’s middle 
period, Kienzler takes these analogies to suggest that phenomenological language 
was never envisaged to be an actual language after all, but a technical means to 
produce pictures.170 I suggest instead that these analogies are meant primarily to 
set the most charitable conditions for an immediate description. Read in this way, 
the analogies do follow the ultimate implication that a hypothesis-free, immediate 
description would have to be a means of expression that cannot rely on written or 
spoken signs. However, on this reading, the point of the analogies is not to make a 
substantial claim about the nature of phenomenological language. Their point is to 
show that even under the most favourable conditions, the aim to provide an 
immediate description of experience cannot be fulfilled.    
One reflection that questions the ideal of the immediacy of presentation 
begins by imagining an ideal memory to which nothing given in immediate 
experience would ever escape: 
 
Suppose I had such a good memory that I could remember all my sense 
impressions. In that case, there would, prima facie, be nothing to prevent 
me from describing them. This would be a biography 
[Lebensbeschreibung]. And why should I not be able to leave everything 
hypothetical out of this description?171 
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An ideal memory would thus recognize and retain each and every sense-
impression ever provided by immediate experience. To account strictly for 
everything that immediate experience has ever provided would amount to a 
biography or a description of life in a non-hypothetical manner. It would seem 
that a presentation sticking exclusively to immediate experience would not allow 
for the intrusion of any hypothesis. Conversely, it would seem that a holistic 
account strictly confined to what immediate experience has provided would 
remove any hypothetical addition from the description given through ordinary 
propositions.  
 By contrast to a biography or a description of life in this sense, 
phenomenological language would not have to account for everything that was 
ever given to someone in immediate experience. But similarly to such a 
description, phenomenological language would need a way to exhaustively 
scrutinize what is immediately given at a certain moment in a situation. This 
scrutiny would be required by the need to separate what is essential from what is 
inessential to a presentation of immediate experience. It would be a way to 
distinguish what is not hypothetical from what is hypothetical in a presentation. 
Yet the continuation of Wittgenstein’s reflection raises the question of the 
substratum of such an immediate description. This is the question of the signs that 
may be employed by an account of immediate experience: 
 
I could, e.g., present the visual images plastically, perhaps with plaster-cast 
figures on a reduced scale which I would only finish as far as I had 
actually seen them, designating the rest as inessential by shading or a 
mode of design. 
So far everything would be fine. But what about the time I take to 
make this presentation? I am assuming I would be able to keep pace with 
my memory in ‘writing’ this language – producing this presentation. But if 
we suppose I then read the description through, is it now not yet 
hypothetical?172 
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The production of plaster-cast figures is imagined as a way to present the content 
of immediate experience, or at least the content of immediate visual perception. 
But the material basis of the figures, their three-dimensionality, their reduced 
scale would first strike as elements quite difficult to correlate to the actual visual 
images they are meant to describe. The plaster-cast figures may also exhibit more 
or less detail than the visual images. So various means (e.g. shading, explicating 
the mode of design) would be required to distinguish what immediate experience 
actually provides from what is merely due to the chosen means of description. 
 Wittgenstein allows that up to this point the presentation by plaster-cast 
figures could be regarded as being in order. The problem arises when one raises 
the question of the time needed to produce the presentation. In this respect, he 
further grants the striking eventuality that the production of plaster-cast figures 
could be taken to keep pace with memory. Namely, that this presentation could 
be produced as fast as memory would recognize the ever new sense-data or facets 
of phenomena given in immediate experience. 
 But even under the most charitable conditions granted so far, it would still 
remain doubtful whether such a presentation of immediate experience could be 
considered to be hypothesis-free. Insofar as the presentation would be read or 
deciphered after its production, the time of its reading or deciphering would not 
be the time when the immediate experience was attended to. This would raise the 
question of whether the presentation can still be regarded to be hypothesis-free. 
Indeed the only criterion for regarding a presentation as hypothesis-free was its 
confinement to the immediate experience it accounts for. But insofar as 
immediate experience was taken to be in an ongoing flux, it would not be 
available anymore at the point when the presentation would be reconsidered.    
 The issue that the imagined description by plaster-cast figures poses for 
phenomenological language is in the end that of the reliability of this language as 
a hypothesis-free medium of expression. Even granted that phenomenological 
language was able to provide a complete analysis of experience at a given moment, 
its hypothesis-free character would have to be reassessed again and again. That is, 
each time the presentation of experience is deciphered again. It could be said that 
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all the resources of analysis would be invested in achieving a hypothesis-free 
means of presentation at a given moment. But then nothing would guarantee that 
the same means of presentation can still be regarded as hypothesis-free once the 
immediate experience it accounted for is not available anymore. 
 Wittgenstein provides a further analogy to assess the notion of an 
immediate presentation, this time, in terms of a mechanism for the production of 
descriptions: 
 
Let us imagine a presentation such as this: the bodies I seem to see are 
moved by a mechanism in such a way that they would give the visual 
images to be presented to two eyes fixed at a particular place in the model. 
The visual image described is then determined from the position of the 
eyes in the model and from the position and motion of the bodies. 
We could imagine that the mechanism could be driven by turning 
a crank and in that way the description ‘read off’. 
Is it not clear that this would be the most immediate description 
that can be imagined? That is to say, that anything which tried to be more 
immediate still would inevitably cease to be a description?  
Instead of a description, what would then come out would be that 
inarticulate sound with which many writers would like to begin 
philosophy.173 
 
The ultimate point of this analogy is that any language would have be understood 
in the end as a means of expression in physical time. A few pages after imagining 
the mechanism Wittgenstein writes: “What we understand by the word ‘language’ 
unwinds in physical time. (As is made perfectly clear by the comparison with a 
mechanism.)”174 The comparison of language with the mechanism underlines that 
any intelligible mode of expression is an articulated one. A language has an 
articulation not only in that it has a logical structure. In order for a means of 
expression to count as a language, it has to employ signs, be they spoken or 
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written signs. And in this way a language is articulated in physical time, in that 
the speaking, writing or reading of signs is itself a temporal process.175  
 Its unwinding in physical time is essential for any mechanism to count as 
a mechanism and for any means of expression to count as a language. 
Wittgenstein’s reflection further responds to a dissatisfaction with a means of 
expression unwound in physical time to fulfil the aim of a phenomenological 
language. The dissatisfaction would be that a phenomenological language 
unwinding in physical time would not be a mode of description immediate 
enough. A mode of description unfolding in physical time, as the analogy of the 
plaster-cast figures suggests, would remain vulnerable to the doubt that it fails to 
remain a hypothesis-free account of immediate experience.  
 On the other hand, the insistence that phenomenological language did not 
unwind in physical time raises the question whether this mode of description 
would be intelligible at all. Wittgenstein notes that a description envisaged to be 
more immediate than an articulated mode of presentation would cease to be a 
description altogether. That is, any description envisaged to be produced as fast as 
the recognition of immediate experience and thus not employ written or spoken 
signs would not fit the very notion of a genuine description. The final remark on 
the analogy suggests a parallel between articulation as unwinding of a mode of 
presentation in physical time and articulation as the very intelligibility of a mode 
of presentation. A mode of presentation more immediate than one articulated in 
physical time by way of written or spoken signs would amount in the end to an 
inarticulate, unintelligible expression. Wittgenstein denounces the inarticulate 
sound with which many authors would like to begin philosophy. Yet, this ironic 
remark concerns his own philosophical project as well, insofar as an inarticulate 
sound would in the end be the phenomenological language itself.  
So Wittgenstein’s worry is that phenomenological language as the most 
immediate description of immediate experience would be lacking articulation as 
intelligibility. In the end, it would not be able to meaningfully convey the very 
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content of experience. The search for a phenomenological language would in the 
end lose sight of the very marks of a genuine language. Wittgenstein formulates 
the following remark somewhat as a self reminder of the misleading goal of 
providing an account of immediate experience in ongoing flux: 
 
If one yet says: the philosopher must however simply descend in this basin 
and grasp the pure reality itself and bring it to daylight, so comes the 
answer that he thereby must leave language behind and therefore return 
empty-handed.176 
 
In the end, the analogy of the plaster-cast figures and the analogy of the 
mechanism show that, even granted the most charitable conditions, 
phenomenological language cannot be a viable means  of expression. The first 
analogy raises the doubt that phenomenological language cannot achieve a 
hypothesis-free character, as its means of construction by verification would 
suggest. The second analogy raises the worry that a hypothesis-free means of 
expression, namely, an immediate presentation of immediate experience, is in the 
end a misleading goal. Such a presentation would be inarticulate, lacking the 
intelligibility of a genuine language.   
 
3.3.3 Critique of the notion of immediate experience 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of immediate experience in an ever flowing 
present is tied to the previous critique of a presentation that does not unwind in 
physical time. The connection between these two problems is addressed in the 
following remark: 
 
What we could call the time in phenomenon (specious present) lies not in 
the time (past, present and future) of history, is not a stretch of this time. 
While the process of ‘language’ unwinds in physical time. (Think of the 
mechanism for the description of immediate experience.)177 
                                                     
176 Ms 107: p. 2 [Pichler (1994): September 1929]. 
177 Ms 113: p. 123v [dated 19 May 1932]. 
123 
 
 
While the two analogies discussed above question the idea of a phenomenological 
language as immediate description, a series of remarks on the notion of the time of 
immediate experience as a flowing present isolated from historical time question 
the envisaged field of description of phenomenological language. The search for a 
phenomenological language turned out to lose sight of the very notion of a 
language or of presentation that can be actually used and can be intelligible. In a 
similar fashion, the notion of flowing present qualifying immediate experience 
turns out to lose sight of what counts as correct uses of concepts of time:  
 
We guide the words from their metaphysical back to their correct use in 
the language.  
The man who says that one could not descend twice in the same flux, says 
something false; one can descend twice in the same flux.178 
 
The aim at describing everything that occurs in a flowing stream of immediate 
experience turns out to be entangled in a metaphysics of presence. This 
metaphysical view is encapsulated by the saying that one cannot step twice in the 
same stream. The worry that this view informs is that immediate experience is 
fleeting and that ordinary experience has only an apparent stability or 
consistency. The further worry is that ordinary language describing experience in 
terms of past, present and future events does so only misleadingly. Ordinary 
presentations were taken to receive their very hypothetical addition by being 
reminiscent of past experiences and by pointing to the future. By contrast, the aim 
of phenomenological language was to grasp exclusively everything that the 
flowing flux of immediate experience gives.179  
A first clue that something went wrong in this conception of immediate 
experience is that the image of an ongoing flux of experience so difficult to 
capture arises in the first place only when philosophizing: 
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It is strange that in ordinary life we are not troubled by the feeling that 
the phenomenon is slipping away from us, the perpetual flux of 
appearance, but only when we philosophize. This indicates that what is in 
question here is a thought suggested by a misapplication of our (ordinary) 
language.180 
 
This incipient critique of the alleged field of description of phenomenological 
language is tied to Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the clarificatory resources of 
ordinary language. The idea that ordinary experience has only an apparent 
stability did not first arise from ordinary descriptions. The further idea that 
immediate experience is in an ongoing flux is equally foreign to ordinary 
language. Such requirements and implications of analysis by phenomenological 
language imposed as a philosophical remedy for the unclarities and confusions 
springing from ordinary language. The development of these requirements and 
implications seemed to be well justified by the aim of clarification alone.  
While phenomenological language was characterized as primary and a 
privileged means of expression, this characterization informed a further 
development of interconnected notions in light of the ideal of clarification alone. 
The abandonment of phenomenological language as a primary language brings to 
the foreground the question of the intelligibility of the clarificatory means 
themselves. Together with this move, Wittgenstein turns to ordinary language as 
a reliable resource to assess the intelligibility of these means. The strand of 
positive remarks on phenomenological language are motivated by the view that 
misapplications of ordinary language are to be signalled and clarified by way of 
phenomenological language. But now the very methodological reflections upon 
phenomenological language are rendered as involving misapplications of ordinary 
language.  
Wittgenstein’s turn to ordinary language as a reliable means to assess the 
intelligibility of notions involved by methods of philosophy was discussed in more 
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detail in the first section of the present chapter. At this point the notion of the 
perpetual flux of immediate experience is recognized as foreign to ordinary 
language and experience. But if this notion can be expressed at all, it should be 
expressed in ordinary language. And what can be expressed by ordinary language 
is now to be clarified by ordinary language: 
 
That everything flows must be expressed in the use of language, and in 
fact not in one kind of use as opposed to another but in the use. In that 
which we in general call the use of language. 
By use I understand what makes the combination of sounds or 
marks on paper in general into a language at all.181 
 
If “everything flows”, or the idea of a perpetual stream of experience, must be 
expressed in ordinary language, then it must mean a process that allows for past, 
present, and future qualifications. If the notion of flowing present attributed to 
immediate experience is to be expressed intelligibly at all, it must not be 
disconnected from notions of past and future. Then what was considered to be the 
present of immediate experience can only be part of physical time: 
 
The moment of time of which I say it is the present which contains 
everything that is given to me belongs itself to physical time.  
For how is otherwise such a moment determined? Somehow 
through a bell ring? And can I then really describe the whole experience 
that is simultaneous with this ring? If one thinks of trying it, one becomes 
straightaway aware that it is a fiction that we are talking about.182 
 
Once the attempt is made to remove the present of immediate experience from 
physical time, one faces the problem of delimiting that very present moment. The 
possibility of delimiting it through a ring of a bell is not really an option, but 
rather an ironical way of emphasising the problem. The ring of a bell has a 
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duration in time, namely, in physical time, even if the duration is very short. 
Wittgenstein already refers to a present removed from physical time as a fiction, 
while the remark may be taken to not reveal more than a difficulty with 
delimiting a present in the intended sense. It may seem that this is merely an 
empirical difficulty of the task, which would not yet substantiate the claim for the 
fictitious character of the notion.  
 On other occasions, however, Wittgenstein suggests that the idea of a 
present removed from physical time is not only fictitious but rather unintelligible: 
 
We are in temptation to say: ‘Only the experience of the present instant 
has reality’. 
And here the first answer must be: ‘By opposition to what?’183 
 
The questioned view was a central motivation for the construction of a 
phenomenological language. This language was meant to be constructed through 
the method of verification in the present, as it was considered that in this way the 
hypothetical addition of ordinary language could be left aside. We have seen that 
Wittgenstein comes to realize that the method of verification cannot be carried 
out in some cases, especially in the case of propositions about the past. But now it 
turns out that the very conception of verification is underlined by a spurious 
notion of the present in the first place.  
 The notion of the present removed from physical time is questionable not 
merely because of an empirical difficulty of delimiting such a present moment. 
The notion is conceptually problematic. It rather turns out to be an unintelligible 
notion insofar as it does not admit any opposite. The qualification of immediate 
experience as being in a flux removed from physical time, does not allow for the 
possibility of conceiving this very notion of the present by contrast to something 
that is not present in the same sense. 
 Unlike ordinary notions of time allowing for references to past and future 
events, this notion of the present of immediate experience involves an attempt at 
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making an absolute use of the word “present”. In the end, the notion of the 
present used in such an absolute sense is rendered superfluous when trying to 
delimit the field of description of phenomenological language: 
 
When one says the present experience only has reality, then here the 
word ‘present’ must already be superfluous [...]. For it cannot mean 
present by opposition to past and future.184 
 
The word “present” used in this absolute sense is superfluous or a wheel of 
language turning idly. The apparent substantial claim that only the present 
experience has reality does not gain or lose anything by the addition or 
subtraction of the word “present”. The attempted claim could then be considered 
to have a tautological character, saying nothing more than that experience is 
reality, or that experience is real. Indeed, if the notion of the present does not 
admit opposites in its attempted absolute use, then it cannot delimit experience 
from something else either. 
 In the end the field of description for phenomenological language turns 
out to be ill defined. The notion of the present in the absolute sense was meant to 
delineate the flux of immediate experience from the historical or physical time of 
ordinary experience. But the attempt to remove the notion of the present from its 
interconnection with the notions of past and future is just as misguided as the 
previous attempt to find a description more immediate than a description carried 
out through ordinary language.           
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PAIN EXPRESSIONS 
 
So far the question of Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology has been 
discussed insofar as it involves a method of analysis and clarification. The focus 
has been on methodological reflections on the phenomenological language. Some 
of these reflections contribute to a positive conception of this means of expression. 
Other reflections, mingled in manuscripts with the former, address a series of 
difficulties with the attempt at developing a viable conception of 
phenomenological language. It was shown that Wittgenstein’s notion of 
verification is central to both his positive conception and his critique of 
phenomenological language.  
 The present chapter discusses the ultimately problematic idea of 
phenomenological language from the angle of an attempt at applying the method 
of clarification that comes with it. To this purpose I will focus on Wittgenstein’s 
incipient investigations of the intelligibility of pain expressions in 1929 and early 
1930’s. Like the methodological remarks, these investigations do not form a 
unitary corpus throughout the manuscripts of this period.  
Some of these investigations have the notion of verification as their 
background and inform a view on the workings of pain expressions used in the 
first person. When this view in its turn is taken as a model of the intelligibility of 
all discourse about pain, this leads to a uniform account of the workings of pain 
expressions in general. The gist of the account relies on the positive conception of 
phenomenological language in the following way. According to this conception, 
ordinary propositions are analyzable into phenomenological statements directly 
verifiable in immediate experience. In line with this notion of analysis, the 
uniform account of pain expressions regards them as amounting to, or being 
analyzable into, phenomenological statements in the first person (e.g. I am in 
pain). Such statements are correlated to an experience of the presence or the 
absence of pain, which Wittgenstein explores in terms of mental states. An 
expression of one’s being in pain is verifiable by comparison to a mental state of 
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painfulness. An expression of one’s not being in pain is verifiable by comparison 
to a mental state of painlessness. 
In the same period, however, Wittgenstein becomes aware of some crucial 
differences between the workings of pain expressions, according to whether they 
are formulated in the first person or the second/third person. A series of remarks 
on this asymmetry questions the viability of a uniform account of the 
intelligibility of pain expressions. The case of expressions about the pain of the 
other is central in this respect. The case challenges the assumption that 
understanding and clarifying a proposition about the other’s pain requires a 
concern with the mental state of the other or with the other’s pain sensations. 
Thus the methodological requirement to seek here a verification of such pain 
expressions by correlation to pain sensations is misleading.  
This fourth chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 reconstructs the above 
mentioned view on the workings of pain expressions used in the first person, the 
view informed by the notion of verification. Section 4.2 explores the uniform 
account of the intelligibility of the discourse about pain, the account which takes 
the above view as the general model of clarification. A critique of the uniform 
account will then be pursued.  
 
4.1 Pain expressions in the first person 
 
Some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on pain expressions in the first person amount to 
a view according to which the intelligibility of these expressions involves their 
being correlated to an immediate experience, or to what Wittgenstein calls a 
mental state. I will first connect his concern with mental states in the case of pain 
expressions to his concern with immediate experience in his methodological 
remarks on phenomenological language (subsection 4.1.1). Against this 
background, the view on the workings of pain expressions in the first person will 
be exposed as involving a parallelism between relations of affirmative and 
negative expressions of pain on the one hand, with states of painfulness and of 
painlessness on the other hand (subsection 4.1.2). I will then focus more closely 
on the idea that the negative expression of pain designates a mental state of 
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painlessness. I will discuss this idea as indicating Wittgenstein’s attempt to 
elucidate how negative expressions of pain invoke a particular absence, namely 
that of pain, as opposed to an indeterminate absence (subsection 4.1.3).  
 
4.1.1 Mental states and immediate experience 
Wittgenstein’s notion of mental state in his reflections on the workings of pain 
expressions brings back into view his appeal for an attendance to experience. It is 
the appeal that was made already in his methodological remarks on 
phenomenological language. Wittgenstein remarks that 
 
in the sense in which one calls pains a mental state [o]ne wants thereby 
with the word ‘mind process’ to distinguish ‘lived experience [Erlebnis]’ 
from a ‘physical process’.185  
 
Lived experience is an instantiation of immediate experience in the case of 
phenomena commonly regarded as part of the inner life of the subject. Pain is 
among such phenomena. Like immediate experience in general, lived experience 
is contrasted to a physical process or a physical experience. In the case of pain one 
distinguishes the lived experience of pain in terms of pain sensations. The lived 
experience of pain is opposed to physical processes that may or may not 
accompany the pain sensations. Among such processes, which can be revealed by 
way of experiment, are physiological happenings, such as nerve impulses. Among 
these physical processes, one can also count facial signs of pain such as grimaces. 
Wittgenstein thus uses here the term physical in a broad sense. Physical processes 
are whatever is readily available to the person who is not in pain or whatever may 
be made accessible through experimental devices and technical means to assess 
the intensity of pain experienced by the subject in pain.  
 By approaching the phenomenon of pain in terms of mental states, 
Wittgenstein focuses on the first person perspective on the experience of pain. 
This approach will be central to his uniform account of the intelligibility of pain 
                                                     
185 Ms 114: p. 189 [Pichler (1994): 1933]. 
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expressions. The account gives a priority to the first person perspective, as the 
privileged one for clarifying the workings of pain expressions in general.  
 This prioritizing of one kind of pain expressions, namely, the ones in the 
first person, parallels the privilege that his methodological remarks give to 
phenomenological language as the adequate means of clarification of ordinary 
statements. The methodological remarks distinguish between a first system and a 
second system. The first system is the one of sense data or phenomenal facets 
made available by immediate experience at a given moment. In the case of pain, 
sensations correspond to the first system. The second system is the one of physical 
objects like chairs and tables. In the case of pain, among the relevant physical 
processes corresponding to the second system are the mentioned physiological 
happenings and facial signs of pain. 
The gist of Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenological language is 
that, by confining itself to immediate experience, this means of expression is able 
to clarify the workings of ordinary language in general. The workings of ordinary 
discourse about pain would be clarified in a similar way. The ordinary discourse 
about pain includes a wide variety of propositions, dealing with issues as diverse as 
the localization of pains, their intensity, their occurring or reoccurring at given 
times, or their persistence throughout a certain period. The clarification of the 
workings of these propositions would then boil down to an elucidation of the way 
in which they are ultimately related to immediate experience, namely, to the 
mental states of pain.  
  
4.1.2 Pain expressions and mental states 
Wittgenstein’s following view on the workings of pain expressions in the first 
person reflects the concern with verification within his methodological remarks 
on phenomenological language. This view involves also a reconsideration of the 
Tractarian account of the relation between affirmative and negative propositions 
in general.  
The following remark from 1929 draws a parallel between the relation of 
affirmative and negative expressions of pain to experience: 
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If I say ‘I have now no pains’, I describe thereby obviously my present 
state. And thus ‘no pains’ designates this state, whereas ‘pains’ another 
state and the formal relation between both expressions signifies a formal 
relation between states.186 
 
The designation relation between the affirmation “I have pains” and a state of pain 
on the one hand parallels the designation relation between the negation “I have 
no pains” and a state of painlessness on the other hand. One can trace here the 
conception of phenomenological language at work. According to this conception, 
each proposition can be analyzed into a phenomenological statement verifiable by 
comparison with the content of immediate experience. The same idea would hold 
in the case of pain expressions. The discourse about pain in the first person 
involves affirmative and negative expressions of pain. Insofar as these are simple 
expressions, allowing for no further analysis, they count as samples of 
phenomenological language. The intelligibility of ordinary propositions in general 
was taken to boil down to the correlation of phenomenological statements to 
immediate experience. By the same token, the intelligibility of the discourse about 
pain in the first person is now taken to boil down to the correlation of simple 
affirmative and negative expressions of pain to mental states of pain. 
 On this view, in order to understand and clarify an affirmative expression 
of pain, one would need to attend to a mental state of painfulness. And in order to 
understand and clarify a negative expression of pain, one would need to attend to 
a mental state of painlessness.  
 Wittgenstein mentions not only a relation of designation between 
propositions and mental states but also a formal relation between propositions. 
And a formal relation between states as well.  A formal relation between the 
affirmative expression and the negative expression would parallel a formal 
relation between the state of pain and the state of painlessness. The question of 
the formal relation between the affirmative and the negative proposition in 
general was discussed in the Tractatus.  
                                                     
186 Ms 107: p. 203 [dated 21 November 1929] / Ts 209: p. 24. 
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 The gist of early Wittgenstein’s view on the relation between an 
affirmative proposition and its negation is the following. According to the 
Tractatus, a proposition determines a place in logical space [Ort im logischen 
Raum] (3.4)187. Logical space is a space of intelligibility of phenomena and their 
expressions. The place in logical space is determined by the propositional sign 
(written or spoken) and its logical coordinates (3.41). A proposition determines 
only one place in logical space, but the whole logical space is already given by it 
(3.42a): the proposition reaches through [durchgreift] the whole logical space, 
determines the whole of it through the logical scaffolding round the proposition 
(3.42c). That is, the proposition determines the whole of logical space through the 
logical coordinates that connect the proposition with other propositions. 188 
Among the logical coordinates is logical negation [Verneinung]. However, the 
negating [verneinend] proposition, namely the negative proposition, and the 
negated [verneint] proposition determine different logical places: the logical place 
of the negating proposition lies outside [liegt ausserhalb] the logical place of the 
negated proposition (4.0641b-c). 
 Wittgenstein’s account of the workings of pain expressions in the first 
person resembles to an extent this Tractarian cartography of logical space: 
 
‘I have no pains’ means: When I compare the proposition ‘I have pains’ 
with reality it turns out that it is false. – I must thus be able to compare it 
with that which is actually the case. And this possibility of comparison – 
even if it does not yield truth – is what we mean with the expression that 
what is the case must play itself out in the same space as that which is 
negated; things must only be otherwise.189 
 
                                                     
187 It points to [deutet] that logical place (Nb 102: p. 36r [dated 23 November 1914] / N: p. 31). 
188 Wittgenstein’s clarification for Ogden’s translation reads: “the scaffolding is as big as the logical 
space. You could imagine a house with such a big scaffolding round it that by its length, breadth and 
width it filled the whole space. (Though ‘filling’ wouldn’t be the right expression. I think to ‘reach 
through space’ is what I mean.)” (Wittgenstein 1973: p. 25.) 
189 Ms 107: pp. 203-204  [dated 21 November 1929] / Ts 209: p. 24. 
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Wittgenstein thus notes that what is the case (i.e. present pain) must play itself 
out in the same space as that which is not the case (i.e. possible pain). In this 
sense, the necessity, the must, of the state of pain playing itself out in the same 
space as the state of painlessness is required by one’s being able to compare 
relevant affirmative and negative expressions with reality. But this space is not 
really the Tractarian logical space:  
  
I compare this state [of painlessness] with another [i.e. a state of pain], 
thus the former must be comparable with the latter. The former too must 
lie in pain-space [Schmerzraum] although in another place. – Otherwise 
my proposition [‘I have no pains’] would somehow mean that my present 
state [of painlessness] has nothing to do with one of painfulness; somehow 
as if I said that the colour of this rose has nothing to do with the conquest 
of Gaul through Caesar. That is, there is no connection. But I mean 
precisely that between my present state [of painlessness] and one of 
painfulness there subsists a connection.190     
 
The possibility to compare the expression “I have pains” with reality is here taken 
to exhibit a formal relation not only between this expression and its negation “I 
have no pains”. It is taken to exhibit a formal relation also between the state of 
painfulness and the state of painlessness. These relations, however, do not 
determine places in a general logical space, but in pain-space.   
 Without thematizing it, the Tractatus anticipates the notion of pain-space. 
The underlying reasoning is that any phenomenon, insofar as it immediately 
admits certain properties and not others, lies in a space of its own possibilities: ‘A 
speck in visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour; it has, so to speak, 
a colour-space round it [um sich]. A tone must have a pitch, the object of the 
sense of touch a hardness, etc.’191 Thus early Wittgenstein envisages particular 
spaces of intelligibility for particular phenomena. Coloured flecks would lie in a 
                                                     
190 Ms 108: p. 37 [dated 25 December 1929] / Ts 209: p. 35 / Ts 212: p. 347 / Ts 213: p. 102; cf. PR: § 
82. 
191 TLP: 2.0131. 
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colour-space. Tones would lie in a sound-space. And in a similar fashion, 
phenomena of pain or mental states of pain would lie in a pain-space.  
In the Tractatus general logical space is an all encompassing space of 
intelligibility. This conception is tied with the universal status conferred to 
account of the syntax for logical connectives that is meant to hold for any domain 
of discourse. However, Wittgenstein’s 1929 paper has pointed out precisely the 
incapacity of the Tractarian logical notation to do justice to the workings of colour 
ascriptions. Once this point is taken on board, the idea of an all-encompassing 
logical space is already shaken. The moral of “Some Remarks on Logical Form” is 
precisely the problematic character of the attempt at giving a universal account of 
the syntax for connectives irrespective of the subject-matter of the propositions 
linked by them. Thus the call for a logical investigation of the phenomena 
themselves is not a call for an undiscriminating attendance to experience. It is 
rather a plea for attempting to clarify the workings of propositions while grouping 
them in different domains of discourse according to their subject-matter. The 
solution to the colour-exclusion case thus involved the initial recognition that 
colour ascriptions belong to a domain of discourse about phenomena that admit 
gradation. The investigation of the colour-exclusion case was to be carried out 
with regard to the particular colour-space and not in view of a general Tractarian 
logical space.  
 Wittgenstein’s view on the workings of pain expressions similarly relies 
on the particular notion of pain-space, rather than on the notion of general 
Tractarian logical space. The view on the workings of negative expressions of pain 
also diverges from the Tractarian approach to negative expressions in general. Let 
us have a closer look at this divergence.  
 
4.1.3 Specific absence and negative expressions 
Wittgenstein’s view on the workings of pain expressions in the first person points 
to a further issue with the Tractarian notion of logical space. The Tractarian 
conception of the relation between the affirmative and the negative proposition as 
a relation in general logical space does not reach as far as accounting for the 
difference of subject matter between various negative propositions. Again, 
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according to early Wittgenstein, the negating or the negative proposition 
determines a logical place outside the logical place determined by the affirmative 
or the negated proposition. This amounts to a somewhat deflationary approach to 
negation. According to this approach, the negative proposition does not add 
anything substantial to the discourse and it does not correspond to anything in 
reality either. Take the example of describing the content of a pocket. In the 
pocket there was, say, a pen and a rubber band, but not money. According to a 
Tractarian approach, the description of the content would amount to saying “In 
the pocket there is a pen and a rubber band and nothing else.” The description 
would consist in a conjunction of affirmative propositions followed by an ending 
phrase. The ending phrase “and nothing else” would merely put an end to the 
enumeration of what is actually in the pocket. The problem is that a negative 
proposition like “In the pocket there is no money” is not substitutable with the 
phrase “and nothing else”. This negative proposition does add something 
substantial to the description of the content of the pocket. Namely, that what is 
missing from the pocket is money as opposed to, say, feathers.  
 In the case of pain expressions, Wittgenstein is concerned with the fact 
that negative expressions of pain cannot be taken to be about just any absence.  
They are rather about a specific absence, namely that of pain. In 1929 he writes:  
 
‘I have no stomach ache’ is comparable to the proposition ‘These apples 
cost nothing’. They cost namely no money, but not no snow or no trouble. 
The null point is the null point on one scale. And no point on the 
yardstick can be given to me without the yardstick, so neither its null 
point. ‘I have no pains’ does not designate a state which is not about pains. 
Rather it is about pains. [...] I describe my present state [of painlessness] 
by way of the allusion to something that is not the case. If this attendance 
is required for the description (and is not merely an ornament) then in my 
present state something has to lie that requires that mention.192 
 
                                                     
192 Ms 108: pp. 35-36 [dated 24  December 1929] / Ts 209: p. 35 / PR: § 82 tr. mod.  
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Thus, the negative expression “I have no stomach ache” accounts for a specific 
absence. Namely, it accounts for the absence of stomach ache. By comparison, the 
proposition “These apples cost nothing” accounts for the specific matter that one 
need not pay any money in order to get the apples. The proposition invokes the 
absence of the need to pay or the absence of money required in order for one to 
get in the possession of the apples.  
Each of these propositions is conceived of as a point on a scale or on a 
yardstick. Wittgenstein’s introduction of the model of the yardstick is indicative 
of the turn of his investigations from 1929 onwards to particular domains of 
discourse. Instead of attempting to account for the syntax of language in general, 
he now rather thinks that the activity of clarification is to attend to propositions 
considered as belonging to different domains of discourse according to their 
subject matter.  
In our case, along with the first proposition about the absence of pain, 
other propositions on its scale would account for the eventual presence of more or 
less intense stomach aches. Along with the second proposition about the absence 
of money, other propositions on its scale would account for an eventual cost, 
which can be smaller or higher. The propositions considered correspond to the 
null point of a scale, namely, the absence of pain and the absence of an actual cost 
respectively. But the intelligibility of each of these propositions is not 
independent from the intelligibility of the other propositions on the same scale. 
This is what Wittgenstein means by saying that the null point cannot be given 
without the whole yardstick. 
Conversely, this also involves that the yardstick cannot be given without 
its null-point. That is, that the intelligibility of pain expressions presupposes the 
intelligibility of the negative pain expression. And the latter in its turn is here 
accounted for in terms of the negative expression corresponding to a reality or 
experience, namely, a mental state of painlessness.  
So the gist of the above view on the workings of pain expressions is that 
each such expression, either positive or negative, is verifiable by comparison to a 
distinct experience, or a mental state. The affirmative expression of pain is 
correlated to a mental state of painfulness. The negative expression of pain is 
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correlated to a mental state of painlessness. A series of further remarks to be 
discussed take the view on the workings of pain expressions in the first person as a 
general model for the intelligibility of all discourse about pain. This generalization 
will turn out to be, however, ultimately exposed to some objections.    
 
4.2 Critique of the uniform account of pain expressions 
 
The present section discuses the uniform account of the intelligibility of pain 
expressions which is modelled on the above view on the workings of pain 
expressions in the first person. Some questionable implications of the uniform 
account will be first exposed and discussed by further reference to the 
methodological conception of phenomenological language (subsection 4.2.1.) 
Then I will argue that the uniform account is ultimately undermined by 
Wittgenstein’s consideration of the asymmetry between the workings of pain 
expressions in the first person as opposed to the second/third person (subsection 
4.2.2). I will finish by drawing some connections between the critique of the 
uniform account of pain expressions and the critique of phenomenological 
language (subsection 4.2.3). 
 
4.2.1 The uniform account and its implications 
The core elements of the conception of phenomenological language that converge 
with the uniform account of pain expressions are the following. According to this 
conception, ordinary discourse consists in propositions that do not readily exhibit 
their logical syntax. At the same time, ordinary propositions do not provide an 
accurate account of the actual content of experience. This calls for a different 
means of philosophical expression, a different medium of clarificatory analysis. 
This medium is the phenomenological language. The removal of the hypothetical 
addition in ordinary statements involves their analysis into phenomenological 
statements. Such statements are directly verifiable by way of comparison to 
immediate experience.  
 Against this background, all discourse about pain appears as analyzable 
into pain expressions correlated to mental states of pain. In order to account for 
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the intelligibility of pain expressions one would thus have to verify them by 
comparison to the relevant immediate experience, namely, the experience of pain 
sensations. 
 Wittgenstein conceives of the statements directly verifiable by 
comparison to immediate experience as constituting a medium of expression, or a 
language, that has the first person as it centre. He writes: 
 
Now, among all the languages with different people as their centres, each 
of which I can understand, the one with me as its centre has a privileged 
status. This language is particularly adequate.193 
 
This is a methodological first person, a stance which the one carrying out the 
activity of clarification is supposed to take. It is by verifying phenomenological 
statements from the methodological first person perspective that the hypothetical 
addition of ordinary propositions is removed. Indeed, in order that the method of 
verification be carried out, any reliance on reports of others would have to be 
reduced to propositions accounting for immediate experience. According to the 
uniform account of pain expressions, the analysis of all discourse about pain would 
be analyzable into affirmative and negative expressions of pain of the form “I am 
in pain” and “I am not in pain”. 
 Expressions of this form would have, like phenomenological statements, a 
privileged status. Such pain expressions in the first person are considered to 
constitute a privileged medium of expression, in that they reveal the workings of 
all discourse about pain.  
 Now, of course, not all discourse about pain is uttered in the first person. 
Then the clarificatory privilege of pain expressions in the first person could be 
maintained only by attempting to give an account of the workings of the 
expressions about other persons’ pain in terms of expressions of the kind “I am in 
pain”. In line with the uniform account of pain expressions, Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
                                                     
193 Ms 108: p. 9 [dated 14 December 1929] / PR: § 58. 
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We could adopt the following way of representing matters: if I, L. W., 
have toothache, then that is expressed by means of the proposition ‘There 
is toothache’. But if that is so, what we now express by the proposition ‘A 
has toothache’, is put as follows: ‘A is behaving as L. W. does when there 
is toothache’.194  
 
Expressions of pain in the first person are correlated to sensations of pain actually 
experienced. According to the view exposed in the previous section, an expression 
“I am in pain” designates a mental state of painfulness. The expressions about 
other’s pain would function in the same way. To say that the other is in pain 
would be intelligible insofar as the other is actually having pain, that he or she is 
actually experiencing pain sensations. The expressions about the other’s pain 
would have to be correlated to the other’s pain sensations.  
The privilege of the language of pain expressions with the first person as 
its centre as clarificatory for the workings of all discourse about pain involves the 
following assumption. In order to understand expressions about the other being in 
pain from the first person stance, I would have to be concerned with the actual 
pain sensations of the other. I would need to have some access to the pain 
sensations of the other, or even somehow experience them. While drawing on this 
assumption: 
 
In explaining the proposition ‘He has toothache’, we even say something 
like: ‘Quite simple, I know what it means for me to have toothache, and 
when I say he has toothache, I mean he now has what I once had.’ But 
what does ‘he’ mean and what does ‘have toothache’ mean? Is this a 
relation toothache once had to me and now has to him? So in that case I 
would also be conscious of toothache now and of his having it now, just as 
I can now see a wallet in his hand that I saw earlier in mine.195 
 
                                                     
194 Ms 108: pp. 8-9 [dated 14 December 1929] / PR: § 58. 
195 Ms 107: pp. 200-201 [dated 20 November 1929] / PR: § 62.  
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The remark suggests two related ways to account for the understanding of 
expressions about the other’s pain. Both ways involve an appeal to my own 
experience of pain. Both ways involve accounting for the intelligibility of 
expressions about the pain of the other upon the model of the intelligibility of 
expressions in the first person. In the first person, the expressions would refer to 
one’s mental state of pain, or one’s pain sensations. To account for the use of pain 
expressions in this case would be to provide a verification of them by comparison 
to the mental state of pain.  
 Then one way to account for understanding the expressions about the 
other’s pain would be my correlating them, somehow indirectly, to pain 
sensations I actually had. This would amount to my drawing on past uses of pain 
expressions, when these expressions were correlated to my actual pain sensations. 
The understanding of the expression “He has pains” at a present moment thus 
involves a connection between the expression and my past experience. But this 
way of accounting for the intelligibility of expressions about the other’s pain 
would not allow for verification. Verification involves a correlation between the 
use of the expression and an immediate experience occurring at the same moment 
when the expression is used. In order to avoid the difficulty of the attempt to 
verify the expression by correlating it to a past experience, a different way of 
accounting for its understanding may be provided.  
 The second way comes with the assumption that in order to understand 
the expression about the other’s pain, I need to somehow have at the same time 
the pain sensations the other is having. Only in this way could one carry out a 
verification of the expression at the present moment. According to the end of the 
above remark, I would need to be conscious of the pain of the other and of the 
other’s having the pain at the present moment. A comparison is thus drawn with 
the case of my seeing a wallet in the other’s hand, a wallet seen earlier in my own 
hands. This points to a peculiar way in which I would have to be conscious of the 
pain of the other. It would be a form of being conscious of pain in a somewhat 
disengaged manner. Namely, without experiencing at the same time the 
unpleasantness that pain would give to the other.  
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The view that one can be conscious of pain without experiencing its 
unpleasantness draws on a parallel with my being conscious of the presence of 
somebody in another room:  
 
One constructs here on the schema: “How do you know that there is 
somebody in the other room?” – “I have heard him singing.”196 
 
According to the conception of phenomenological language, a proposition like 
“How do you know that there is somebody in the other room?” is analyzable into 
phenomenological statements directly verifiable by comparison to immediate 
experience. In the current example, it is an immediate experience of hearing the 
singing sounds coming from the other room. I am not actually in the other room, 
not actually attending the situation of someone being there. But I would have an 
access to the situation by hearing somebody singing there. If I was, however, in 
the other room, I could have a different experience of the situation. I would be 
able, for instance, to see the singing person. And thus immediate experience 
would provide also visual sense data of the situation.   
 It is by way of a parallel to this case, that one conceives of the eventuality 
of being conscious of the other’s pain without perceiving the unpleasantness. 
There would be different kinds of perception of pain, according to the difference 
in the stances of the person in pain and of the one understanding expressions 
about that person being in pain. The person being in pain would have a full-blown 
experience. The person would not be merely conscious of pain but also perceive 
the unpleasantness. This would correspond by analogy to being in the other room 
where somebody is singing and having the full-blown experience of the situation.  
Whereas in order to understand the expression about the person being in pain I 
would only need to be conscious of pain. This would correspond to my being 
conscious of somebody being in the other room, while I am merely hearing the 
singing.  
                                                     
196 Ms 113: p. 52v [dated 18 April 1932]. 
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 Wittgenstein’s further scrutiny of the understanding of expressions about 
the other’s pain call into question these implications of the uniform account of the 
workings of pain expressions and ultimately the viability of the account itself. 
What is particularly questioned is the idea that in order to understand and clarify 
expressions about the pain of the other one needs to have some access to the 
other’s actual pain sensations. I will now proceed to a discussion of this issue.  
 
4.2.2 The asymmetry of pain expressions  
According to the uniform account of pain expressions, all discourse about pain is 
to be clarified in terms of a language with the first person as its centre. Then the 
workings of every expression of pain would follow the workings of pain 
expressions in the first person correlated to a mental state of pain. The expression 
“I am in pain” designates a state of painfulness and is ultimately verifiable by 
comparison to an immediate experience of pain.  
On this account, my understanding and clarifying the expressions about 
the other’s pain involves a verification by comparison with pain sensations. This is 
the source of the concern with a way of my somehow accessing the other’s pain 
sensations. Such an access would be necessary for my understanding expressions 
about the other’s pain.  
 The uniform account of pain expressions can be questioned starting from 
an example of comforting the other in pain: 
 
When I feel sorry for someone with toothache, I put myself in his place. 
But I put myself in his place.197  
 
The uniform account of pain expressions assumes the possibility of a uniformity of 
my and the other’s experience of painlessness and painfulness. Insofar as neither 
me nor the other would be in pain, we would share an experience of the absence 
of pain. Namely, we would both be in a mental state of painlessness. 
                                                     
197 Ms 107: p. 271 [dated 31 January 1931] / PR: § 63. 
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 The other’s starting to feel pain would induce a divide in this shared 
experience. The presence of pain the other feels would put him or her in a state of 
painfulness. I would continue to be in a state of painlessness until the other would 
utter a pain expression. The expression would be correlated to the other’s state of 
painfulness and would make known to me the presence of pain that he or she is 
experiencing. 
 My understanding of the other’s expression would restore a uniformity in 
our experience. My understanding would involve the advent of a state of 
painfulness. And thus we would both come to experience the presence of pain. It 
would be a shared experience of pain expressed only by the other’s uttering a 
phrase of the form “I am in pain”. 
 But on the uniform account, more is required in order for me to 
understand the phrase of the other. What is required is that an identity be 
established between the particular pain sensations in my state of painfulness and 
in the other’s state of painfulness.   
 The case of comforting the other provides a challenge for this 
requirement. My comforting the other does involve my understanding the other’s 
expression of pain. But it does not necessitate that an identity be established 
between pain sensations I may come to have and the other’s pain sensations. 
While comforting the other having a toothache, I put myself in the situation of 
the other. But I do this not by becoming conscious of the other’s toothache itself. 
Nor by starting to experience the unpleasantness that the other is experiencing. 
By putting myself in the situation of the other I rather draw on relevant situations 
in which I have been myself. I draw on my past use of pain expressions. And I 
draw on my recollection of the comfort I may have received from other people 
when uttering such expressions. 
 To this purpose, while putting myself in the other’s situation I may also 
draw on my past experience of toothaches. But my recollection of toothaches 
would not bring the actual sensations back to my experience in the present. My 
recollection of past experience of toothaches can even less provide me with some 
access to the other’s toothache. 
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 The idea that my understanding of the other’s expression of pain and my 
comforting the other requires my access to the other’s toothache goes hand in 
hand with a misleading attempt at extending the experience of the first person 
over the experience of the second/third person. The hope that such an attempt can 
be successful is the hope that a uniformity between my and the other’s experience 
of the presence and the absence of pain can be established. The following remark 
points to this misleading attempt: 
 
Philosophers who believe you can, in a manner of speaking, extend 
experience by thinking, ought to remember that you can transmit speech 
over the telephone, but not measles.198 
    
The remark refers to philosophers in the plural, but it works well as a reminder of 
the problematic assumption of the uniform account of pain expressions springing 
from Wittgenstein’s own remarks. Indeed, at the heart of the uniform account of 
pain expressions lies precisely an attempt to extend experience. Namely, by 
providing a way in which one could become in the first person conscious of the 
pain sensations of the other.   
 The idea of the possibility of an extension of experience allows for a divide 
between the field of experience pertaining to the use of pain expressions in the 
first person as opposed to the second/third person. But the divide is regarded as 
contingent in the sense of its being relative to the occurrence of pain in the 
experience of the other, relative to the relation that pain happens to have to the 
other as opposed to me. The divide could then be bridged by my  understanding of 
expressions about the other’s pain, an understanding that would necessitate my 
sharing a mental state of painfulness with him or her. 
 The distinction between the fields of experience pertaining to the use of 
pain expressions is, however, not contingent. It is rather logical. The distinction is 
the corollary of the logical impossibility of my coming to experience the actual 
pain sensations of the other:  
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We say, ‘I cannot feel your toothache’; when we say this, do we only 
mean that so far we have never as a matter of fact felt someone else’s 
toothache? Is it not, rather, that it is logically impossible?199 
 
The issue is not that merely so far I did not feel the other’s toothache. It is not that 
in the past I was never conscious of the actual toothache of the other or that I 
have not experienced the unpleasantness that the other was experiencing. The 
divide between my stance and the other’s stance is not a contingent but a logical 
divide. Then an attempt at verifying the pain expressions of the other by 
comparison to the other’s pain sensation is by principle not achievable.   
 The fulfilment of the methodological requirement of verification for my 
understanding the pain expression of the other is indeed logically impossible. 
Wittgenstein’s further example of the comfort provided to someone sad points out 
that the requirement is also superfluous in that it is not actually entertained in 
such a situation of everyday life: 
 
It is not possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some 
kind of verification.  
If I say I believe that someone is sad, it is as though I am seeing his 
behaviour through the medium of sadness, from the viewpoint of 
sadness.200   
 
The remark first exposes the requirement of verification as the general relation 
that any proposition, including one formulating a belief, would ultimately have 
with immediate experience. The example of sadness does not substantiate this 
requirement, but rather points out that one can precisely believe that someone is 
sad without entertaining the requirement to verify the belief by comparison to an 
immediate experience or with sensations corresponding to it.  
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 The focus on the case of sadness in this respect is particularly apt, as one 
does not generally say that being sad involves one’s having sensations of sadness. 
Then someone uttering “I am sad” cannot be taken to account for the person 
having sensations of sadness in the first place. I can equally understand the other’s 
expression before or without being concerned with any sensations that may 
correspond to the expression. That I believe that the other is sad means that I can 
already act upon my understanding the expression without attempting to verify it 
by comparison to sensations. 
 I act upon my understanding of the other’s expression by already 
comforting the other. Doing so requires attention to the circumstances of sadness. 
Namely, attention to the situation of the other and the factors related to the 
sadness the other is exhibiting by way of behaviour or propositions elaborating 
upon the sadness.  
 Wittgenstein’s remark presents comforting the other as involving not my 
explicitly drawing on my past relevant experiences, but my seeing the other’s 
behaviour through the medium of sadness. I thus understand also his expression “I 
am sad” in light of a whole discourse of sadness and actions pertaining to it. That 
is, in light of how people generally talk about sadness and in light of how people 
generally behave when they are sad and comfort others who are sad.  
 Thus in light of the way in which we generally provide comfort to others, 
the methodological requirement of achieving a verification of expressions turns 
out to be superfluous. Conversely, the presence or absence of corresponding 
sensations experienced by others when uttering expressions of pain is equally 
superfluous to my understanding of these expressions and providing comfort:  
 
The two hypotheses 1) that other people have toothache and 2) that they 
behave just as I do but do not have toothache, have identical senses. That 
is, if I had, for example, learnt the second form of expression, I would talk 
in a pitying tone of voice about people who do not have toothache, but are 
behaving as I do when I have. 
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 A proposition so conceived that it is uncontrollably true or false is 
totally detached from reality and does not function anymore as a 
proposition.201 
 
The use of the notion of hypothesis in this remark is not the technical use 
pertaining to the conception of phenomenological language. The mentioned 
hypotheses are not such that can be analyzed in phenomenological statements. 
While verifying such resulting statements by comparison to immediate 
experience, one could thus clarify the intelligibility of the initial hypotheses. And 
further, one could establish the truth or falsehood of either of them. 
The two mentioned hypotheses are rather two forms of expression of the 
workings of the behaviour and use of pain expressions of other people in pain. 
According to the first form, the behaviour and use of pain expressions of others is 
accompanied by their having pain sensations. Their behaviour and their 
expressions would thus be correlated to their immediate experience of pain. In 
light of the second form of expression, the behaviour and use of pain expressions 
of others would not be accompanied by their experiencing any pain sensations.   
 The remark makes the assumption that the second form of expression 
would be somehow accepted. What is relevant for the assumption is not that this 
form of expression would be substantiated as viable. Rather, what is envisaged is 
merely that I learn it. According to the remark, this would not, however, make a 
change in my attitudes towards other people in pain. Guided by the behaviour and 
pain expressions of the other, I would still provide comfort to the other in 
relevant situations.  
 The idea that the behaviour and use of pain expressions of others is not 
accompanied by their having pain sensations would leave unchanged our ordinary 
ways of providing comfort. This idea may seem to be formulated against a 
behaviourist background in the following sense. It may seem to actually deny that 
the behaviour of others is accompanied by pain sensations. But the remark does 
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not deny this. The focus is rather on the intelligibility of the pain expressions of 
the others.  
 According to the uniform account, my understanding and clarifying the 
pain expressions of others requires my having some access to their pain sensations. 
But my actually having the pain sensations of others turned out to be a logical 
impossibility. Once this latter point is taken on board, the uniform account would 
end up rendering the pain expressions of the others as uncontrollably true or false. 
They would be uncontrollably true or false insofar I would not have any means to 
verify them by comparison to pain sensations.  
By insisting on the requirement to access the pain sensations of others, the 
uniform account, contrary to its aim, renders the pain expressions of others as 
unintelligible when heard from a first person perspective. This is because the 
uniform account of pain expressions overlooks the essential asymmetry in the 
workings of these expressions. A significant element overlooked thereby is the 
function that the uttering mouth plays in my understanding of the other’s pain 
expressions: 
 
‘I have a pain’ is a sign of a completely different kind when I am using the 
proposition, from what it is to me on the lips of another; the reason being 
that it is senseless, as far as I am concerned, on the lips of another until I 
know through which mouth it was expressed. The propositional sign in 
this case does not consist in the sound alone, but in the fact that the sound 
came out of this mouth. Whereas in the case in which I say or think it, the 
sign is the sound itself.202 
 
According to this remark, the expression “I have pain” does not work in the same 
manner throughout all discourse about pain. One and the same proposition 
amounts to different propositional signs according to the stance from which it is 
uttered. When I utter the proposition in the first person, I readily understand it. 
In this case, the propositional sign is the sound itself, or my actually uttering the 
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proposition. When the same proposition is used by the other, my understanding it 
requires an attendance to a further element. This is the mouth through which the 
proposition is uttered. The fact that the sound comes out from the particular 
mouth of the other is essential to my understanding the proposition as a 
proposition about the pain of a specific other person.  
 Thus in order that pain expressions of others be understood and clarified 
from the first person stance, these expressions do need to be correlated to 
something in experience. But they need not be correlated to pain sensations of the 
others which I may try to somehow access. In order to understand the pain 
expression of the other and act upon this understanding I rather need to correlate 
it to the mouth through which it was uttered. The mouth of the other through 
which the expression was uttered reflects the asymmetry between the workings of 
pain expressions according to the person in which they are uttered.  
 The attendance to the uttering mouth of the other is one way to account 
for the asymmetry in the workings of pain expressions. Another way to account 
for this asymmetry is from the angle of the pronouns as used in pain expressions 
of ordinary language: 
 
The phenomenon of feeling toothache I am familiar with is represented in 
the idioms of ordinary language by ‘I have a pain in such-and-such a 
tooth’. Not by an expression of the kind ‘In this place there is a feeling of 
pain’. The whole field of this experience is described in this language by 
expressions of the form ‘I have...’. Propositions of the form ‘N has 
toothache’ are reserved for a totally different field. So we should not be 
surprised when for propositions of the form ‘N has toothache’, there is 
nothing left that links with experience in the same way as in the first 
case.203 
 
Thus the use of pain expressions in ordinary discourse already points to an 
asymmetry of their workings. This asymmetry reflects a divide in the field of 
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experience corresponding to the pain expressions in the first person as opposed to 
the second/third person. The first person pronoun “I” delineates a field of 
experience accounted for by the use of expressions “I have a toothache in such and 
such a tooth.” Expressions of pain in the second/third person are reserved for a 
different field of experience. But this does not mean that in order to understand 
the latter expression I need to correlate it to that different field of experience. It 
rather means that I need not attempt to correlate the expression with an 
experience allegedly shared with the other. For the understanding of the 
expression in the second/third person, nothing would be left that connects the 
expression to such an experience.  
 
4.2.3 Connections with the critique of phenomenological language 
This critique of the uniform account of pain expressions converges in several 
points with Wittgenstein’s critique of phenomenological language.  
 Let us first take the rejection of the idea that the intelligibility of 
expressions about the other’s pain involves the model of the workings of 
expressions about pain in the first person. This rejection echoes Wittgenstein’s 
ultimate abandonment of the general distinction between a primary, 
phenomenological language and the secondary, ordinary language. The critique of 
the uniform account of pain expressions reflects this abandonment, however, not 
by involving the collapse of two kinds of expression into one. The asymmetry of 
the workings of pain expressions in the first person and the second/third person 
rather maintains a distinction between two kinds of expression. What the critique 
yet questions is the primacy that the uniform account grants to pain expressions in 
the first person. According to the critique of the uniform account, such 
expressions cannot be given this clarificatory priority. They cannot be regarded as 
constituting a language of what we really know or are conscious of when 
understanding expressions about the other’s pain. 
 The critique of the uniform account also questions the methodological 
privilege given to phenomenological language insofar as this is a language with 
the first person as its centre. Phenomenological language would have to be such a 
language insofar as its statements need to be verified by way of their comparison 
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to immediate experience. The rigidity of the method of verification led in the 
methodological critique to the difficulty of applying this method to the 
clarification of the workings of propositions about the past. In that case, 
verification could not be carried out, as it required the comparison of 
phenomenological statements to a present immediate experience. But an 
immediate experience is essentially lacking on the occasion of the use of 
propositions about the past. The grammar of the notions of past, present, and 
future involves that one’s experiencing the past that a presently used expression is 
about amounts to a logical impossibility. In a similar way, an immediate 
experience of the other’s pain is not available to the first person who understands 
the expression about the pain. The whole concern with ways of accessing or 
becoming conscious of the pain of the other is misleading insofar as it involves an 
attempt to cross a logical divide between different fields of experience. 
 The focus on the case of comforting the other in pain sheds further light 
on Wittgenstein’s way of formulating the abandonment of phenomenological 
language in a central remark discussed above:  
 
Phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I called it, does not 
strike me now as a goal, I hold it no longer to be possible.204     
 
I have pointed out that the phrasing “no longer to be possible” [nicht mehr für 
möglich] in this remark is revised in further versions, occurring in later 
typescripts and finally in the Philosophical Remarks. According to the latter 
phrasing, phenomenological language is taken to be rather no longer necessary 
[nicht mehr für nötig].205 Wittgenstein’s approach to the case of comforting the 
other provides resources to elucidate both phrasings, insofar as the method of 
verification is central to the idea of phenomenological language. The approach  
questions both the necessity and the possibility of carrying out a verification in 
order to understand expressions about the other’s pain. 
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 Let us first take the issue of the necessity of verification in this case. The 
uniform account of the workings of pain expressions makes the methodological 
requirement that their understanding requires their verification in the first 
person. But Wittgenstein’s attendance to the case of providing comfort to the 
other in pain points out that the fulfilment of this methodological requirement is 
not necessary. While providing comfort to the other in pain, I already understand 
expressions about the other’s pain without actually entertaining any concern with 
verifying the expression by comparison to an immediate experience shared with 
the other.  
The methodological requirement of a concern with the other’s pain 
sensations in order to understand the expressions about the other’s pain is equally 
rendered as superfluous. This is shown by Wittgenstein’s consideration of our 
learning that the others may utter pain expressions without actually having pain 
sensations. Our learning this, however, would leave unchanged our ordinary ways 
of understanding the expressions and of providing comfort.  
The possibility to carry out a verification in every case of clarification is 
also questioned by the critique of the uniform account of pain expressions. The 
uniform account involves an unfulfillable attempt at extending my field of 
experience over the other’s field of experience in order that the expression about 
the other’s pain be verifiable. This attempt involves my alleged concern with a 
way to access the actual pain sensations of the other. But the eventuality of my 
having an access to the actual pain sensation of the other is not a genuine 
possibility at all. It is rather tantamount to a logical impossibility. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present thesis was guided by three leading questions. One question is that of 
the rationale of Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology. Another question is 
that of the specificity of phenomenology as he conceived of it. A further question 
is that of Wittgenstein’s commitment to phenomenology. I will now readdress 
these questions in light of the discussions provided in the previous chapters.  
 
The rationale of Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology 
According to Hintikka’s influential reading, phenomenology was implicitly at 
work already in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy.206 My account of the rationale of 
Wittgenstein’s explicit concern with phenomenology challenged this reading. To 
this purpose I have focused on Wittgenstein’s 1929 paper “Some Remarks on 
Logical Form”, which calls for a logical investigation of phenomena as a remedy to 
what Wittgenstein comes to see as a problem with the project of the Tractatus. 
The problem is the applicability of the universal account of logical grammar that 
early Wittgenstein provided. 
 The paper approaches the so-called case of colour-exclusion, an issue 
raised already in the Tractatus. According to this work, a proposition like “This 
cannot be red and blue simultaneously all over” expresses a logical impossibility. 
On the other hand, every proposition expressing a logical impossibility is taken to 
boil down to a contradiction. Namely, a contradiction to be exhibited through 
truth-tables of the logical operations involved by the proposition. The proposition 
above should thus be shown to boil down to a contradiction exhibited by the 
Tractarian truth-table of logical product, or conjunction. However, as I pointed 
out in light of Ramsey’s review of the Tractatus, early Wittgenstein does not go as 
far as providing an actual analysis of the proposition in question, leaving it open 
where and how a contradiction could be established in this case. The paper “Some 
Remarks on Logical Form” makes an attempt at carrying out the required analysis. 
This leads to Wittgenstein’s acknowledgment that, in the case of simultaneous 
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colour ascriptions, one cannot in fact establish a contradiction to be exhibited by 
the Tractarian truth-table of logical product. According to the paper, such 
ascriptions are rather articulated by a relation of mutual exclusion. This relation 
has no correlate in the complete table of connectives provided by the Tractatus. 
 The paper thus suggests that logical grammar cannot be exhaustively 
accounted for by the combinations of propositions exhibited by Tractarian truth-
tables. Wittgenstein calls for an attendance to the character of phenomena and of 
the qualities that the propositions to be clarified are about. It is when qualities 
admit gradation that the syntax of simultaneous ascriptions does not follow the 
logical syntax for operators exhibited by standard truth-tables. Against this 
background I discussed Wittgenstein’s introduction of phenomenology as a logic 
of content by contrast to Tractarian logic of form. Unlike a logic of propositional 
form, a logic of propositional content would not involve a universal account of 
logical grammar in terms of combinations exhibited by truth-tables. 
Phenomenology would first scrutinize the kind of the subject matter of 
propositions to be clarified. But Wittgenstein will take this scrutiny to involve yet 
again a universal means of clarification, namely a specific method of verification. 
This method is central to his conception of phenomenological language. 
 
The specificity of Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology      
The notion of phenomenological language was regarded as the core of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology. He envisages a phenomenological 
language as an adequate medium of philosophical expression and clarification. As 
such, this medium is opposed to ordinary language, which disguises its logical 
structure. Wittgenstein discusses the way in which ordinary language disguises 
logical structure by regarding ordinary statements as hypotheses. According to 
some readings, Wittgenstein uses the notion of hypothesis in the sense it is used in 
the sciences, namely, as a view to be confirmed or disconfirmed by way of 
experiment. The notion has also been taken to be used simply in the sense of 
prejudice. I have shown that hypothesis is rather a technical term in 
Wittgenstein’s writings. In his conversations recorded by Waismann, the 
qualification of ordinary statements as hypotheses involves regarding them as 
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three-dimensional grammatical structures. As such, ordinary statements have 
different facets, like a three dimensional object. Each of these facets corresponds 
to a way in which one and the same ordinary statement can be meant or taken. 
On the other hand, this three-dimensional model is applied to ordinary 
objects as well. Wittgenstein conceives of ordinary objects as multi-facetted 
phenomena. Among the facets of a chair as phenomenon are, for instance, its 
shape, colour, hardness. The unity of the facets is provided by a hypothesis about 
the chair, such as “There is a chair here”. The clarification of the workings of 
ordinary statements thus calls for a means to establish the way in which a 
multifaceted hypothesis is connected to a multifaceted phenomenon on a 
particular occasion. 
  This means is given by phenomenological language. The construction of 
phenomenological language involves an isolation, both on the side of language 
and on the side of phenomena. A phenomenological statement amounts to one 
facet of a hypothesis isolated from the other facets. Such a statement is meant to 
be verifiable by correlation to one facet of the phenomenon, the facet intended by 
the initial proposition to be clarified. The initial proposition “There is a chair 
here” may draw attention to the red chair in a room. By doing so, the proposition 
may respond to the request of giving an inventory of red items in the room. The 
analysis of the proposition then involves the isolation of one facet of it, namely, a 
phenomenological statement such as “This patch is red”. This statement would be 
correlated to an isolated facet of the chair insofar as its experience involves the 
perception of a patch of red colour.  
 By contrast to ordinary language, phenomenological language accounts for 
the content of immediate experience within particular sensory fields. The 
hypothetical character of ordinary language is also due to its not distinguishing 
between such fields. One and the same ordinary statement “There is a chair here” 
can be used to account for the presence of a hard item or for the presence of an 
item of a certain colour. According to its different senses, the proposition is 
analyzed into different phenomenological statements, for instance, “This item is 
hard” or “This patch is red”. These statements are correlated to relevant contents 
of immediate experience provided in different sensory fields.  
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 My reconstruction of this notion of isolation in Wittgenstein’s writings 
provides resources for the further inquiry into the question of his endorsement of 
an idea of reduction akin to that of classical phenomenological reduction. Some 
commentators have discussed whether Wittgenstein’s conception of 
phenomenology involves a method of reduction akin to that of Husserl.207 This 
discussion can be readdressed by future research in light of the account I provided 
of the relation between phenomenological and ordinary language in middle 
Wittgenstein’s work.  
 
Wittgenstein’s commitment to phenomenology 
Wittgenstein has been taken to fully endorse a conception of phenomenology for 
a definite period of time and suddenly abandon it.208 By considering the initial 
context of his remarks pertaining to phenomenology in the Nachlass, I have tried 
to formulate a more nuanced view on the fate of phenomenology in 
Wittgenstein’s development. On this view, Wittgenstein develops his conception 
of phenomenology in different directions. Yet at the same time he comes to 
question the viability of various notions involved thereby, sometimes in the very 
context in which they are introduced.      
 In this respect I have discussed Wittgenstein’s questioning at one point the 
general distinction between a primary and a secondary language. His rejection of 
the distinction involves the rejection of the privilege granted to one single mode 
of description, which would convey, as he puts it, what we really know when 
using ordinary propositions. This real knowledge would be confined to what we 
actually perceive in immediate experience, by contrast to a knowledge of physical 
objects conveyed by ordinary language. 
 One motive for the rejection of a primary, phenomenological language is 
the ultimately acknowledged difficulty of achieving a verification in the analysis 
of kinds of propositions not previously considered. Propositions of such a kind are 
those about the past. One may try to analyze such propositions into 
phenomenological statements. But these statements do not have as a correlate an 
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immediate experience by comparison with which they can be verified. A further 
set of propositions that pose a difficulty for the attempt at clarifying them through 
phenomenological language are orders and instructions. To understand an order 
or an instruction is thus to understand what one is supposed to do in a given 
situation. It is to get how one is expected to act upon the situation. This aspect of 
propositions expressing orders or instructions distinguishes them from simple 
reports of the content of experience. Their sense is thus not fully captured by an 
analysis into phenomenological statements verifiable by comparison to immediate 
experience.  
 Another strand of the critique of phenomenological language concerns its 
status as an immediate description of immediate experience. The requirement of 
this language to be a direct description confined to immediate experience is the 
requirement of its being a hypothesis-free medium of expression. Ordinary 
language statements have a hypothetical character also in virtue of their being 
recollecting past experiences. And further in virtue of their anticipating aspects of 
situations not yet experienced. The distinction between phenomenological 
language and ordinary language goes hand in hand with a distinction 
Wittgenstein makes between the flowing present of immediate experience and 
the physical time of ordinary experience. The notion of flowing present, or 
memory time, is taken to be categorically different from the ordinary notion of 
time involving references to past, present, and future. 
 The use of ordinary propositions, as written or spoken propositions, is 
unfolded in physical time. On the other hand, in order that a phenomenological 
language be usable, it should be expressed by written or spoken signs as well. But 
this requirement of the usability of phenomenological language ultimately 
infringes upon its envisaged character as hypothesis-free description. One could 
try to establish the hypothesis-free status of the description at the moment of its 
production, by correlation to immediate experience. But then each time the 
description were read again, it would remain doubtful whether it is still free of 
hypotheses or not. Conversely, insisting that phenomenological language is a 
hypothesis-free description in virtue of its not being, like ordinary statements, 
unfolded in physical time, ultimately casts doubt on its very intelligibility. A 
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description aiming at being more immediate than one employing written or 
spoken signs would cease to be a genuine description altogether. 
Phenomenological language would thus end up being, as Wittgenstein puts it, an 
inarticulate sound. 
A further line of critical inquiry into the idea of phenomenological 
language is informed by Wittgenstein’s remarks on the notion of flowing present 
qualifying immediate experience. The attempt to outline immediate experience as 
the field of description for phenomenological language assumed the categorical 
distinction between the notion of flowing present and that of physical time. 
Wittgenstein comes to dismiss this distinction insofar as in the end it renders 
unfulfillable the very delimitation of the flowing present. The delimitation does 
not involve merely an empirical difficulty but a conceptual fallacy. It is an attempt 
to use the notion of the present in an absolute sense, lacking the ordinary 
opposites of past and future. The gist of Wittgenstein’s questioning the 
intelligibility of this absolute use of the notion of the present is the rhetorical 
question “Present as opposed to what?”. Then the reliance on this notion in order 
to outline the field of immediate experience turns out to be unsuccessful. The 
requirement that phenomenological language be confined to immediate 
experience was tied to the assumption that only the present immediate experience 
is real. Namely, that the persistence of ordinary experience is nurtured by sense 
data occurring in a flux of immediate experience. But the absolute use of the 
notion of the present in the phrase “only the present experience has reality” does 
not achieve its intended aim at delimiting immediate experience from something 
else. Wittgenstein ultimately regards the occurrence of this notion of the present 
as superfluous, or a wheel turning idly in the phrase.  
I have finally addressed the question of the internal consistency of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of phenomenology in light of an application of the idea 
of phenomenological language. The application is to the case of the clarification of 
the discourse about pain. In this respect, the idea of phenomenological language 
informs a uniform account of pain expressions. According to this account, the 
clarification of all discourse about pain involves its reduction to pain expressions 
used in the first person. Such pain expressions are taken to be correlated with an 
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immediate experience of pain, or to what Wittgenstein calls mental states of pain. 
On this view, my understanding expressions about the other’s pain requires my 
access to the other’s experience of pain, or the other’s pain sensations.  
Wittgenstein’s continuing remarks on the understanding and use of pain 
expressions ultimately question this uniform account. His focus on the ways we 
provide comfort to the others in pain renders superfluous and ultimately 
unfulfillable the methodological requirement of verification. In providing comfort 
to the others in pain we understand expressions about their pain and act upon 
them without being concerned with their actual pain sensations. Wittgenstein 
comes to regard a first person experience of the other’s pain sensations as logically 
impossible. Thus an extension of the field of experience of the first person over 
that of the second/third person in order to carry out a verification of the 
expression about the other’s pain is in its turn logically impossible.  
Wittgenstein’s approach to the workings of pain expressions in the middle 
period turns out to be constantly revised, just as his conception of 
phenomenological language. While the uniform account of pain expressions is 
informed by his positive remarks on phenomenological language, critical remarks 
of the uniform account are connected, as shown, to the methodological critique of 
this language. 
From 1929 onwards Wittgenstein develops a longstanding interest in 
problems such as the perception and the expression of pain. He often returns to 
this issue not only in the period when he envisages a phenomenological method. 
The problem of pain will be a central concern of his later philosophy, when 
dealing also with broader issues in the philosophy of language or philosophy of 
psychology.  
 In a remark occurring much later in his Nachlass, namely in 1950, 
Wittgenstein reflects on the relation between a method of philosophy and the 
problems it addresses:  
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There is no phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological 
problems.209 
 
This is an enlightening retrospective remark on the outcome of the critique of 
phenomenological language. Wittgenstein comes to ultimately reject the idea of 
phenomenology, insofar as it involves a privileged method of philosophy. While 
he conceived of phenomenological language as involving such a method, he 
finally realized that it was not a viable one. His critique of phenomenological 
language is followed by later critiques of the attempt to privilege any other single 
philosophical method, be it phenomenological or not. While ultimately 
abandoning phenomenological language and dismissing phenomenology in this 
sense, Wittgenstein would also be reluctant to endorse conceptions of 
phenomenology as a strong science, of Husserlian inspiration. 
At the end of his career, however, we see Wittgenstein admitting that 
there are phenomenological problems. The issues addressed in the period when he 
envisages a phenomenological language remain for him genuine problems. By this 
point he has in mind also the problems addressed by other philosophers who 
invoked a phenomenological approach to them. Proto-phenomenologists such as 
Goethe and psychologists in the phenomenological tradition such as Koehler are 
often referred to in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Wittgenstein will engage at 
length with the problems addressed by figures like Goethe and Koehler. While 
doing so, however, Wittgenstein will be reluctant to endorse the idea that one 
single philosophical method can solve every philosophical problem. He will rather 
call for methodological flexibility and the need to devise diverse and suitable 
approaches in light of the specific philosophical problems encountered.  
  
                                                     
209 Ms 176: p. 13r [Pichler (1994): 1950] / Remarks on Colour: § 248. 
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